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Abstract 
In the past decade, environmental degradation has become a leading social concern 
in Chinese society. Due to the difficulties and complexities involved in solving 
environmental issues, the Chinese government gives its citizens more leeway to 
participate in environmental issues than in other areas of public affairs (albeit within 
a context of strict internet censorship and restricted protest rights). Within this 
limited space, the use of social media and mobile technologies has seen networked 
civic engagement with environmental issues increase. Many studies have examined 
the relationships between social media and civic engagement with China’s 
environmental issues, focusing upon the opportunities brought by information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and constraints faced by Chinese environmental 
non-government organizations (ENGOs) and citizens. However, although visual 
images have become the central component of social media, few studies have 
specifically examined the impact of visual social media on China’s civic engagement. 
This thesis investigates the role of visual social media in providing Chinese people 
with an alternative space to articulate their opinions on environmental issues. By 
studying three notable environmental cases that recently occurred in different 
Chinese cities, this thesis explores how Chinese citizens adopt visual social media 
practices as a response to environmental issues, and to aid in the fight for 
environmental justice. In this study, data were collected through in-depth semi-
structured interviews with 32 interviewees, from interviewees’ social media posts, 
and through personally archived visual images, to explore what forms of visual 
images were produced and circulated on social media, how Chinese citizens express 
their opinions through the forms of visual social media practice, and what impact 
visual social media-facilitated civic engagement has on Chinese society. 
Based on the case studies, this study suggests that visual social media practices are 
prominent for citizen journalism, culture jamming, and other image-centric events. 
Compared with other studies that emphasize the advantage of visual images in 
circumventing internet censorship, this thesis pays more attention to how ordinary 
Chinese creatively incorporate various affect and emotions into everyday visual 
images to enhance the reach of their voices on social media. This thesis argues that 
affect and emotions are a kind of capital, which is conducive to accelerating 
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information dissemination. The alternative space enabled by visual social media for 
civic engagement is contingent, ephemeral and less likely to achieve any genuine 
political or social changes to Chinese society. However, because Chinese individuals 
have been informed and empowered by visual social media, they are able to discuss 
and comment on public affairs, and even negotiate with the government. It is no 
exaggeration to say that online environmental participation simply could not happen 
without the use of visual social media. Through the discussion, this thesis provides a 
new perspective to understand China’s visual social media practices and its 
networked civic engagement. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
Due to its single-minded pursuit of economic development, China has been 
confronted with serious environmental deterioration in its modernization process. In 
the past decades, environmental degradation has become a leading social concern 
and caused social unrest in Chinese society. The number of large-scale protests 
associated with environmental issues has increased rapidly by an average rate of 29% 
every year since 1996 (Ru, Lu, & Li, 2010), and it rose by 120% in 2011 (Liu, 2013). 
For instance, a series of large-scale anti-paraxylene (PX) protests occurred in 
multiple Chinese cities from 2007 to 2014 (Liu, 2016). Almost all of these protests 
appeared to be successful in pushing the local governments to halt projects that might 
cause pollution. Since the increasing amount of environmental unrest challenges the 
legitimacy of its governance, in recent years the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
has been continually strengthening its control over protest information and social 
organizations online to prevent collective actions.  
With the prevalence in China, social media and mobile technologies have opened a 
new arena of expression, participation, and organization for ordinary people. On 
China’s social media, environmental discussion has become an integral part of 
everyday online communication as the issues continue to deteriorate. In Chinese 
society, public participation in the environmental sector is more common than in 
other social and political issues. This is because the complexity and difficulty of 
problem solving has led the Chinese government to leave a limited space for 
environmental actions. In certain circumstances, the Chinese government is capable 
of engaging and negotiating with other stakeholders to solve environmental issues in 
different levels rather than enacting stringent control (Wang, 2015). However, this 
does not mean that Chinese citizens are able to freely speak their opinions about the 
issues. In reality, due to stringent internet censorship, they still have to struggle with 
bypassing the censorship and enhancing the visibility of their everyday opinions.  
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With the advent of visual turn in today’s social environment, visual practice has 
become a repertoire of social media in facilitating, mobilizing, and organizing civic 
engagement around the world (Prøitz, 2018). According to Highfield and Leaver 
(2016), with the convergence of mobile phone and camera applications (apps), 
everyday visual social media practice takes on various forms including selfies, 
memes, emojis, culture jamming, videos, GIFs (Graphic Interchange Format), and 
photographic tropes from social events, and so on. In the context of China, visual 
images instead of texts have been considered an effective way to circumvent internet 
censorship (Sullivan, 2014). The prominent examples such as ‘grass mud horse’ and 
‘Free CGC’1 have proved the role of visual social media practices in presenting 
powerful statements of collective dissent in an authoritarian regime (Yang & Jiang, 
2015). In the recent environmental cases that have occurred in China, visual images 
appear to have more potential than texts to mobilize collective actions and draw 
public attention. More importantly, compared with text, visual image provides 
grassroots and marginalized groups with a relatively low threshold to articulate their 
opinions.  
 
Without a doubt, visual content on social media is an alternative site of struggle for 
Chinese citizens. According to John Hartley (1992), beyond circumventing 
censorship, visual images ‘are the place where collective social action, individual 
identity and symbolic imagination meet – the nexus between culture and politics’ 
(p.3). John Hartley (1992) has argued that the importance of visual images is how 
people create rather than represent reality. At the time of the study, a series of 
notable environmental events occurred in multiple Chinese cities. Through 
observation it has been found that numerous visual images were recorded by mobile 
phones and circulated on social media in the aftermath of the events. In this sense, it 
is important to understand what the contents of these visual images are and how 
Chinese citizens create visual content on social media to engage in environmental 
issues.  
 
 
1 CGC refers to the blind lawyer and human rights activist Chen Guangcheng. After he was arrested, 
his supporters made internet memes featuring a graphic of Chen’s face with his sunglasses that alter 
the KFC logo to say ‘Free CGC’ (Moore, 2012). 
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However, although the phenomenon of visual content bringing new possibilities to 
the networked civic engagement in contemporary China has received sufficient 
academic attention (Jiang, 2009; Mina, 2014; Svensson, 2016; Szablewicz, 2014; J. 
Xu, 2016; G. Yang & Jiang, 2015), only a few studies have investigated the 
relationship between visual social media practice and civic engagement from the 
perspective of China’s environmental issues (K. Deluca, Brunner, & Sun, 2016; 
Kevin M DeLuca, Sun, & Peeples, 2011). As one of the most active civic sectors in 
Chinese society (P. Ho & Edmonds, 2007a), the perspective of environmental 
engagement provides us with an opportunity to comprehensively understand the 
impact of new technologies on China’s civic engagement. Therefore, this thesis aims 
to enrich the growing academic discussion surrounding the relationship between 
visual social media practices and networked civic engagement. 
1.2 Civic engagement in China 
Social media and mobile technologies have created more horizontal and participatory 
forms of civic engagement around the world. With significant economic freedom but 
stringent political control, civic engagement enabled by new ICTs is more vivid and 
multifaceted in Chinese society. A large number of studies have illustrated how 
creatively Chinese people use a variety of approaches to express their concerns on 
public affairs through social media. However, this creativity also exactly reflects the 
dilemma that Chinese citizens are excluded from the traditional political system and 
have insufficient channels to participate in public affairs. Although new ICTs 
provides Chinese citizens with new opportunities for civic engagement, they often 
have to struggle with pervasive surveillance and censorship (Chen and Reese, 2015).  
Existing literature has offered different understandings and definitions of civic 
engagement, which are related to both collective and individual actions regarding 
issues of public concerns (Levinson, 2010; Sloam 2014; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 
2005). In Western society, civic engagement involves a range of activities, such as 
“individual voluntarism, organizational involvement, and electoral participation” 
(Cheng, Y., Liang, J., & Leung, L, 2015). However, different from established 
democratic societies, the level of civic engagement in Chinese society is lower 
because of the strict political and social control (Wang, 2008). Current studies in 
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China’s civic engagement have emphasized that social media and other new 
technologies empower Chinese citizens for public participation. For instance, Marina 
Svensson (2016) has argued that new ICTs, especially social media, provide Chinese 
citizens with opportunities to express discontent and challenge communicative power 
dominated by mainstream media. Meanwhile, many scholars (Bennett, 2012; Huang 
& Sun, 2014; Klinger & Svensson, 2014; Svensson, 2016) have also pointed out that 
networked civic engagement is issue-based and personalized. 
 
Since visual images have increasingly played a critical role in online communication, 
this thesis focuses on Weibo and WeChat to explore the significance of visual images 
in facilitating a networked form of civic engagement with environmental issues in 
the context of China. The uniqueness of Chinese society leads to more diverse forms 
of networked civic engagement. From the aspects of environmental participation and 
visual images, I seek to investigate the opportunities and constraints of civic 
engagement enabled by Chinese visual social media, in order to offer a better 
understanding of how ordinary Chinese enjoy more freedom within a new alternative 
space facilitated by visual images on social media.   
 
1.3 Research questions 
The thesis situates everyday visual social media practices within the realm of China’s 
civic engagement to investigate how Chinese individuals respond to environmental 
issues by adopting everyday visual social media practices. In this regard, the thesis 
seeks to investigate the relationship between visual social media practices and civic 
engagement in the context of China, explores the new image-dominated modes of 
networked environmental engagement, and examines the impact of visual social 
media practices on everyday opinions and discussions of environmental issues in 
China. Therefore, the primary research question is as follows: 
 
How do visual social media practices influence everyday opinions and discussions of 
environmental issues in China? 
 
In order to address the primary research question, I propose the following subsidiary 
research questions: 
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⑴ What forms of visual social media practices have recently been developed by 
Chinese individuals to respond to environmental issues? 
⑵ How do Chinese individuals produce and create visual materials using mobile 
technologies and other such new technologies? 
⑶ How do Chinese individuals enhance the visibility of their everyday opinions on 
social media by creating and circulating visual images? 
⑷ What is the impact of the new modes of everyday visual social media practice on 
China’s environmental engagement? 
 
1.4 Research design  
The research is grounded in three notable cases that recently occurred in multiple 
Chinese cities. Each case study responds to the research questions by presenting a 
specific subject concerning how local residents adopt and develop different modes of 
visual social media practice to engage in different environmental issues. In the first 
case study, I explore how citizen journalism performed as a form of storytelling to 
intervene in official discourse in the aftermath of a disaster event. In the second, I 
examine how culture jamming has been pervasively adopted to mock and criticize 
the government’s unfulfilled responsibility in solving the air pollution crisis in 
Beijing. In the third case study, I analyse how grassroots environmental volunteers 
have created image events in an effort to monitor and improve the local water 
pollution situation in Hunan. Together, these three case studies follow a general 
trajectory of analysis of visual social media practices in environmental engagement 
but provide the reader with different perspectives to review.  
 
1.4.1 Methods 
The research predominantly relies upon qualitative and ethnographic data collection 
processes. Since this thesis seeks to understand how ordinary Chinese have 
responded to environmental issues via visual social media practices and 
conceptualized their experiences, and to examine the relationship between social 
media and individuals’ everyday articulation, I draw upon case studies as a method 
to ensure that the research questions are well explored. In accordance with Yin 
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(2009), this method allows us to ‘understand a real-life phenomenon in depth, [and] 
such understanding encompasses important contextual conditions’ (p. 18). In this 
research, the real-life phenomenon is visual social media practices.  
The ‘case’ refers to ‘a broad variety of topics, including small groups, communities, 
decisions, programs, organizational change, and specific events’ (Yin, 2014, p. 31). 
The unique strength of a case study is its ability to ‘recognize the importance of the 
subjective human creation of meaning, but doesn’t reject outright some notion of 
objectivity’ (Crabtree & Miller, 1999, p. 10). Moreover, it also provides participants 
with an opportunity to describe their views of the real world, which helps us to gain a 
better understanding of their actions (Lather, 1992; Robottom & Hart, 1993). In this 
sense, multiple-case studies are particularly appropriate to this research because 
visual social media practice is a subjective experience and can only be understood by 
the investigation of individuals’ engagement.  
Given the political sensitivity of the topics, I draw on a series of in-depth interviews 
conducted during the fieldwork trips to investigate the cases and collect data. The 
fieldwork trips provided me with an opportunity to access central figures of the cases, 
observe participants’ daily practices on the ground, and communicate with them 
face-to-face. Conducting in-depth interviews enabled me to find out ‘how people 
have organized the world and the meaning attached to what goes on in the world’ 
(Patton, 2002, p. 341). All participants were selected by two criteria: they were 
involved with the environmental issues and they had posted visual images to respond 
to the environmental cases of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, smog in Beijing, and 
River Watchers in Hunan via social media. In this project, I conducted 10 in-depth 
interviews for each case.  
 
The in-depth interviews were semi-structured, following a prepared list of 
predetermined questions I planned to discuss with interviewees. According to M. Q. 
Patton (2002), the semi-structured interview ‘provides topics or subject areas within 
which the interviewer is free to explore, probe, and ask questions that will elucidate 
and illuminate the particular subject [of enquiry]’ (p. 343). To enrich the data 
collection, I handwrote field notes in a notebook to document my thoughts on 
interviews, important clues provided by participants, contact information of 
7 
participants, inspiring points of interviews, and other information involved with the 
research. 
At the same time, a series of ethnographic methods were undertaken to mould the 
data collection. By exchanging social media accounts with participants, I adopted an 
online participant observation approach to observe how the participants distribute 
visual images on social media, especially on WeChat. For the case of River Watchers, 
online participant observation helped me to distinguish the difference between 
content distribution on Weibo and WeChat, which is considered as an online 
communication strategy by the participants. Moreover, I also adopted the approach 
of photograph elicitation to evoke deeper ‘information, feelings, and memories’ by 
inserting visual images into interviews (Harper, 2002, p. 13). This approach is able to 
connect memory to interviewees who could describe more details and provide 
information in relation to the past environmental events. To underpin the evidence, 
this research also analyses a variety of administrative documents, news articles, and 
blogs. 
1.4.2 Interviewees 
After obtaining human research ethics clearance in 2016, I began to invite people 
involved with the three cases to participate in the research project. Because the topic 
of the 2015 Tianjin explosions was still politically sensitive in China at the time of 
study, openly recruiting interviewees for the case was difficult. Instead, exploiting 
personal social networks and snowball sampling were the most effective methods to 
gain support and trust from interviewees. Almost all interviewees in the case of the 
2015 Tianjin explosions were provided by the journalists who reported the disaster 
and were contacts of mine. The interviews were conducted over a year after the 
explosions. Due to the difficulty of recruitment, six interviews were conducted 
during the field trip in Tianjin, and four other interviews were conducted by 
telephone when I was based in Perth, Australia. 
Since the topic of Beijing smog is less politically sensitive in China, I openly 
recruited some interviewees via Weibo and WeChat. In accordance with both 
domestic and international media reports, I targeted two potential interviewees who 
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created prominent visual materials on Weibo during the period of smog in Beijing. I 
sent the interview invitations to them and received their acceptance via Weibo 
messages. At the same time, I contacted one of the most influential Chinese 
Environmental Non-governmental Organization (ENGOs), the Institute of Public and 
Environmental Affairs (IPE),2 and attempted to recruit interviewees via their social 
network. This is because IPE has organized and mobilized the activity of air quality 
self-testing on Weibo for years. After being invited to join their WeChat group of 
volunteers, I posted a brief self-introduction and the advertisement of recruitment. I 
recruited the rest of the interviewees using my social network in Beijing and 
encouraged interviewees to invite their friends and acquaintances to participate in the 
research. 
 
For the third case study I completed the recruitment with the help of Mr Liu Ke, who 
was the former organizer of the programme of River Watchers. Mr Liu helped me 
established a WeChat group and invited 11 potential interviewees to join. I began the 
recruitment in the group and conducted preliminary interviews with them to select 
more ideal interviewees. I recruited the rest of the interviewees for this case using a 
snowball approach. During the process of transcribing interview texts, I found a 
prominent research clue and conducted two more interviewees via online telephone 
calls when I was in Perth, Australia.  
 
With the help of my contacts and interviewees, I finally completed 32 in-depth 
interviews with local residents, journalists, photographers, ENGO staff, and 
environmental volunteers, who are key figures in environmental events. Each 
interview lasted between 30 minutes and an hour. To protect the identities of those 
concerned, some names and identifying information are either anonymized or altered 
via pseudonyms. Meanwhile, watermarks of social media accounts and other 
personal information on the visual materials have been blurred by manipulation 
software. The interviewees chose the pseudonyms assigned to them. Throughout the 
thesis, the interviewees who were concerned are de-identified as much as possible to 
avoid the potential risks of participating in the research. 
 
 
2 The IPE is a Beijing-based non-profit environmental research organisation that has been collecting, 
analysing, and publishing data on pollution in China since it was founded in 2004.   
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1.4.3 Data collection 
The research consists of two data sources: three case studies of notable 
environmental events in China focusing upon the content of visual social media 
practices regarding environmental issues, and second-hand data provided by media 
reports and official released documents that supply important background 
information and research cues. In the research, I conducted two fieldwork trips. At 
the time of study, online debates about the Tianjin explosions had faded and part of 
the visual data was gone due to government censorship; more importantly, the topic 
was extremely politically sensitive. In order to dig out more ‘hidden data’ that is 
difficult to access via public online sources, I conducted a fieldwork trip to Tianjin in 
September 2016. To observe and engage in the whole process of River Watchers 
documenting river pollution and circulating the visual materials on social media, I 
conducted the second fieldwork trip in multiple cities of Hunan in December 2018. 
Since Beijing smog is a long-term environmental issue and most of the interviewees 
were openly recruited online, I utilized telephone calls and emails to conduct the 
interviews. These mediated interviewing methods were particularly useful because 
they not only allowed me to maintain contact with interviewees after I left the field 
sites, but they also enabled me to conduct follow-up interviews with interviewees 
during the thesis writing process. 
 
During the interviews, all interviewees were first asked to provide their demographic 
details including age, gender, and occupation. They were then encouraged to freely 
discuss their daily experiences with a particular focus upon their attitudes to 
environmental governance, motivations for visual social media practices, and 
recognition of the impact of visual social media content on environmental issues. 
Through the interviews, the semi-structured questions left room for me to raise 
responsive questions to gather more information. The interviews were voice-
recorded using my mobile phone and transcribed as soon as possible after the 
completion of the interview. 
 
During the process of data analysing, I invited interviewees to do follow-up 
interviews, which helped me confirm the unclear pronunciations in the recordings 
and the accuracy of the analysis I had conducted so far. Through follow-up questions, 
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I also sought further details of the interesting clues mentioned in the previous 
interviews. Slightly different from the previous interviews, apart from email, the 
follow-up questions were mainly exchanged by various mobile phone-mediated 
methods such as voices messages and instant messages on WeChat. Since the 
interviews were conducted in Chinese, all interview content was translated into 
English after transcription and checked for accuracy by a reliable translator. 
 
The interviewees provided almost all the visual data presented in the thesis. During 
the fieldwork trips and interviews, I exchanged my personal WeChat and Weibo 
accounts with interviewees and thus obtained permissions to save the posts and 
images from their social media accounts. Apart from culture jamming presented in 
Chapter 4, it is difficult to trace the original authors; the rest of the visual data 
presented in the thesis have been authorized by the owners. Most examples of culture 
jamming were downloaded from interviewees’ social media accounts except for 
‘Feed smog to the People’ (see Figure 4.8). This culture jamming was prevalent on 
China’s social media during the period of smog in Beijing, therefore, I downloaded it 
from an open online source and used it as photo elicitation to obtain more 
information from interviewees. 
 
1.5 Significance of the research 
Since visual content has become the central component of social media, this research 
is timely and significant for studies of China’s networked civic engagement. 
Although scholars have increasingly noticed the importance of visual social media 
practices in cultural, social, and political dimensions, the comprehensive study of 
visual social media practices and civic engagement within China’s environmental 
communication is still at an early stage. Given the visual turn in online 
communication, this research is able to scrutinize the role of visual social media and 
mobile technologies in opening up new windows of opportunity for individuals’ 
articulation and public discussion in China, where censorship is stringent and protest 
rights are limited. Under the theoretical framework of civic engagement, this 
research is an opportunity to contribute further empirical evidence through case 
study-led research to understand how Chinese citizens deploy visual social media 
practices to create an alternative space of civic engagement.  
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Secondly, the research seeks to provide an insight into China’s networked civic 
engagement by revealing the specific forms of visual social media practice. Different 
forms of visual social media practice elicit different affect and emotions and lead to 
different reactions among audiences. In this sense, this research sheds light on the 
process of how ‘solidarity, suffering, and witnessing are visualized, represented, 
understood, shared and acted upon’ (Svensson, 2016, p. 65) in the forms of citizen 
journalism, culture jamming, and image events. In analysing the forms, this research 
is an opportunity to explore the potential of visual social media practices in China’s 
networked civic engagement. Based on the analysis, this research also illustrates 
dynamics, motivations, and mechanisms of China’s networked environmental 
engagement. 
Finally, by utilizing affect studies and theory, this research aims to integrate affect 
into visual social media practices, which could help to explain how networked 
approaches incorporate affect in social movement (Brunner, 2017), particularly in the 
context of China. Based on interviews and collected visual data, this research 
illustrates how ordinary Chinese produce and create affective appeals in a variety of 
visual social media practices to engage in environmental issues and examines the 
role of affect in causing public resonance and driving collective actions on social 
media. In doing so, the research does not merely reveal the emerging trends of 
China’s civic engagement in environmental issues but also sheds light on the 
importance of affect in transforming ordinary people’s everyday experiences into 
shared public appeal on social media. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
This thesis is structured around the study of three notable environmental cases that 
recently occurred in multiple cities in China. This structure is intended to provide the 
reader with multiple perspectives to understand the new phenomena and modes of 
networked civic engagement in the context of China. The thesis begins with a 
comprehensive literature review to introduce the theoretical framework and key 
terms. Following this, the reader is taken through the three case study chapters. The 
case studies focus on unfolding the newly emerged methods of visualized digital 
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engagement in environmental issues in China and demonstrate empirical examples of 
the research question within the framework of civic engagement. These chapters are 
followed by the final chapter, which provides a thorough, critical discussion of the 
research findings and returns to address the research question and objectives.  
 
After justifying the research questions that guide my analysis of the relationship 
between visual social media practices and environmental engagement in China, in 
Chapter 2 I present a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
that informs this thesis, introducing the key terms of China’s environmental 
governance, internet censorship, environmental engagement, and visual social media 
practices. To provide the reader with a thorough understanding of environmental 
engagement within Chinese society, the literature review chapter compares the 
differences and commonalities in environmental governance, online environment, 
and visual practices on social media between China and Western societies. Following 
this, the chapter reviews current research concerning prominent visual social media 
practices and presents a historical overview of the various understandings of online 
visual practices involved with civic engagement found in Chinese society. 
 
Following the literature review, Chapter 3 presents the analysis and findings of the 
case study of the 2015 Tianjin explosions from the perspective of citizen journalism. 
Although citizen journalism is not a new form of networked civic engagement that 
ordinary Chinese adopted to respond to environmental issues, it has not been studied 
much as storytelling in the aftermath of a catastrophic environmental event. This 
chapter highlights three visual flows that emerged on WeChat after the disaster, 
analyses the major patterns of the stories told by local residents with eyewitness 
images, and illustrates the motivations and process of updating various stories 
regarding the explosions on a relatively small and closed social media platform. In 
this chapter, I demonstrate that citizen journalism performed as storytelling is an 
affective form of communication. The collected WeChat posts show that the 
participants embedded sadness and sympathy in their stories to shape a strong sense 
of community and facilitated civic engagement at the neighbourhood level in a time 
of disaster. Based on the findings, I argue that citizen journalism as storytelling 
contributes to the visibility of citizens’ voice and provides an alternative form of 
public participation in a highly politically sensitive topic in China. 
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Chapter 4 studies the visual social media practices in the case of Beijing smog. The 
interviewees presented several visual measures to comment on air pollution, but 
particular attention is given to the culture jamming. Among the environmental cases 
that have occurred in China in the past decade, it is rare to see that culture jamming 
has been so prominently adopted by Chinese citizens to mock the government’s 
unfulfilled responsibility to improve the air quality. By appropriating and sabotaging 
existing popular cultural and political materials, Chinese social media users have 
creatively exploited humour and irony to criticize their undesirable environment. 
Chapter 4 examines a range of culture jamming provided by interviewees, who either 
posted on social media or saw these images from others’ posts. To help the reader 
understand the presented culture jamming, this chapter provides the historical, 
cultural, and political contexts of the original visual materials before further analysis. 
By examining the culture jamming, the findings highlight that humour is the key 
affect eliciting public resonance and accelerating the dissemination. In addition, the 
analysis of in-depth interviews reveals the motivations for circulating the culture 
jamming in this case. As a result, I argue that Chinese citizens use culture jamming 
as an ironic criticism to articulate their disappointment and discontent with a long-
lasting environmental issue despite the fact that culture jamming has also commonly 
served to smooth personal relationships on social media.  
 
Chapter 5 studies the case of the image-oriented environmental advocacy campaign 
initiated by the Hunan-based grassroots ENGO Green Hunan since April 2011. In the 
campaign, Green Hunan calls on concerned local residents to join as volunteers and 
encourages them to regularly monitor and test water conditions in local rivers, 
especially where chemical plants are located. By using smartphones, volunteers 
document water conditions and test results, then post the images on Weibo via their 
personal accounts. This group of environmental volunteers is called River Watchers. 
Although this is not the first time that do-it-yourself activism has been adopted in 
environmental campaigns in China, this case presents some interesting and unique 
characteristics. By conducting fieldwork and in-depth interviews in multiple cities in 
Hunan Province, I found that the ENGO designed a practice schedule to prevent 
volunteers’ aggressive expressions and critiques to the government, and some 
volunteers gradually established informal channels with local authorities and officers 
to solve issues. These situations demonstrate what Peter P. Ho (2007b) has noted: the 
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nature of China’s environmentalism is depoliticized, and the characteristic of 
embeddedness means that Chinese ENGOs and environmental activists are partners 
with rather than adversaries of the government.  
 
After a short period of success, however, the campaign became trapped in a 
communication dilemma when facing a content flood on social media; 
simultaneously, informal contact channels cannot always guarantee solutions to the 
problems. To overcome these hurdles, some River Watchers fully played creativities 
in their everyday visual practices. The wedding photographs next to a polluted river 
is the most prominent example that has not merely gone viral on Weibo but has also 
drawn significant attention from mainstream media. To understand how the group of 
environmental volunteers present local water pollution problems in the photographs, 
I adopt the approach of visual rhetoric to analyse the collected visual data. By 
utilizing the concept of image event (DeLuca, 2012), I illustrate how the group of 
environmental volunteers facilitated civic engagement on Weibo. In this chapter, I 
found that River Watchers attempt to create shock effect to amplify the severity of 
the water pollution issues. The created everyday images provoke despair, anger, and 
sympathy to attract more public attention. Meanwhile, I argue that this group of 
grassroots environmental activists is attempting to enhance the visibility of their 
appeals by framing their reality. According to the findings, what distinguishes this 
mode of environmental engagement is how environmental activists have used images 
to re-politicize the advocacy campaign. 
 
The final chapter pulls together the key findings of the case studies in an effort to 
address the research questions. I highlight that visual content on social media has 
opened up an alternative space for civic engagement in China. The conclusion begins 
with a summary of the main findings and the restatement of key arguments from 
three case studies. By discussing the dynamics, motivations, and modes of visual 
social media practices, it illustrates how the research lays the groundwork for such 
analysis. The conclusion then provides a critical reflection to demonstrate the unique 
combination of affect and visual social media practices in mobilizing and connecting 
distant people to engage in environmental issues. The discussion modestly comments 
on the role of visual social media-facilitated civic engagement in enhancing the 
visibility of ordinary people’s everyday opinions. Finally, I raises several questions 
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in the chapter to call for more academic attention to future visual social media 
research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction  
In the past decades, environmental degradation has become one of the most serious 
social concerns in Chinese society as the economy continues to grow. Existing 
studies have demonstrated that the emergence and boom of environmental activism 
in China is accompanied by the rapid development of the internet (Grano & Zhang, 
2016; Sullivan & Xie, 2009; G.Yang, 2005). In recent years, the Chinese government 
has paid more attention to mitigating the country’s serious environmental 
degradation but has also increasingly implemented more stringent control over both 
online and offline collective actions. Facing this situation, environmental non-
government organizations (ENGOs) and environmental activists have not ceased 
their efforts but creatively articulated their opinions in various visual images by 
using mobile phones and social media.  
Before further exploring research on the newly emerged phenomena of networked 
environmental activism in China, this chapter provides a detailed review of related 
academic research backgrounds to explore the relationship between networked 
environmental activism and everyday visual social media practices. Reviewing the 
academic literature within the field, the chapter first introduces environmental 
governance and the complex online environment in the context of China before 
moving on to an analysis of the ways social media empowers environmental activism. 
Everyday visual practices on social media are explored as a relatively effective 
method that assists ordinary Chinese in bypassing internet censorship and mobilizing 
collective actions, particularly with the power of playfulness. Following this, the 
chapter unfolds the importance of affect in activism and explores how visual content 
drives environmental activism by incorporating affect and emotions on social media. 
2.2 China’s environmental governance 
After experiencing a large wave of environmental protests against major economic 
development projects since the mid-2000s (Grano, 2015; Steinhardt & Wu, 2016), 
the Chinese government has changed its attitude on environmental governance. 
According to the news report from Chinadialogue, the number of environmental 
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protests has increased by an average of 29% every year since 1996, and the number 
of major environmental incidents even rose by 120% in 2011 (Liu, 2013). Concerned 
by the growing number of environmental protests, the Chinese government has felt 
compelled to relax its strict political control and tolerate a certain degree of public 
participation in environmental issues. 
In recent years, the Chinese government has become more receptive towards 
environmental issues (Grano & Zhang, 2016). In April 2014, a joint official report3 
openly acknowledged that severe environmental degradations are currently affecting 
the country. Moreover, environmental issues have been widely reported by the state-
run media and frequently mentioned in high-ranking government leaders’ speeches. 
For example, since 2103, to show its determination to improve the environment, Xi 
Jinping’s administration has given numerous speeches on environmental topics and 
committed to adopting a more transparent approach to environmental issues (Grano& 
Zhang, 2016). 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government has also been increasing its efforts to reform 
and develop a comprehensive legislative framework to halt environmental 
destruction. As noted by Grano and Zhang (2016), apart from the Environmental 
Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China（中华人民共和国环境保护法）, 
which was promulgated in 1979, nearly 30 environmental and natural resources-
related laws, more than 60 administrative regulations, and over 600 rules for local 
environmental management have been published for the purpose of preventing 
pollution and protecting the environment in China. To expand the institutional 
channels for public participation, in December 2014 the government approved more 
than 700 NGOs to launch public interest litigation regarding violations of 
environmental law, and the government now imposes heavier punishments on 
polluters (French, 2015). 
In addition, the Chinese central government has also developed a series of 
decentralized systems of environmental governance, because it believes that the 
lower government level has many advantages in problem-solving (Ran, 2017). Grano 
and Zhang (2016) have stated that the emphasis on decentralization of environmental 
 
3 The joint report published by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Ministry of Land and 
Resources on nationwide soil pollution in China. 
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governance has been reflected by several published official documents. In addition, 
the central government has also set environmental targets as one of the top priorities 
to evaluate local cadre performance in order to push local governments and officials 
to fulfil their environmental governance responsibilities (Chen, 2009).  
However, the increasingly deteriorated environment and persistent public 
dissatisfaction suggest that the situation in China has not improved significantly. As 
a result, a number of scholars have questioned the efficiency of China’s 
environmental governance, although the central government has demonstrated its 
concrete willingness to combat pollution and has made a series of positive changes. 
Scholars have attributed the failure of China’s environmental governance to four 
reasons.  
First, the Chinese government is more willing to solve the environmental problem by 
adopting new technologies rather than making any fundamental shift in its current 
developmental model, which prioritizes economic stability. In China, the gross 
domestic product (GDP)-dominated economy has been considered a national policy 
priority, and since the growth of GDP is an important indicator for evaluating cadres, 
the local government is always willing to sacrifice the environment to maintain high 
economic growth rates (Chen, 2009). 
The second reason for the failure of China’s environmental governance is the weak 
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations. Zhang and Shaw (2015) have 
made the criticism that the regulations merely served as a showcase as they are not 
enforced strictly by local governments. Sometimes, the government creates 
environmental policies to calm the rising social discontent and maintain social 
stability (Grano & Zhang, 2016). Kostka and Hobbs (2012) have attributed the 
dysfunction of China’s environmental performance to the wide gap between policies 
made by the central government and implementation outcomes at the local levels. 
For example, although the Communist Party has upgraded environmental targets in 
the cadre performance evaluation system, it is difficult to find a case where officials 
were blamed or punished for a problem involved with environmental protection (Ran, 
2017).  
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Third, the ambiguity of laws and regulations prevents the effective implementation 
of environmental governance (Grano & Zhang, 2016). In her influential news 
investigative report, Liu Yiman (2015) discloses that local environmental protection 
agencies do not have the power necessary to maintain fairness in environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) projects, and they are always put in a difficult position. 
However, EIA is supposed to be the most important and often-obligatory process to 
predict the environmental consequences of proposing or launching a plan, policy, 
programme, or project in China. 
The fourth reason for the failure of China’s environmental governance is the ‘lack of 
adequate agency transparency and public participation in environmental policy 
making and implementation’ (Tang & X. Zhan, 2008, p. 430). While the Chinese 
government has realized the necessity of cooperating with civil society to solve 
environmental degradation, the social and political space opened for citizens and 
NGOs to participate in public affairs is relatively limited (Ho & Edmonds, 2007b; 
Xu, 2014). In reality, it is difficult for civic organizations and citizens to find 
effective channels to obtain information, participate in policy decision-making, and 
express their opinions. Moreover, scholars S. Tang, Tang, and Lo (2005) have argued 
that a lack of organized social interests among citizens is also an important factor 
limiting the information transparency and public participation in environmental 
issues in China. Therefore, Peter Ho (2008) has lamented that the formalized and 
institutionalized channels for public participation and engaging in policy-making do 
not really exist in China. 
2.3 Social media and censorship in China 
Studies on China’s social media and censorship are numerous. The existing literature 
surrounding social media in China continues to reflect a tendency of ideological dyad 
(Sullivan, 2014; Svensson, 2014; F.Yang, 2016), which is what Wendy Chun (2008) 
has described as ‘the coupling of control and freedom’ (p. 1). Jonathan Sullivan 
(2014) has thus described scholars who study China’s social media as ‘cyber-utopian’ 
and ‘cyber-realists’.  
On one hand, scholars who are cyber-utopian (Nisbet, Stoycheff, & Pearce, 2012; 
Wallis, 2011) argue that social media has positively changed the state-society 
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relationship and brought pluralization and liberalization to Chinese society. In terms 
of political impact, Sullivan (2014) has argued that social media has long-term 
implications for the future development of collective action and the emergence of 
social movements in China. Cara Wallis (2011) has even claimed that Chinese social 
media has become ‘an active realm for public discussion, information dissemination, 
and mobilization in ways that are both sanctioned and discouraged by the 
government’ (p. 419). More importantly, the Chinese working-class has adopted a 
variety of social media as important tools for expanding the media ecology of 
resistance (Qiu, 2016). 
On the other hand, scholars who are cyber-realists (Roberts, Zuckerman, Faris, York, 
& Palfrey, 2011) concerned that the state exerts strict online restrictions over 
individual speech and adaptively uses the information communication technologies 
(ICTs) to maintain its control. A large number of studies have demonstrated a 
particularly strong research interest in documenting and analysing the censorship and 
surveillance practices concerning social media in China (Bamman, O'Connor, & 
Smith, 2012; Cairns & Carlson, 2016; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; Qin, Strömberg, 
& Wu, 2017). In addition, Jonathan Hassid (2012) has argued that Chinese social 
media have actually been used as ‘a safety valve’ (MacKinnon, 2008, p. 33) to vent 
people’s emotions and grievances in order to prevent protests in the street.  
This section mainly focuses on introducing the development and affordances of 
China’s two leading social media platforms, which are pervasively adopted by 
Chinese activists. In addition, this section also elaborates on the complex operation 
system of internet censorship to help better understand China’s unique online 
environment. 
2.3.1 The rise of China’s social media 
China has the largest internet population in the world. According to the 41th 
Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, China reached approximately 
772 million internet users in March 2018, 753 million of whom are mobile phone 
users (CNNIC, 2018). This massive internet population enables China’s internet to 
be ‘one of the most vibrant economic and social cyberspaces in the world’ (Yeo & Li, 
2012). A great deal of existing literature has proved that social media can provide 
ordinary Chinese with both a powerful tool and a novel space to challenge the 
 
 
21 
relationship between the state and society (Teng, 2012; J. Tong & Zuo, 2014; Y. 
Tong & Lei, 2013). 
Although the Chinese government has blocked Western-based social media services 
like Facebook, Google, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram since 2009 (Branigan, 
2010a), people still have an abundance of competitive domestic social media services 
to choose from. To counteract the demands for social media apps, the Chinese 
government encourages and supports domestic companies to develop and tailor 
social media services for the market (Martin, 2011). Today, WeChat and Weibo are 
two leading social media platforms absorbing the attention of users in China. By the 
end of 2018, the monthly active users for WeChat was in excess of 1 billion (Tencent, 
2019). This is because, in addition to the domestic market, WeChat is widely used in 
Southeast Asian countries and some developed Western countries where Chinese 
companies and immigration have a notable presence (Lee, 2019). Since the 2013 
crackdown, Weibo had experienced a long period of decline in its number of 
monthly active users. However, it has demonstrated a resurgence trend in recent 
years. According to the latest official data, the number of monthly active users 
reached 462 million in December 2018 (Weibo, 2018). 
A large number of previous studies on environmental activism in China have 
demonstrated that these two social media are primary choices for Chinese ENGOs 
and environmental activists. Moreover, based on the data collected from fieldwork, 
these two social media platforms are the major channels for ordinary Chinese to 
engage in public events. Therefore, the following sections introduce the affordances 
of Weibo and WeChat. 
2.3.2 Weibo  
Weibo is often referred as ‘Chinese Facebook’ or ‘Chinese Twitter’. Since its launch 
in 2009, it has become the largest and most influential Chinese microblogging site 
(Sullivan, 2014) where users can frequently and immediately get information; update 
their activities, opinions, and status; and communicate with other users (L. Zhang & 
Pentina, 2012). In less than two years, Weibo tripled its size and number of 
registered users, dramatically reaching 300 million in February 2012 (Phneah, 2012) 
despite there being many ‘zombie’ accounts (Svensson, 2016). 
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Similar to Twitter, Weibo has a 140-character length limitation. On Weibo, users can 
follow any account, make direct comments under original posts, and repost others’ 
posts to their own homepages. With abundant visual affordances, users are allowed 
to insert graphic emoticons and attach links, pictures, videos, and music to each post. 
Additionally, users can use the format @username to remind someone to read the 
message and create hashtags to facilitate conversations. 
Weibo has changed the way information is received and disseminated in China (R. 
Huang & Sun, 2013; Sullivan, 2014; Teng, 2012). With the follower network 
mechanism, Weibo provides Chinese people with a novel space for information-
seeking and public debate (Huang & Sun, 2013). With the rise of citizen journalism, 
many prominent news stories and public events first began to spread on Weibo, and 
people thus obtain more timely information via this platform than mainstream media 
(Han, 2016). As a result, a number of scholars (Han, 2017; Sullivan, 2014) have 
argued that microblogging has destroyed the mainstream media’s information 
monopoly and triggered Chinese citizens’ enthusiasm to engage in public discussions. 
However, Jonathan Svensson (2014) has also questioned the equality of 
communicative power on Weibo and criticized the privileges granted to a certain 
group of users including opinion leaders and celebrities due to market exposure. 
However, facing the increasing challenges of freedom of speech on Weibo, the 
government has considered the social media platform a ‘main battle ground’ to 
strengthen its control of the internet (Nip & Fu, 2016). In 2013, the most significant 
crackdown was launched on Weibo, and a number of well-known critical and 
influential microbloggers were arrested for spreading rumours and other criminal 
offences (Han, 2016). Moreover, internet companies and celebrities were invited to 
discuss their social responsibilities and publicize the official propaganda line. In its 
statements and speeches, the state Internet Information Office emphasized the 
importance of fighting rumours and controlling the internet. The crackdown directly 
resulted in a migration of Chinese social media users from Weibo to WeChat, which 
is a more closed and private social media platform (Tu, 2016). 
 
2.3.3 WeChat 
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WeChat, an instant messaging and calling app bundled with multi-functional social 
features, was launched by Tencent in 2011. It has been compared with WhatsApp (an 
American instant messaging service), but Svensson (2013) has commented on his 
blog that WeChat is ‘a better WhatsApp crossed with the social features of Facebook 
and Instagram, mixed with Skype and a walkie-talkie’. As the official report 
announced, WeChat has been integrated into the daily social life of users and created 
a new digital life style in China (WeChat, 2015).  
By developing more convenient and versatile features, WeChat enables their users to 
send messages via a variety forms including texts, voice, pictures, and videos, to 
either a person or a group. In addition to exchanging messages, WeChat users are 
able to read news from public accounts, establish groups with different purposes, 
send ‘a red envelope’ (called hongbao 红包 in Chinese, which refers to a monetary 
gift) to friends or family to demonstrate care, update posts in Moments (also called 
the friend circle), split the dinner bill with friends by using the AA function, play 
mobile games, or even organize protests to defend rights.  
Compared with Weibo, WeChat has a much higher threshold for entry. The most 
significant difference is that the social circles on WeChat are more private and 
exclusive. While users can simply follow any accounts on Weibo, WeChat users are 
required to obtain permission to see individuals’ accounts and browse their posts in 
Movements. The Facebook-like function ‘Moments’ was added to WeChat in April 
2012. By using it, users are able to post texts, emoji, pictures (limited to nine within 
one post), 10-second videos, and links from other social media platforms to share 
with their followers. After reading others’ posts, subscribers can press ‘Like’ or leave 
comments. However, even under the same post, subscribers cannot see others’ 
reactions unless they follow those others’ accounts.  
In this sense, Eric Harwit (2017) is concerned that the narrowed circles on WeChat 
limit the spreading effect of information, and Chinese citizens perhaps have less 
opportunities to share their opinions publicly in a broader internet space, which could 
have a negative impact on the development of civic engagement in China. However, 
K. Deluca et al. (2016) have argued that the private and exclusive characteristics of
WeChat actually form a more intimate sense of community, which is beneficial to
organize and mobilize ENGOs’ online environmental campaigns. Although it is
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difficult to see how a message travels through the platform, WeChat has the potential 
to spread it beyond a personal network.  
An emerging body of literature has revealed that WeChat has become a critical 
discursive space that empowers Chinese citizens to articulate their opinions on 
political events and mobilize collective actions. Fangjing Tu (2016) has pointed out 
that the technical features on WeChat provide users with more possibilities to bypass 
internet censorship; therefore, WeChat has become a critical and comfortable 
platform to promote public debates and popular protests in China. Based on the case 
study of the Maoming anti-PX protest in 2014, Lee and Ho (2014) have found that 
WeChat is the only relatively effective online channel to circulate information during 
a period of protest and have emphasized that the limited scope of information 
dissemination actually creates reliability among information senders and receivers. 
2.3.4 Internet censorship in China 
MacKinnon (2009) has explained how internet censorship works on three levels: the 
government, internet companies, and citizens. To provide a comprehensive 
understanding of China’s internet censorship, this section focuses on the current 
studies on how the three aforementioned sectors interact within the complex 
operation system of internet censorship. In particular, this section investigates 
scholarly literature about how ordinary Chinese circumvent the strict censorship in 
their country and articulate their opinions using visual methods on social media.  
Existing studies have provided considerable evidence to demonstrate that the internet 
could jeopardize the legitimacy of the one-party state to rule the country (Chen & 
Ang, 2011; MacKinnon, 2012; Ng, 2015; Xiao, 2011; Y. Zhang, 2010). The 
fundamentally interactive character of social media allows citizens to discuss public 
affairs widely and threatens the government’s ability to control online public 
discussions (Willnat, Wei, & Martin, 2015). Therefore, the Chinese government has 
developed complex censorship apparatuses to control the internet while also leaving 
a limited space for critiques of government policies and officials (King, Pan, & 
Roberts, 2013).  
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Many of the discussions on internet censorship in China have highlighted the 
intensive control imposed by the one-party state. Among these discussions, one 
research line has revealed how the state adapts to the rapid development of ITCs and 
harnesses social media as a new tool to maintain its governance (Harwit & Clark, 
2001; Gary King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017b; Noesselt, 2014). Scholars have also 
emphasized that the multilayered censorship system allows people to criticize the 
government, officials, and policies online to a certain extent, but it blocks any 
discussion that could provoke large-scale collective action offline (Gary King et al., 
2013; Pan, & Roberts, 2014). Susan L. Shirk (2011) has pointed out that the Chinese 
government actually enjoys the benefits from opening the limited online space, 
which provides an insight into what is provoking collective action. In other words, 
the Chinese government takes the internet as a ‘dual use problem’ (Chen & Ang, 
2011). 
Scholarly literature has elaborated on how the Chinese government monitors and 
intervenes in online content by adopting sophisticated technical approaches. Scholars 
(G. King et al., 2013) have found that the Great Firewall, keyword blocking, and 
human censors, which aim to preclude the potential of collective actions by clipping 
the social ties within such groups, are three major approaches of censorship. Apart 
from blocking foreign websites, the Great Firewall is also used to break off the 
connection between users and the website when it discovers the blacklisted keywords. 
On social media, keyword filtering and deletion are the most common approaches 
implemented on individual posts (Bamman et al., 2012; King, Pan, & Roberts, 
2017a). 
Moreover, the Chinese government has imposed ‘reverse censorship’ to strategically 
fabricate people’s online opinions in multifarious ways (King, Pan, & Roberts, 
2017b; Sullivan, 2014). A large number of internet police, internet monitors, and 
internet commentators have been employed to monitor public discussions and sway 
public opinions (X. Chen & Ang, 2011; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017a). In particular, 
internet commentators are hired to post enormous fabricated comments on social 
media as if they were genuine opinions from people (Henochowicz, 2014; Tong & 
Lei, 2013). Furthermore, local governments have established their official 
microblogging accounts to expand the influence of central propaganda in the online 
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civic realm (Jiang, 2009), and this act has been viewed as an ‘occupy microblog 
movement’ (Schlæger & Jiang, 2014). All these measures indicate that the state has 
adopted and adapted social media as a new tool to maintain its governance. 
However, many critical scholars have argued that ‘state control’ is too simple a 
concept to capture the complexity of China’s internet censorship. Scholars have 
pointed out that the government is operating its multilayered internet censorship 
together with private internet companies (MacKinnon, 2009; Pan, 2017; F. Yang, 
2016). Since 1996, the Chinese government has been creating a highly constrained 
regulatory environment to manage the internet (G. Yang, 2003a) and has successfully 
passed most of the responsibility for censorship to the private service and content 
providers (G. King et al., 2013). If they fail to comply with these censorship 
regulations, the private internet companies can be punished by penalties of fines, 
shutdown, or criminal liability (MacKinnon, 2008).  
In addition, market exposure is also an important dynamic for these domestic internet 
companies to adopt the principle of ‘self-discipline’ (Hughes & Wacker, 2003; Pan, 
2017). As Jennifer Pan (2017) has noted, China’s social media companies widely 
accept censorship as part and parcel of developing their business in the domestic 
market. Meanwhile, these companies are quite flexible in implementing censorship 
(Crandall et al., 2013; MacKinnon, 2009). In the process of implementation, social 
media companies sometimes try to push the censorship boundaries of what is 
acceptable to the government rather than always blindly following the official 
directives (G. Yang, 2009). 
While internet censorship is heavy, Chinese netizens have found and created many 
ways to get around the censorship (Mathieson, 2006; G. Yang, 2009). Scholars 
consider these practices of evading censorship a form of resistance against the 
government’s domination. According to the existing literature, Chinese people 
mainly adopt three approaches to evade internet censorship: circumvention tools, 
language evasions, and visual resources. 
First, circumvention technology is used to access blocked foreign information. In 
China, it is no secret that virtual private network (VPN) services are widely and 
frequently utilized by Chinese users to bypass the Great Firewall and access 
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information from blocked foreign websites (Roberts, Zuckerman, & Palfrey, 2011). 
However, the government keeps updating more sophisticated measures to prevent 
Chinese citizens from accessing the blocked content (Q. Yang & Liu, 2014). 
Although scholars (Mou, Wu, & Atkin, 2016) have found that most use of 
circumvention tools in China has nothing to do with non-political needs, the Chinese 
regulators decided to ban circumvention tools in July 2017 (Haas, 2017). 
Second, language evasions are used to deal with keyword blocking. It has become a 
pervasive online practice that Chinese netizens use homophones and homographs to 
replace banned words or phrases (G. King et al., 2013). A representative example of 
a homophone is that the Mandarin term ‘harmony’ (和谐) has often been written as 
‘he xie’ (河蟹), which literally means ‘river crab’. In the context of China, ‘harmony’ 
refers to the official state slogan of ‘building a harmonious society’. Along with 
‘river crab’, Chinese netizens also created ‘grass mud horse’ (草泥马), which is an 
obscene swear word used to mock China’s online policies (Qiang, 2011; F. Yang, 
2016).  
Third, a variety of visual materials are used to keep blocked topics in conversation on 
social media. Compared with texts, visual materials have a unique advantage for 
bypassing the censorship in that they cannot be pre-blocked. While visual resources 
can be banned by manual censorship, there is a delayed gap between circulation and 
deletion (Mina, 2014). Since internet censorship relies more on keyword filtering 
techniques, visual materials have been prominently deployed as an effective way to 
elude the censors in China (Sullivan, 2014). One of the most common practices on 
China’s internet is when some ‘sensitive’ posts are deleted due to content violation, 
Chinese netizens take screenshots to save the texts as pictures and then post them on 
social media again. In reality, scholars (Kou, Kow, & Gui, 2017) have found that 
Chinese netizens consider images a non-machine-readable way to communicate and 
enjoy using the visual form to express their opinions.  
Apart from circumventing internet censorship, ordinary Chinese also deploy visual 
materials as an online counter-narrative to challenge and mock internet censorship 
(Levine, 2012). As early as June 2009, Chinese netizens created an internet meme of 
Green Dam Girl, which is a Japanese anime-style virtual female character, in order to 
express their dissent to internet censorship. Since the authorities consider Japanese 
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popular culture a negative influence, Saito (2017) has argued that the meme also 
aims to express people’s dissent from the restrain of public access to Japanese anime 
and manga. Another notable example is the iconic images of an empty chair. In 
December 2010, the well-known Chinese dissenter Liu Xiaobo was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize, but could not attend the ceremony due to his imprisonment in 
China (Branigan, 2010b). Simultaneously, although relevant discussions were under 
strict surveillance and inaccessible, Chinese netizens began to circulate images of an 
empty chair on Weibo to show their support for Xiaobo Liu and protest the 
government’s control.  
As a byproduct of internet censorship, current literature states that Chinese netizens 
have consciously managed to minimize the possibility of being censored for both the 
content they produce and the commentary they receive (MacKinnon, 2011; Schlæger 
& Jiang, 2014). Chinese organizations and individuals often adopt self-censorship as 
a strategy to cope with internet regulations (Zhong et al., 2017). The behaviour of 
filtering their own thoughts or expressions before publishing and sharing not only 
reflects people’s fear of the authorities (Lee and Chan, 2009) but also their 
acceptance of the censorship and avoidance of punishment or political risk (Simons 
and Strovsky, 2006).  
2.4 China’s networked environmental activism 
Environmental issues are one of the most prominent social topics trending on 
China’s social media (K. Deluca et al., 2016). While heavy internet censorship has 
been imposed in China, recent studies have demonstrated that social media has 
played a key role in opening up new channels of possibilities for collective action (S. 
Grano, 2015; Tai, 2015; X. Zhang & Shaw, 2015). Elizabeth Brunner (2017) has 
asserted that Chinese environmental activism is less likely to occur without the use of 
social media. Supported by mobile technologies and social media, Chinese activists 
have enriched the modalities of environmental activism and provided a large number 
of vibrant examples of proliferating environmental activities.  
In China’s complex political environment, environmental activism is different from 
what can be witnessed in democratic countries. To provide a thorough understanding 
of the uniqueness of China’s environmental activism, it is necessary to highlight the 
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existing studies on how environmental activism emerged and developed in China, 
how the state governs with respect to environmental issues, what the status and roles 
of ENGOs are in Chinese society, and how environmental activism is conducted on 
Chinese social media. 
 
2.4.1 The development of environmental activism in 
China 
Compared with many industrialized and developing countries, the emergence of 
environmental activism in China lagged behind. In the most industrialized countries, 
the emergency of an environmental civil society sector occurred in the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s, and such sectors were formed in some developing countries in the 
1980s (Xie, 2012). Accompanied by the establishment of ENGOs and the internet, 
China’s environmental activism emerged in the mid-to-late 1990s (G.Yang, 2005). 
Through participating in the ENGOs and using ICTs, ordinary Chinese eventually 
found an effective way to engage in environmental policy-making. Since its 
emergence, the environmental realm has become one of the earliest and most active 
sectors of civil society in China (P. Ho & Edmonds, 2007b). Moreover, unlike 
traditional Chinese politics, which is often top-down, China’s environmental 
activism is strongly bottom-up grassroots politics (G. Yang, 2003b).  
According to the current literature, the burgeoning of China’s environmental 
activism can be attributed to three major factors. The first is the relaxation of the 
political atmosphere in China (Sima, 2011). As the environment continues to 
deteriorate, the Chinese government has realized the importance of ENGOs in 
‘fill[ing] a critical gap in the state’s capacity to protect the environment effectively’ 
(Economy, 2005). To maintain social stability, the government has not only 
increased its transparency and efforts on improving the environment but has also 
provided ENGOs and environmental activists with a more favourable environment to 
express their opinions and engage in environmental policy-making at various levels 
(Wu, 2013; Xie, 2012; Zhan & Tang, 2013).  
The second factor is the flourishing of the non-governmental sector in contemporary 
Chinese society. In the context of China, the marketization and privatization of the 
Chinese economy has promoted the expansive growth of non-governmental 
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organizations (Howell, 2004). According to Peter Ho (2007), in the late 1990s, the 
Chinese government was facing a difficult and complicated economic situation while 
implementing a major restructuring of state industries and terminating the state 
bureaucracy. As a result, the government had to cut back on its public expenditures 
and made moves to open political and social space for NGOs to be more supportive 
to help disadvantaged groups in a variety of voluntary civic actions (Ho, 2007). 
The third factor is the innovation of ICTs. A large body of literature emphasizes the 
critical role of ICTs in empowering both groups and individuals to articulate 
arguments, record and curate events, affect official policy-making, and mobilize 
collective action (Jiang, 2016; Mercea, 2012; G. Yang, 2003a, 2009). From 
environmentalists’ social media posts to mobile phone apps, it is evident that digital 
media has not merely provided new avenues to protest but has also transformed the 
roles and impacts of environmental activism (Cox, 2010). As a result, ‘growth in 
networked digital communications technology innovation and use since the 1990s 
has helped to change the conditions for visibility in environmental politics’ (Lester & 
Hutchins, 2012, p. 848).  
However, although environmental activism has been developing steadily in Chinese 
society in the past decades, it differs from what has occurred in Western countries. In 
the context of China’s ‘semi-authoritarian’ society (Ho, 2007), regarding the 
government’s attitude towards public participation, Goldman (2002) has explained 
that ‘political rights are to enable citizens to contribute to the state rather than to 
enable individuals to protect themselves against the state’ (p. 159). Through 
implementing a series of regulatory approaches, Chinese ENGOs are highly 
constrained by the government (Schwartz, 2004), and environmental activism thus 
has ‘mostly fragmentary, highly localized and nonconfrontational’ characteristics 
(Ho & Edmonds, 2007b, p. 332). 
Due to the ‘de-politicized’ (Howell, 2004, p. 162) character of China’s civil society, 
Chinese ENGOs have been prone to adopt a non-confrontational stance in order to 
avoid potential political risks. Like in Western society, environmental activities 
conducted by the Chinese ENGOs are about ‘awareness-raising, environmental 
education, research, and advocacy’ (Ho, 2007, p. 29). However, most Chinese 
ENGOs have been cautious about getting involved in mobilizing large-scale social 
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movements against the government (Zhan & Tang, 2013). Therefore, Peter Ho (2007) 
has argued that the collective environmental activities in China are ‘specialized and 
media-attractive yet politically innocent’ (p. 29). 
2.4.2 The embeddedness of China’s ENGOs and activists
Unlike how Western NGOs have played a key role in civil society, Chinese ENGOs 
have been ‘embedded’ in the institutional system with the feature of depoliticized 
(Ho, 2001, 2007a; G. Yang & Calhoun, 2007; Zhan & Tang, 2013). Having 
borrowed the notion of embedded social activism, Peter Ho (2007) has developed it 
to describe the setting and dynamics of China’s environmental activists and ENGOs 
in a semi-authoritarian context. The conception of embedded environmental activism 
refers to ‘a negotiated symbiosis between Party, state, and society’ (Ho, 2007, p. 37), 
and the Party-state has drawn certain boundaries to monitor and control ENGOs and 
activists. Given the embeddedness of environmental activism, Ho (2007) has thus 
argued that ENGOs and activists perform as a partners rather than adversaries of the 
Chinese government. 
Besides, in the limited political space, Chinese ENGOs and activists are also facing 
other constraints to develop themselves. Compared with governmental-affiliated 
ENGOs, private ENGOs, especially grassroots ENGOs, have long been troubled with 
the issues of funding and media exposure (G. Yang, 2005). Moreover, due to the lack 
of organizational capacity and interest in policy advocacy (Lu, 2007), nearly all 
Chinese ENGOs can only engage in a limited range of activities, which mainly 
include public education, community building, research, and advocacy in a non-
confrontational stance (G. Yang, 2005).  
While political and financial resources are limited by the government, Chinese 
ENGOs have become more visible in public participation (Wang, 2015) and 
continually make contributions to China’s emerging civil society (Zhan & Tang, 
2013). According to Yangzi Sima (2011), with the help of ICTs, Chinese ENGOs 
have made great efforts to empower disadvantaged people in their self-presentation, 
break the information monopoly, establish networks, mobilize campaigns, and 
construct discourse communities. Based on a long-term observation and two rounds 
of interviews, Zhan and Tang (2013) have concluded that Chinese ENGOs have 
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major progress in two areas in recent years. One that is through taking advantage of 
the conflicts and misalignments between the central and local governments, Chinese 
ENGOs have strategically enhanced their influence in the process of environmental 
policy-making. The other is that Chinese ENGOs have strengthened their societal 
connections by raising funds domestically and offering help to pollution victims. In 
some cases where the controversial projects were under the protection of the local 
authorities, Chinese ENGOs played a central role in tipping the balance by 
supporting the government’s opponents (Yang & Calhoun, 2007).  
2.4.3 Social media and networked environmental activism 
 
Social media has become the dominant media landscape where environmental 
protests are performed in China. In the research field of online activism, a number of 
thorough studies have documented the prominent role of social media in processes 
such as information distribution, claims-making, identity solidarity, and social 
movement mobilization (Castells, 2015; Earl & Kimport, 2011; S. Grano, 2015; 
Highfield, 2017). Another newly emerged line of research has addressed the fact that 
affect is bound up with mobilizing activism on social media and has emphasized the 
importance of affective resonance in evoking collective action online (Brunner, 2017; 
Gerbaudo, 2012; Papacharissi, 2015; Prøitz, 2018).  
The new affordances of digital communication technologies play an important role in 
affecting the forms of social organization and modes of users’ perception and 
behaviour (Cox, 2015). In China, mobile technology and social media have become 
integral parts of environmental activism and advocacy campaigns. For example, to 
challenge information transparency, some Chinese grassroots ENGOs have initiated 
do-it-yourself (DIY) activism in multiple Chinese cities, which has encouraged 
volunteers to measure air quality, document air pollution data, and post images of 
testing results through their personal social media accounts (Xu, 2014). The result 
has been that the networked digital communication technologies are beneficial for 
people, especially grassroots and marginalized groups, in enhancing the visibility of 
environmental issues (Lester & Hutchins, 2012).  
Another important line of research underlines the special phenomenon in China that 
ENGOs and environmental activists inevitably rely on personal social networks that 
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include friends, relatives, colleagues, neighbours, and others to mobilize resources 
for activism (Tang & Zhan, 2008; G. Yang, 2005). Xie Lei (2012) has added that 
these informal relations have played a critical role in ‘shaping collective identity, 
mobilizing coordinated actions and influencing political authorities to grant them 
access to useful information as well as political protection’ (p. 9). As J. Liu (2015) 
has identified, social networks have become a crucial factor in mobilizing social 
movements in China.  
At the same time, scholars have commonly agreed that social media is not enough to 
achieve any significant political and social changes in Chinese society (Kay, Zhao, & 
Sui, 2015; Lee & Ho, 2014; Zhang & Shaw, 2015). If without support from 
mainstream media and temporary compromise made by the local government, 
Chinese activists are less likely to accomplish their goals (Grano, 2015). The reality 
in China is that most outcomes of environmental movements are questionable. 
Having reviewed many cases of urban environmental protests in China, Grano (2015) 
has lamented that almost all of the controversial projects resume immediately when 
the dissent has quieted down.  
Although there have been extensive studies stating the significant role of mobile 
technologies and social media in empowering environmental activism in China, it is 
necessary to understand its myriad practices conducted by new tools and measures. 
So far, only a few scholars (Brunner, 2017; K. Deluca et al., 2016) have paid 
attention to the evolving methods of social media-facilitated environmental activism 
in the context of China; the impact of images and affective appeals on driving 
environmental activism has particularly been emphasized. However, scarce attention 
has been paid to investigating the content of visual materials created and circulated 
on social media to express affective appeals towards environmental issues to explore 
the impact of everyday visual practices on social media-dominated environmental 
activism in China. 
2.5 Everyday visual practice as activism on 
China’s social media 
 
The power of visual content has been clearly elucidated by the well-known proverb 
‘a picture is worth a thousand words’. In contemporary society, everyday non-
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professional photography has become a social and cultural documentary practice 
(Harrison, 2004). Due to the affective power and educative capacities of images, 
activists and NGOs around the world have long used them (Bogre, 2012). In the 
realm of environmental activism, Kevin Michael DeLuca (2012) has illustrated how 
ENGOs and activists create powerful images to undermine hegemonic values and 
meanings in social movements and has argued that images provide an alternative 
space for us to understand social movements deeply within the perspective of 
communication studies.  
 
In the era of Web 2.0, new technologies and media have fundamentally changed the 
motivations for and methods of taking and sharing images (Van House, 2011). With 
the ubiquity of smart phone sand social media in today’s society, visual content has 
become a common but central component of people’s everyday practices on social 
media. Smart phones provide technical support to record opportunistic photographs 
and videos, and social media platforms expand the scope of information circulation. 
According to social media scholars Highfield and Leaver (2016), visual practices on 
social media take a myriad of forms including ‘selfies, looping media, infographics, 
memes, online videos, and more’. Although most of everyday visual social media 
practices have been primarily considered as banal (Koskinen, 2007), Highfield and 
Leaver (2016) have argued that they can be extraordinary in highlighting ‘affect, 
political views, reactions, key information, and scenes of importance’ (p. 48). 
In recent years, an emerging body of studies has paid more attention to a range of 
everyday visual social media practices, but only a few are mentioned here (Barnard, 
2016; Maniou & Veglis, 2016; Miguel, 2016; Miltner & Highfield, 2017; 
Nissenbaum & Shifman, 2017; Wiggins, 2019). Among many recent publications, 
scholars have progressively dealt with qualitative and quantitative analysis of visual 
social media practices within the theoretical framework of social movement 
(Gerbaudo, 2015; Kharroub & Bas, 2016; Seo, 2014). However, in online 
communication studies, there is still limited empirical research on the role that 
everyday visual social media practices play in environmental activism in the context 
of China. Therefore, this section introduces recent studies on the modes, dynamics, 
and roles of visual content involved in China’s online activism. 
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2.5.1 Visual social media practices as citizen journalism 
In today’s visually oriented online environment, visual content has become an 
integral part of citizen journalism. Scholars have provided a body of studies on the 
role of visual content in non-professional photographers’ documentation and 
distribution of information about crisis events. Based on a longitudinal qualitative 
study of notable crisis events in America, Liu, Palen, Sutton, Hunghes, and Vieweg 
(2009) have stated that online photograph sharing can be ‘informative, newsworthy, 
and even therapeutic’ (p. 43) during times of disaster. In addition, having examined 
the 2011 Queensland floods, Hjorth and Burgess (2014) have argued that due to their 
emotional resonance and currency, images are more suitable and effective to express 
and convey people’s complicated feelings than just written words.  
Most visual content documented and spread on social media by amateurs in times of 
crisis events is eyewitness images, which makes citizen journalism more visible in 
several ways. Due to the phenomenon that eyewitness images from amateurs are 
increasingly adopted by mainstream media as formal disaster response, Hjorth and 
Burgess (2014) have argued that personal visual practice has been legitimated as 
important information and evidence for both the authorities and mainstream media. 
Concerning the characteristic of immediacy, Gaby David (2010) has emphasized that 
smart phone pictures and videos play a prominent role in informing, expanding, and 
probably moulding breaking news. Therefore, scholars (Sophia B Liu, Palen, Sutton, 
Hughes, & Vieweg, 2008) have proposed that the visual practices conducted by 
amateurs have significantly enhanced the visibility of citizen journalism on social 
media. 
According to Nip (2009), the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China was the first time 
Chinese citizen journalists enjoyed the freedom to report a disaster and question the 
government’s culpability. In the aftermath, from a high-speed train crash in 2011 to 
the Tianjin explosions in 2015, several tragic events in China have demonstrated that 
taking photographs with smart phones and uploading to social media has become a 
common practice for citizens to capture an ongoing event (Han, 2016). Through 
analysing a series of crisis events in China, Chinese media scholar Jian Xu (2016) 
has concluded that there are three forms of Chinese citizen journalism in crisis 
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communication: ‘eyewitness reporting, online discussion and networking, and 
independent investigation projects’ (p. 54).  
 
In the context of China, where the government tightly controls the mainstream news 
channels, many scholars have argued that the implications of citizen journalism have 
been considered more political. Jian Xu (2016) has emphasized that the watchdog 
function and public nature of citizen journalism in Chinese society are more 
prominent than in Western societies. Xin (2010) has revealed that citizen journalism 
does not only serve to supply news sources to the mainstream media but also 
provides an alternative channel for releasing politically sensitive information. 
Moreover, by studying the case of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, scholars (Zeng, 
Burgess, & Bruns, 2019) have discovered the unique phenomenon that citizen 
journalists play a role in refuting rumours and verifying information on Chinese 
social media. There are three findings about the political implications of citizen 
journalism in China: challenge the tight control of information flows, provide an 
alternative space for information circulation, and empower grassroots and 
marginalized groups (Chin-Fu, 2013; Reese & Dai, 2009; J. Xu, 2016; Yu, 2009). 
 
2.5.2 Visual social media practices as playful resistance 
Playfulness is one of the most prominent characteristics in China’s cyberspace (G. 
Yang & Jiang, 2015). Supported by digital technologies, a series of playful measures 
including humour, irony, satire, parody, and jokes have been embedded in various 
forms of online visual content. This kind of visual content has flourished in the 
Chinese online environment. If we consider de Certeau’s (1984) thoughts on 
everyday practice, we can understand that everyday visual practices on social media 
are infused with the spirit of creative resistance.  
 
Recent studies have mainly examined the meanings and significance of playful 
online culture within the framework of hegemony and resistance (Bakhtin, 1984b; 
Hongmei Li, 2011; L. Tang & Bhattacharya, 2011; G. Yang, 2009). In the context of 
China, the creation of playful visual content is often understood as a communicative 
power and resisting strategy to internet censorship (Levine, 2012; Meng, 2011; 
Nordin & Richaud, 2014; Qiang, 2011; L. Tang & Yang, 2011). By taking advantage 
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of manipulation software, smart phones, and various apps, the playful visual content 
on social media mainly takes the form of multimedia remixes that include textual, 
audio, visual, and gaming materials (Yang & Jiang, 2015). 
 
A number of studies have illustrated the prominence of internet memes in China’s 
social media. According to Shifman (2014), an internet meme refers to ‘a group of 
digital items sharing common characteristics of content, form, and/or stance, which 
were created with awareness of each other, and were circulated, imitated, and/or 
transformed via Internet by many users’. With ‘rapid vitality, irreverent humour, 
[and] participatory culture’ (p. 364), internet memes have become a popular vehicle 
often employed by Chinese activists to challenge the hegemonic media environment 
(Mina, 2014). For example, internet users create humorous parodies of existing 
issues in memes to mock the establishment (Szablewicz, 2014). In China, the well-
circulated internet memes ‘grass mud horse’ (草泥马) and ‘river crab’ 
（河蟹）have been used as outcry against China’s strict internet censorship. In this 
sense, Fan Yang (2016) has stated that internet memes as a creative visual practice 
have potential to enhance the visibility of censored topics in Chinese cyberspace.  
 
Moreover, creating memes about political leaders with both political and apolitical 
purposes has been a fever in the Chinese Internet for a few years. One of the most 
prominent examples is the ‘toad meme’, which refers to the meme of former Party 
and country leader Jiang Zemin. The toad meme has become a popular culture 
phenomenon called toad worship culture since 2014. On Chinese social media Weibo 
and WeChat, Jiang’s numerous fans posted his memes with reciting his quotations to 
wish him all the best (Gracie, 2016). Through examining the toad worship culture, 
Kecheng Fang (2020) has reminded us that this sort of toad memes is coded by 
several meanings of political icons on both political and apolitical aspects. The most 
obvious political meaning is criticising the current leadership and uniting groups of 
dissidents. However, it also presents that growing number of people depoliticize a 
political figure as the memes are often shared purely for fun in a bonded community. 
 
Another prominent playful visual practice on social media is culture jamming. As 
Jian Xu (2016) has noted, cultural jamming emerged as an important part of popular 
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internet culture in China in 2006. Through being infused with irony and parody, 
culture jamming has been adopted to criticize politics and energize acts of social and 
political activism in China (Jiang, 2016). More specifically, cultural jamming has 
helped ordinary Chinese in three ways: to articulate their dissent opinions, to 
intervene in official discourses, and to expose social injustice problems (Min Jiang, 
2016; J. Xu, 2016). In addition, the existing studies have emphasized the important 
role of playful visual content in creating a sense of belonging and maintaining social 
ties (Gye, 2007). Laughter produced by playful visual content has been recognized as 
a key factor that can help stimulate ‘a strong fellow-feeling among participants and 
joint aggressiveness against outsiders’ (Lorenz, 2005, p. 253). Apart from laughter, L. 
Tang and Yang (2011) have argued that ‘the shared sentiments, emotions or 
experiences’ within the playful visual content can also resonate with the public. 
Inspired by participatory culture on social media, the process of production invites 
multiple individuals to work together online (Szablewicz, 2014; G. Yang & Jiang, 
2015).  
 
However, scholars have taken a cautious stance concerning the effectiveness of the 
everyday practices of playful resistance and have emphasized that it should not be 
overestimated. Although playful visual content is a novel way of resisting internet 
censorship and challenging the hegemony, it is impossible to bring any significant 
social and political change to Chinese society (Jiang, 2016). This is mainly because 
everyday visual practices on social media are not well-coordinated collective actions. 
Therefore, the government can still use a multilayered censorship system to remove 
these alternative voices (Li, 2011) and even implement real suppression of activists. 
Another important reason is the inequality of power distribution on the internet. Tang 
and Yang (2011) have stated that the visual voices of marginalized individuals and 
groups can only receive limited attention. 
2.6 Affective turn and visual social media practices 
 
The term ‘affective turn’ provides us with a new insight into social media and online 
activism. The very first question we may want to ask is why affect is necessary to the 
understanding of everyday politics on social media. Zizi Papacharissi (2015) has 
given the convincing answer that ‘affect presents a key part of how people internalize 
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and act on everyday experience’ (p. 12). With the emerging movement of affective 
turn, scholars in media and cultural research have found a new way to examine how 
affect shapes online communication and the role of affect in the field of social 
movements. In examining the relationship between affect, visual content, and social 
media, this section aims to reflect on the preoccupation with affect in social media 
research. 
So far, there are no universally accepted definitions of affect. Some theoretical 
frameworks have made efforts to underline distinctions between affect and emotion. 
In such frameworks, Crociani-Windland and Hoggett (2012, p. 164) have described 
affect as a ‘bodily based and indeterminate level of experience’, and Hochschild 
(2012) has outlined emotion as a complex and socially formed interplay of thoughts 
and feelings. However, since affect and emotion are often synonymous, some 
scholars have claimed that the distinctions are not necessary and emphasized that 
affect should be seen as part of emotions and consciousness (Gregg & Seigworth, 
2010; Wetherell, 2012). Elizabeth Brunner (2017) has explained that affect is 
sometimes incorporated in emotion, and emotional responses are often elicited by 
affective experiences. Given the potential of iconic images in evoking an affective 
intersection, Lin Prøitz (2018) has also suggested that affect should be considered as 
part of emotions. 
Media are ‘affect generators’ (Reckwitz, 2016), and social media is the place where 
affect and emotions are activated and expressed. The temporal dynamics and 
intensities of social media can be understood as ‘affective flows’ (Wetherell, 2012). 
In this sense, Zizi Papacharissi (2015) has emphasized that affect is a key component 
to examine and evaluate everyday practices on social media and elaborate on the 
ways social media facilitates political formations of affect. Therefore, Serrano-Puche 
(2015) has argued that social media has an important impact on modulating, playing 
out, and displaying affect. 
In the realm of social movements, scholars have increasingly realized the necessity 
of drawing more academic attention to affect and collective actions on social media. 
Tracing the historical backdrop of social movement studies, affect and emotions 
were long associated with irrationality (Weber, 1978). However, the binary of affect 
and rationality limited scholars’ attentions to the force of affect. Guattari and 
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Deleuze (2000) have argued that in reality, affect and rationality are not ambivalent, 
and pure rationality does not exist without passions. In this manner, Elizabeth 
Brunner (2017) has called for more academic interest in studying how affective 
appeals in visual content can drive collective activities on social media.  
Recently, more related literature has emerged. Based on the case study of the image 
of Alan Kurdi, Lin Prøitz (2018) has demonstrated that iconic images circulated on 
social media are more likely to generate affective resonance and galvanize collect 
actions in young generations. In the context of China, Elizabeth Brunner (2017) has 
found that images of violence and coalescing bodies productively moved local 
residents in Maoming to join the anti-PX environmental protest. However, compared 
with other networked approaches to social movement, not enough studies have 
incorporated affect yet.  
In regards to the relationship between affect, visual content, and social media, 
inspired by Sara Ahmed (2013)’s work, Lin Prøitz (2018) has suggested that we 
understand affect and emotions as serving as a form of capital that helps particular 
narratives, stories, and images to increase in power by being articulated and repeated 
via social media. As an amplifier and modulator of affect, the infrastructure of 
storytelling on a social media platform provides ‘affective publics’ with a place to 
develop their stories through sharing opinions, facts, feelings, and self-performance 
(Papacharissi, 2016).  
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter mainly reviews the existing studies on the birth and development of 
networked environmental activism in China. The chapter began with literature 
concerning China’s environmental governance, which shed light on the unique 
characteristics of Chinese environmental activism. With the ubiquity of social media 
and digital technologies, Chinese NGOs and activists have transformed the space for 
fighting for environmental justice from the streets to a virtual space. Although 
scholars hold opposite positions on whether social media could bring democracy to 
Chinese society, one thing is certain: social media is the only channel for public 
participation in China. 
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China’s internet environment is full of stringent internet censorship, but much 
research has demonstrated that this censorship cannot put an end to resistance. In fact, 
Chinese netizens have begun to adopt a variety of digital technologies to actively 
articulate their opinions concerning public events. This chapter therefore elaborated 
on the complexity of the multilayered internet censorship system and its impact on 
networked environmental activism.  
In order to gain a better understanding of China’s environmental governance and the 
role of visual social media practices in environmental participation, this chapter 
compared the differences in the roles of ENGOs and the use of social media in 
Chinese and Western societies. Simultaneously, the comparison highlighted the 
commonalities in making ordinary people’s voices more audible by exploiting the 
advantages of technologies in different contexts, such as pervasively adopting visual 
content to express and affect in order to mobilize collective actions.  
In addition, through examining the related research, this chapter has drawn the basic 
boundaries of this PhD study. However, it has also found some gaps that need to be 
filled. There is not much research that illuminates how networked environmental 
activism incorporates affect and emotions to mobilize collective actions in China, 
what affect and emotions are incorporated, how Chinese environmental activists 
galvanize public resonance by everyday visual practices on social media, and what is 
the impact of affect and emotions on China’s environmental activism. In the 
following chapters, this study attempts to address these research gaps. 
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Chapter 3 Citizen Journalism as 
Storytelling: A Case Study of the 2015 
Tianjin Explosions 
‘Everyone is a witness. Everyone is a journalist. Everyone edits.’ 
                                                                                                 Matthew Arnison (2002) 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
3.1.1 The 2015 Tianjin explosions  
On the night of 12 August 2015, two massive explosions erupted from a chemical 
warehouse owned by Ruihai International Logistics, killing hundreds of people and 
causing severe damage to the Tianjin seaport and nearby residential areas in Tianjin 
Binhai New Area (TBNA), China (The Guardian, 2015). Unlike other catastrophes 
far from boom cities, the Tianjin explosions occurred very close to the middle-class 
neighbourhoods in one of the most prosperous cities, which is only a 30-minute ride 
from Beijing by high-speed train. Tianjin Binhai New Area, a prosperous economic 
development area with a population of 2.98 million that emerged in recent years, was 
established by China’s state council around one of busiest seaports in 2009. The 
news report from China Daily (2012) shows that through growth in prominence as a 
hub supplying goods to Beijing and north China, TBNA contributed more than half 
of the GDP to the Tianjin municipality, and that petrochemicals are one of TBNA’s 
pillar industries. Yixiu Wu, a campaigner for Greenpeace, attributed the reason for 
the disaster to ‘local governments … putting economic growth first’ (Jacobs, 
Hernandez, & Buckley, 2015). 
The Tianjin explosions were one of the worst human-induced industrial disasters in 
contemporary China. Despite China having a terrible record of industrial safety, the 
whole nation was stunned after watching the dramatic videos captured by 
eyewitnesses on social media. Thirty-nine weeks pregnant at that time, Interviewee 
XC experienced a difficult evacuation the night of the explosions and describes the 
scenes she went through like a Hollywood disaster movie. On 5 February 2016, 
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China’s state council released an investigation report saying that this disaster was the 
result of mismanagement (Hernández, 2016). According to Xinhua (2016), the state 
news agency, the 2015 Tianjin explosions took 165 lives, devastated more than 300 
buildings, left nearly 800 people injured, and caused $.1 billion USD in damages. 
The initial explosion at the Tianjin seaport had a power equivalent to the blast of 15 
tonnes of trinitrotoluene (TNT), and the second one was equivalent to the blast of 
430 tonnes of TNT. According to this report, the main reason that caused the massive 
explosions is that the Ruihai chemical warehouse stored hazardous chemical 
materials improperly. More importantly, the distance between the Ruihai chemical 
warehouse and three local large residential complexes is less than 1 km despite 
government regulations clearly stating that such facilities should be at least 1 km 
from public places (Phillips, 2015). 
The massive environmental disaster evoked large-scale citizen journalism practices 
on social media platforms. With the help of ICTs, ordinary people are no longer 
satisfied to seek information from news media or emergency agencies; they are more 
active in providing information through internet and social media platforms in times 
of crises (Palen & Liu, 2007). In the aftermath of the Tianjin explosions, many local 
residents and volunteers recorded and uploaded numerous images to social media 
platforms by using their smartphones. A cartoon named “the world’s coolest 
retrograde” (see Figure 3.1) went viral on Weibo in a short time, due to it triggered 
Chinese citizens’ affect and emotions towards the sacrificed young firefighters. It 
was reposted more than 517,000 times, attracting more than 438,000 likes and 
72,000 comments. This cartoon evokes Chinese citizens’ resonance of respect to 
firemen and regret of their sacrifice. 
Meanwhile, due to lack of information and people’s distrust towards the government, 
rumours began to be prevalent on Chinese social media as a side effect of the disaster. 
In order to maintain social and political stability after explosions, the propaganda 
department saliently strengthened control and censorship on both news media and 
social media. In such circumstances, local residents saw the opportunity to establish 
alternative news publications by conducting citizen journalism. Through citizen 
journalism practices, ordinary Chinese were able to highlight social concerns, 
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organize relief activities, defend rights, and construct personal and collective 
memories.  
 
Figure 3.1 A screenshot about the Weibo post of the cartoon uploaded on13th August 
2015. The caption is, “The world’s coolest retrograding”. 
3.1.2 Finding participants  
In September 2016, one month after the one-year anniversary of the Tianjin 
explosions, I went to TBNA (also called Tanggu), China to investigate how local 
residents utilized social media with visual features in response to the 2015 Tianjin 
explosions by conducting fieldwork. However, because the topic was still highly 
sensitive in China when I conducted the fieldwork, gaining access to interviewees 
who were blast victims or local residents at the time of the Tianjin explosions proved 
to be more difficult than anticipated. There was never any reply after I sent a brief 
self-introduction, research introduction, and interview invitation via the message 
function on Weibo to people who engaged in discussions of the Tianjin explosions. 
At the same time, a friend is a journalist who reported on the Tianjin explosions in 
China invited me to join a WeChat group called ‘group of media and property 
owners’ (媒体业主群). This group was created to exchange information between 
affected house owners and journalists working in domestic or international media. 
Again, I was rejected when I tried to connect with the blast victims in the group. 
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Many people were worried that it might cause potential political risk if they accepted 
interviews with a PhD student with an overseas educational background.  
After failing in contacting people via Chinese social media, I changed my strategy of 
recruiting participants. Using my personal connections and the method of 
snowballing was the only possible way to recruit enough participants in this 
politically sensitive case. Besides, through reading relevant materials such as blogs 
and media reports, I also found some clues that two people with professional 
backgrounds could contribute their experiences to my research and enrich the variety 
of the interview samples. During the fieldwork in Tianjin, some interviewees kindly 
introduced their friends or neighbours to me to help me complete the data collection 
for the 2015 Tianjin explosions. Due to the ethics requirements, all interviewees are 
anonymous in this chapter, and the demographic information is listed in Table 3.1. 
All the interviewees were very open and helpful when interviewed, and their 
contributions to this research are appreciated. Even though the online debates about 
the Tianjin explosions have faded out and parts of the visual materials are gone due 
to being censored by authorities or deleted voluntarily by users, there are still plenty 
of images left on social media or archived privately that deserved to be explored.  
Table 3.1 List of interviewees 
# Name Age Gender Occupation 
1 PS.Z 38 M Consultant 
2 W.M 34 M Manager 
3 T.Z 28 F Designer 
4 D.Z 27 F Translator 
5 XC.L 32 F Lab engineer 
6 X.Z 36 M Self-employed 
7 J.C 45 M Photojournalist 
8 GB.Z 23 M NGO staff 
9 YL.W 35 M Sales 
10 YF.W 31 M Logistics business 
 
This chapter mainly seeks to address how local residents utilized citizen journalism 
as a visual social media practice to produce alternative information through social 
media in the aftermath of an environmental disaster in China, a country where news 
media are tightly controlled by the government. As an alternative crisis 
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communication, citizen journalism has been recognized as major online activism that 
challenges official discourses in times of crisis or disaster in China (Xu, 2016). In 
this chapter, based on the data collection, I suggest that networked ordinary Chinese 
have adopted storytelling as a newly emerged form of citizen journalism to produce 
alternative information in an affective way through social media in order to break the 
monopoly of information by the government and enhance the visibility of ordinary 
people’s voice online.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections. It begins with a background 
introduction to the rise of citizen journalism on China’s internet and then analyses its 
peculiar Chinese characteristics in crisis communication. Since WeChat has been 
prominently used in this case, the second section focuses on exploring how and why 
ordinary Chinese prefer to use a relatively closed platform to distribute first-hand 
reporting of news stories as a peer-to-peer communication strategy in times of 
disaster, especially when the topic is politically sensitive. Based on the conceptual 
framework of affective news stories by Papacharissi (2015), apart from presenting 
four examples provided by interviewees, the third section also illustrates 
what content of news stories was produced and circulated during the period from the 
aftermath of explosions to the one-year anniversary and explores how people who 
were more or less involved in the explosions turned an environmental disaster into a 
variety of stories based on their first-hand experiences at the scene. To highlight 
more political, social, and cultural meanings behind those amateur news stories and 
the affective turn that occurred in alternative crisis communication in China, the last 
section does not merely analyse what news values drive people to produce affective 
news stories, but also discusses how those citizen journalists played a role of 
gatewatcher in producing and disseminating the information of an environmental 
disaster. 
3.2 Chinese characteristics of citizen journalism in 
times of crisis 
3.2.1 Chinese characteristics of crisis communication 
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The major focus of this chapter is on how local people conducted citizen journalism 
to respond to a public crisis in the case of the 2015 Tianjin explosions. According to 
Fearn-Banks (2011, p. 2), crisis communication refers to ‘dialog between the 
organization and its public(s) prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence. The 
dialog details strategies and tactics designed to minimize damage to the image of the 
organization’. Fearn-Banks (2011) has also pointed out that as a part of crisis 
management, effective crisis communication can reduce or eliminate the negative 
influences caused by crises. From the government’s perspective, when people’s lives 
and property are at risk due to a disaster, crisis communication is critical in order to 
release timely and accurate information, reduce social panic, and maintain social and 
political stability (Xu, 2016). However, although the Chinese government has made 
progress in improving the openness of its information system, China’s media have 
rarely reported news in times of crisis. 
In the context of China, mass media have served as an agent of maintaining social 
and political stability to meet the Party’s needs, especially in times of crisis (Chin-Fu, 
2013), rather than playing an important role in filling the information gap between 
the government and the public. In reality, local media organizations are not allowed 
to report facts in times of critical events unless they can get the permission from the 
propaganda departments at upper levels (Chen, 2008). Therefore, there has long been 
criticism – from both inside and outside the country – of China’s mass media’s lack 
of transparency, timeliness, and accountability (A. P. Liu, 1971; Su, 1994), although 
news coverage still carries some basic functions of information and surveillance in 
times of crisis (Chen, 2008).  
The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2003 is one of the most 
representative cases that validate this criticism. When SARS broke out as a small-
scale local disease in Guangzhou at the end of 2002, the government mislead the 
public with false information, refused to publish the exact number of infected people, 
and exerted tight control over media reports (Yu, 2007). Eventually, the SARS 
epidemic had not merely swept through the whole country but had also become a 
cross-border pandemic. Lidan Chen (2008) has pointed out that the government did 
not act transparently or accountably due to its conventional practice of minimizing 
the exposure of negative information. Jian Xu (2016) has noted that the logic behind 
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such practices was that the government was worried that the negative news may 
trigger large-scale social chaos.  
The conventional mode of crises communication may cause the delay of information 
flow between the public, news media, and government departments (Chen, 2008). 
According to the official policies and regulations, an important principle of reporting 
public crises in China is that all coverage to the outside world must be approved by 
the Central Propaganda Department and directly managed by the responsible 
authorities, with the news reports centrally released by the Xinhua News Agency 
(CCP-CPD, 1994). Apart from the case of SARS, this could also explain why 
interviewees complained that they could not find any effective information from 
local TV channels shortly after the explosions. As a result, the information gap in the 
early stage of the explosions triggered local residents’ desire to fill the gap through 
constantly posting their first-hand experiences on social media. Furthermore, because 
the information cannot be sufficiently disseminated in the disaster area, rumours are 
always spread quickly and spin out of control. 
The SARS epidemic in 2003 has become a turning point of reforming the 
conventional mode of crisis communication in China (Xu, 2016). According to Chen 
(2008), the central government has been more proactive in establishing an open 
information system since 2003. A number of related regulatory documents were 
slowly released. In January 2006, the State Council published a National Emergency 
Response Plan,4 which marked the establishment of a new open information system 
for handling different types of emergency incidents. In August 2007, the Emergency 
Response Law was passed, which offers a comprehensive framework for government 
departments to institutionalize crisis management and crisis communication. 
However, although the government has made more efforts to improve media 
operations, the conventional mode has not been completely abandoned and the 
entanglement of proactive and repressive approaches still effectively limits the 
information flow in times of crisis. With the emergence and rise of citizen journalism 
in China, social media and mobile technologies help non-professional journalists 
spread information and break the monopoly dominated by state-run media and 
Chinese people are able to obtain more information that they could not reach before. 
 
4 See http://www.gov.cn/yjgl/2006-01/08/content_21048.htm.  
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In this sense, the rise of citizen journalism in the context of China represents a 
bottom-up form of crisis communication. 
3.2.2 The rise of citizen journalism in China 
In today’s society, citizen journalism has become an integral part of news gathering 
and delivery (Wall, 2015). However, although scholars have provided a variety of 
definitions for the term ‘citizen journalism’ (Glaser, 2006; Goode, 2009; J. Y. Nip, 
2006; Stuart, 2009), there is not a certain one that has been agreed upon. From a 
general perspective, it consists of a wide range of internet-based journalistic practices 
that ordinary people engage in (Goode, 2009). In order to describe the phenomenon 
of amateur news reporting in detail in an environmental disaster, I have adopted a 
relatively specific definition of citizen journalism, which is ‘the act of a citizen, or a 
group of citizens, playing an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, 
analysing and disseminating news and information … [in order to] provide 
independent, reliable, accurate, wide-ranging and relevant information that a 
democracy requires’ (Bowman & Willis, 2003, p. 9). 
The reason for the rise of citizen journalism in Chinese society is mainly attributed to 
the government, which has persistently implemented intricate information control 
and censorship on China’s news media and internet (Chin-Fu, 2013; Xin, 2010; Xu, 
2016). This is totally different from Western societies, where the rise of citizen 
journalism in democratic counties has occurred due to the long-term financial crisis 
and technological challenges that the news industry is facing (Lievrouw, 2011). As 
previously mentioned, China’s regulations and laws have limited the possibilities for 
news media to be transformed into a genuine watchdog. However, through the 
development of ICTs, ordinary Chinese have obtained the ability to intervene in and 
transform the top-down official crisis communication by delivering crafted messages 
to a precise public much faster than traditional methods can. 
Similar to Western societies, recent technological developments are the crucial 
driving force of the rise of citizen journalism in China, and citizen journalism is 
particularly prevalent in times of crisis. By conducting journalistic practices on the 
internet, ordinary users become not merely consumers but simultaneously also 
producers of news. Citizen journalism emerged in Western countries in the late 
 
 
50 
1990s (Bruns, 2018) and then became noticeable during the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
2001 and prominent during the South Asian tsunami in 2004 (Outing, 2005). 
According to J. Y. M. Nip (2009), the Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 was the first 
time that Chinese amateur journalists provided on-the-ground eyewitness reports of a 
disaster through online communication networks. At that time, Chinese citizen 
journalism primarily took place on online forums and blogs. By using digital and 
mobile technologies, ordinary Chinese are thus able to constantly upload news 
images and stories on the internet and successfully evoke large-scale interactions 
among audiences online. 
With the advent of Web 2.0, ordinary Chinese are empowered to establish alternative 
voices and make them reach as many audiences as mainstream media can. Mobile 
technologies and social media do not merely lower the barriers for ordinary people to 
participate in citizen journalism practices but also increasingly provide people with 
an open, prompt, and interactive platform to circulate, exchange, and debate their 
opinions about public events. Without a doubt, social media enable citizens to 
engage in first-hand reporting on ongoing events immediately on the ground. In 
China, citizen journalists have played a more significant role in bringing first-hand 
breaking news to audiences than mainstream media have in a series of public crises 
in recent years. It has become a common phenomenon that amateur materials are 
adopted as important original news sources by the state-run news media in China. 
Antony and Thomas (2010) have noted that through engaging in various forms of 
participatory publishing via social media, such as posts and image-sharing, people 
without professional journalism training are able to subvert the ‘vertical, top-down, 
passive, one-way flow of information’ (Birdsall, 2007, p. 2) from traditional media 
and set agendas themselves. As a result, these alternative discourses can be 
manifested before the public.  
While most of Western social media have been blocked in China, Chinese people 
still have plenty of social media platforms tailored by local internet companies. In 
recent years, with the evolution of social media, Weibo (a Twitter-like microblog) 
and WeChat (an instant messaging app attached to a variety of affordances) have 
become two leading social media platforms that amateur journalists use to distribute 
the news content in China. For example, on 23 July 2011, two high-speed trains 
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collided in Wenzhou, a southeast coastal city in China, killing 40 people and injuring 
more than 200 people (Han, 2017). According to Wines and LaFraniere (2011), 
within 10 minutes following the train crash, some passengers at the scene had 
already posted a few messages to report the collision on Weibo. Although they were 
short and fragmented, these first-hand reporting messages successfully attracted 
nation-wide attention to the collision on Weibo. However, due to the crackdown on 
Weibo launched by the government in December 2013, Chinese social media users 
have gradually shifted to the relatively closed and private platform WeChat 
(Svensson, 2014).  
Based on the interviews, I found that almost all interviewees in this case used 
WeChat as the only platform to distribute and disseminate their affective news 
stories of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, though Weibo has also played an important 
role in circulating disaster information. Therefore, to offer a better understanding of 
the choice made by interviewees, the following section discusses this remarkable 
phenomenon of migration as a change of peer-to-peer communication strategies in 
times of crisis and disaster in China.  
3.3 WeChat as a platform for news storytelling  
Unlike other environmental incidents that previously occurred in China, interviewees 
involved in the 2015 Tianjin explosions prominently used WeChat as their primary 
social media platform to distribute information. In previous cases, such as a series of 
anti-PX projects in different Chinese cities, people normally chose Weibo to fight for 
environmental justice due to its openness and capability of stirring nationwide debate. 
Although the private features have constrained people to different small groups and 
limited the possibility that information could be circulated with nation-wide 
influence like on Weibo, WeChat successfully creates a closely connected social 
ecosystem where pluralistic interests can be presented and coexist (Tu, 2016). 
According to the interviews, at the time of the explosions, some features of WeChat 
have provided local people with the opportunity to exchange information and news 
and organize and mobilize collective actions that could address issues of local 
community concern, despite WeChat mainly being designed for personal and 
entertainment uses. With versatile functions that are constantly developed, it seems 
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that WeChat has provided local people with a one-stop service in this case. Given the 
highly political sensitivity of this event, using WeChat instead of Weibo can be 
recognized as a new individual communicative strategy to fill information gaps and 
highlight alternative voices in times of disaster. 
Not limited to this case, Chinese social media users have used WeChat more 
frequently than Weibo in daily life. The external reason for many users’ migration to 
WeChat is the decline of Weibo. Since Weibo had played more and more important 
role in facilitating public participation, the government has considered it the main 
battlefield for maintaining the country’s ideological security (J. Y. Nip & Fu, 2016). 
During the summer of 2013, in response to ‘rumours’ about Weibo, the Chinese 
government launched its largest crackdown in years. A judicial clause released in 
September 2013 meant that people can be charged for defamation if their slanderous 
posts are read by 5,000 or more users or reposted 500 times or more (Mu, 2013). In 
this crackdown, opinion leaders and Big Vs (verified microbloggers with huge 
followings) became the targets (Svensson, 2014). They were not merely invited to 
publicize the official line of propaganda via their accounts; some critical 
microbloggers were arrested for spreading rumours or charged with other criminal 
offences (J. Y. Nip & Fu, 2016). Svensson (2014) once stated that the most 
prominent impact that Weibo has had Chinese society is that it has enabled ordinary 
Chinese to share their sentiments and opinions in public. However, there is no doubt 
that the crackdown did not merely stifle the progress of China’s civil society in the 
cradle; it also hastened the migration from Weibo to WeChat. 
In addition, Weibo’s commercial strategy that largely privileges a certain group of 
users keeps ordinary Chinese’s voices on the margins. Apart from state control and 
censorship, the commercial strategy is also an important force that guides speech and 
connectivity on China’s social media (Svensson, 2014). To boost its popularity and 
compete with other Chinese social media companies, Weibo privileges a certain 
group of influential individuals by the verification procedure called ‘Big Vs’ (Wang, 
She, & Chen, 2014). This verification scheme is actually based on the real-name 
registration system for Chinese internet users. Through identifying the genuineness 
of users’ accounts and adding a capitalized letter ‘V’ alongside the user name, Weibo 
has offered the endorsement of official credit and trustworthiness and a special status 
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to influential people such as celebrities, opinion leaders, journalists, public 
intellectuals, scholars, organizations, and so on. With huge numbers of followers on 
Weibo, this group of certain users has thus obtained more impact when discussing 
public events and promoting social issues. It has become a common phenomenon 
that marginalized people seek Big Vs’ help to defend their rights by addressing them 
with @username in their posts. In contrast, due to limited social network resources, 
ordinary users’ voices are difficult to hear unless they are creative or strategically 
take advantage of the platform (Svensson, 2014). 
One internal reason for the transition to WeChat is that it provides a highly private 
environment, which ensures that users have a comparatively safe channel to 
exchange information and mobilize collective actions. Based on the case study of the 
Maoning anti-PX protest in China, Lee and Ho (2014) have found that WeChat is 
comparatively free from censorship in contrast with other social media platforms. 
Although the Chinese government has paid more attention to governing WeChat, the 
statistics show that 16.25% of posts are censored on Weibo (Bamman, O'Connor, & 
Smith, 2012), but only 1.5% of posts from public accounts were censored by the 
authorities and 2.44% of posts were self-censored on WeChat (Tu, 2016). Tu (2016) 
has also noted that censorship on WeChat mainly focuses on public accounts, and 
users still have a plenty of ways to bypass it. It is fair to say that the private 
environment on WeChat reduces the potential political risks for users, and they are 
able to enjoy a certain degree of freedom of expression on the platform. As a result, 
in the wake of explosions, local residents chose WeChat as a primary platform to 
organize, mobilize, and coordinate collective actions to defend their rights. For 
example, Interviewee YL joined a couple of WeChat groups immediately upon 
invitations from his neighbours, whose properties were damaged to different extents, 
in order to be united to defend their rights. According to his recollection, group 
members actively uploaded a variety of pictures and videos as evidence gathered for 
the purpose of negotiating compensation with the local government.  
The reinforced sense of community shaped by more intensive and exclusive social 
ties on WeChat is another important internal reason for interviewees to choose this 
platform. Centola and Macy (2007) have argued that a tighter social network is 
conducive to circulating information more effectively despite the speed and scale 
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being limited by the relatively closed environment on WeChat. In fact, acquaintance 
is the key element that constructs the connections on WeChat. According to the 
concept of ‘acquaintance society’ raised by the pioneering Chinese sociologist and 
anthropologist Xiaotong Fei (1992), in Chinese society, peoples’ relationships go 
through close friends to form connections with each other, they prefer to get to know 
other people through familiar people’s introduction, and they rely on acquaintances 
more than strangers when doing social activities. In the context of China, 
acquaintance always links to the word guanxi (关系), which can be translated as 
‘relation’ or ‘personal connections’ in English. Beyond the literal meaning, guanxi 
implies intangible emotional attachments like trust, reliability, and intimacy (J. Liu, 
2015). During the period of The Tianjin explosions, relying on his social network on 
WeChat, Interviewee PS successfully recruited more than 30 volunteers, initiated 
donations for blast victims through Moments, and organized and coordinated 
voluntary work in the WeChat group he established after the explosions.  
After the Tianjin explosions, when other social media platforms were under heavy 
censorship and the mass media were not trusted, WeChat afforded local residents a 
more free space to exchange information, publish (reliable) news, and organize 
collective actions. Although the speed and scale of information dissemination on 
WeChat is in question, it still has potential to allow information to easily traverse the 
overlapping networks and go viral in a short time (Harwit, 2017). In such 
circumstances, WeChat quickly rises to prominence and facilitates the dissemination 
of information in times of crisis. Based on the interviews, I found that the relatively 
safe and reliable environment with storytelling infrastructure on WeChat Moments 
provides ordinary Chinese with an ideal platform to share how local residents 
experienced the disaster, and such content is less likely to be seen on China’s 
mainstream media. To illustrate the content of the news stories and the intention 
behind, the next section presents and analyses a number of representative examples 
provided by the interviewees.  
3.4 Samples of affective news stories 
According to the WeChat posts provided by interviewees, they prominently produced 
news stories by conducting citizen journalism practices to describe what they 
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experienced at the scenes after the explosions. The common nature of these samples 
is that the tone of the stories is affective. Similar to the tweets studied by 
Papacharissi (2015) in the case of the 2011 Egypt uprising, the affective news stories 
in this case also mixed ‘emotion with opinion and drama with fact’, which ‘reflect[ed] 
deeply subjective accounts and interpretation of events as they unfolded’ (p. 56). By 
adopting both textual and visual narratives, local residents produced and circulated 
particular feelings in their affective news stories to trigger resonance among their 
social networks.  
In this section, four selected samples might be helpful to illustrate what particular 
feelings local residents were conveying and to consider how they turned a massive 
disaster into a variety of affective news stories in this case. In addition, by analysing 
when the news stories were being told, we have found that all collected visual data 
was updated in three different stages. Therefore, this section also traces the 
progression of the news stories over one year’s time in order to illustrate a whole 
picture of what the prominent broadcasting tendencies are in this case. 
3.4.1 A continued story of a certificate 
On the evening of 12 August 2015, around 11:00 PM, Interviewee PS.Z saw that a 
few pieces of fragmented visual information about the explosions, such as footage 
and pictures, were posted by his friends in his WeChat friend circle who were living 
in TBNA. PS had worked and lived with his family in TBNA for many years. Later, 
he moved to Tianjin city because of work changes, but he still kept two properties, 
which are located in one of the three most affected residential complexes near the 
blast site and were badly damaged in the explosions. According to the visual content, 
PS.Z confirmed the authenticity of the information and the severity of the explosions. 
To check the damage on their properties, he and his wife decided to go to TBNA 
overnight. At the same time, they also prepared some emergency supplies to help the 
local victims.  
The next morning, PS.Z uploaded a picture of a certificate (see Figure 3.1) to 
WeChat when he found it lying on the floor with glass shards from one of his 
properties. This certificate belongs to his neighbour, a primary school student. In the 
post, the attached caption said, ‘Hi little friend Zhuang Zimo, are you staying safe? I 
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will keep the certificate for you’. One year later, on the first anniversary of the 
explosions, PS.Z posted the picture of the certificate on WeChat again and developed 
the story as a commemoration of the explosions (see Figure 3.2): 
‘On the morning of 13th August last year, I picked up a certificate at the 
messy corridor in the residential complex Jinyu Lanwan, one kilometre away 
from the blast site. Afterwards, I entrusted a coach who is working at the 
football club that Zhuang Zimo participates in to help me pass it on to him.’ 
In the interview, PS.Z explained what factors drove him to document the certificate 
and circulate the story: 
‘I did that based on affective factors. Certificate is a kind of honour. Innocent 
children attach more importance to this spiritual thing than adults do, but 
this certificate ended up on the staircase. This scene reminds people that 
there must have been a panic situation so that this highly-valued certificate 
which would have been placed in the most important position was trampled 
under feet. This was a radical change in spirit and emotion, so I was shocked 
at that time. I posted this in the moments to remember the chaos, while at the 
same time hoping to find the owner of this certificate, to alleviate the 
suffering coming with the explosion, to get people back on their normal track. 
In addition, this certificate was finally given back to its little owner, which 
was a spiritual comfort for me.’ 
As the government exerted tight control, China’s news media was quiet on the one-
year anniversary. During the interviews, not only PS.Z but also other interviewees 
noted that the topic had gradually faded out in the public as time went by. ‘This 
tragedy should not be completely forgotten. It should be recalled at an appropriate 
time if it has been forgotten, in order to avoid it would be happened again.’ PS.Z 
explained the purpose of furthering the story he believes to be meaningful and 
sharing it with his social network at a special time. 
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Figure 3.2 (left) A screenshot of PS.Z’s WeChat friend circle from 13 August 2015. 
Figure 3.3 (right) A screenshot of PS.Z’s WeChat friend circle from12 August 2016. 
3.4.2 A story of firefighters 
A short time after the Tianjin explosions, several widespread images of firefighters 
resulted in various public and official responses on both Weibo and WeChat. 
According to a news report (The Guardian, 2015), a total of 104 young firefighters 
were killed in this disaster, and some of them were only 19 years old. Numerous 
posts praising the firefighters’ efforts flooded China’s social media platforms. For 
example, a cartoon of a firefighter moving against a tide of people to reach to the 
blast site posted on Weibo with the hashtag #TheWorldsMostHandsomeRetrograde 
went viral in a short time. It was reposted more than 700,000 times, attracting more 
than 57,000 comments and 300,000 likes in a few hours (Dwyer & Xu, 2015). At the 
same time, a screenshot of the message exchange on WeChat between one unnamed 
fireman and his friend has been shared thousands of times on Chinese social media 
(Chiu, 2015). This conversation happened before the firefighter was heading to the 
blast site, and in it, he asked his friends to ‘visit my mother’s grave’ (BBC, 2015). 
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However, amid the praise, there was a voice to question how the Tianjin explosions 
were handled. 
Feng, a 31-year-old local resident in TBNA, joined a local voluntary association the 
day after the Tianjin explosions. In the period of being a volunteer, he was in charge 
of logistics including distributing food and managing medicines; therefore, he had 
contact with firefighters and observe their working routine. Late at night on 14 
August 2015, two days after the explosions, Feng documented and posted a picture 
of an empty fire station he saw when he was on his way to do voluntary work. In this 
post, Feng shared a conversation between himself and a firefighter to express his 
gratitude to these heroes (see Figure 3.3): 
Have you seen the sentry box at the left bottom in the picture? There is a 
firefighter who did not go to the blasted site. He does not switch on the light 
and was sitting there in the dark alone. I asked him if he needs any relief 
goods. He said no, and thanked us with bowing to salute and folding his 
hands. Can you imagine how sad he felt like when he was talking? You really 
cannot understand how heartbroken I was when I saw these firemen 
(heartbroken emoji). Thank these great firemen, you are the most lovely 
people. You are the security assurance for people in Tianjin, and people in 
Tianjin are your reliable family! 
In the interview, Feng explained that what he saw about how firefighters work on the 
spot was the main thing that caused him to focus on publishing the firefighters’ story:  
‘Many of them died at the blast site when the explosions happened, so I paid 
much attention on these firefighters … When I was being a volunteer, the fire 
stations I went were already empty. No fire trucks, no firefighters. It was a 
difficult feeling when I saw no one else was in the building … I was deeply 
moved by them. It was not an easy job for them … The firefighters I saw are 
all kids, much younger than me.’  
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Figure 3.4 A screenshot of Feng’s WeChat post updated on 14 August 2015. 
3.4.3 A story of the city in the aftermath of the explosions 
The massive chemical explosions led to the whole city being enveloped by harmful 
air pollutants for a while. Numerous local residents escaped from the severe pollution 
to other places, and the interviewee Wei was one of them. On 16 August 2015, four 
days after the explosions, he settled his family in a neighbouring city and came back 
home to collect some belongings. On the way to his apartment by car, he saw that the 
once-prosperous city had become an empty one. There were only a few of cars 
parked on the streets, and some buildings did not have any lights on. The post-
explosions scenes impressed Wei, so he took six pictures of the residential complex 
he was living in and immediately posted them on WeChat (see Figure 3.4). When I 
interviewed him at his office in TBNA, he could still clearly remember what he 
posted that day. In his post, he described a story to share the scenes of the city after 
the explosions with people: 
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In the aftermath of explosions, Tanggu has become an empty city. After four 
days have passed, what does Tanggu look like now? It is recovering 
gradually. This is my home – Xinzijingangyun residential area – about five 
kilometres away from the blasted site. The occupancy rate is about 30 
percentage. You can come back if you are bold enough. 
 
Figure 3.5 A screenshot of Wei’s WeChat post updated on 16 August 2015. 
3.4.4 A story of the one-year anniversary 
On the one-year anniversary of the Tianjin explosions, some interviewees 
spontaneously updated stories in WeChat to commemorate the disaster. Though a 
year had passed, the topic of the 2015 Tianjin explosions was still politically 
sensitive in China. Apart from the memorial ceremony held by the local government, 
the authorities muted other tributes and relevant media reports (BBC, 2016). The 
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quiet performance on mainstream media somewhat increased this decline of public 
attention. In this circumstance, some interviewees attempted to break the quiet and 
enhance the visibility of it in public by posting and circulating the news stories 
among personal social networks.  
On 12 August 2016, the interviewee Feng took a picture of a badly damaged clock 
tower in front of a railway station in TBNA (see Figure 3.5), which is 500 or 600 
meters away from the blast site, and then posted it in his WeChat Moments to mourn 
the young people who lost their lives in the explosions. In his new story, he described 
the details of the clock tower he observed to remind people not to forget: 
How time flies. A year just gone. Although this clock tower is being 
demolished, the time indicated by the clock pointers is fixed forever, 23.32 pm. 
Although the disaster is not reported by the media nor mentioned by the 
government anymore, people in Tianjin will never forget those lives that have 
been taken on this land. Gratitude. Commemoration. May they rest in peace.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Screenshot of Feng’s WeChat post updated on 12 August 2016. 
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3.4.5 Three visual information flows 
In this case study, local residents prominently made contributions to create news-
oriented content in the form of storytelling based on their first-hand experiences. 
These non-professional journalists turned their digital cameras on capturing historical 
moments, which provide not merely a kind of personal document but also the local 
residents’ draft of history of Tianjin explosions in 2015. The visual journalistic 
practice has been done in this case is quite similar to citizen photojournalism.  On 
one hand, the citizen-created eyewitness images show a crisis-driven paradigm and 
were used to tell the public about the stories of what have transpired on the spot. 
With strongly amateur aesthetics, these images provided an unforeseen scene of the 
explosions and an alternative channel of information to the public. On the other hand, 
different with citizen photojournalism, the storytelling within the form of citizen 
journalism is text-based with images rather than pure visual rhetoric. In this case, the 
texts supplied more emotional details which cannot be delivered by the images. It is 
fair to say that text plays an equally important role as image in provoking people’s 
affect and emotions.     
Although the voluntary and unpaid nature prevents interviewees from engaging in 
intensive or regular first-hand news reporting (Bruns, 2018), the proactive 
engagement by local residents formed three visual information flows of citizen 
reporting of the 2015 Tianjin explosions on WeChat friend circles. The three 
information flows occurred separately at different stages in time, and the timespan 
was one year.  
The earliest resources of visual information following the Tianjin explosions that 
emerged on WeChat were the images that captured the moments of the explosions. 
Although this flow lasted for a short time and could not provide sufficient content to 
meet people’s demands, these eyewitness images of the explosions’ impact 
immediately provided updates and evoked national discussions about the explosions. 
After watching the videos, thousands of people began to organize offline citizen-side 
voluntarily activities on social media, particularly on WeChat. According to the 
interviews, some people prominently reposted and circulated the information in order 
to expand the influence of the explosions on social media, though none of the 
interviewees captured such images. On WeChat, interviewees did not merely repost 
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the related information via Moments but also forwarded it to different groups they 
were in to expand the influence as broadly as they could. 
Due to the sudden onset and short impact of the first flow, the content of information 
in the earliest flow was limited and mainly about the impact of the incident. Scholars 
(S. B. Liu, Palen, Sutton, Hughes, & Vieweg, 2008) have noted that the members of 
the public have an urgent demand for more accurate, relevant, and reliable 
information online in the immediate post-disaster time, and the pervasiveness of ICT 
has made everyone capable of being an information seeker. After the explosions, the 
delayed news report from official media caused an information gap in the public. 
According to the interviews, after the evacuation at midnight, some victims urgently 
searched for information regarding the explosions through multiple channels 
including social media, television news, news portal websites, and baidu.com (the 
most popular search engine in China). The victim T.Z described the information gap 
she had been through: 
‘I just kept an eye on the news (by using mobile phone) to see if they 
upgraded or not, trying to found out what exactly happened, because nobody 
told us what happened on earth. I looked through all the news websites 
including Tencent and NetEase to see if there was any report about that. We 
were all speculating in the group at that time, but no one was not sure what 
happened and there were several different versions about it.’ 
As local residents posted and circulated more rich images during the process of 
engaging in the disaster, the first visual flow on social media was quickly replaced by 
the second one. The emergence and rise of the second flow proved that beyond being 
information seekers, people who have a psychological relationship with the disaster 
are prone to be information producers (Palen & Liu, 2007). Compared to the first and 
last ones, the second flow lasted longer, and local residents contributed more diverse 
visual content to fill the information gap in it. Almost all the interviewees engaged in 
this information flow, which was more about post-disaster response and recovery 
efforts. Some of interviewees even actively participated in the creation and 
circulation of news stories based on what they had experienced at the scene of the 
explosions. Some interviewees emphasized that an important reason to document and 
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share the first-hand images on WeChat is to refute rumours. This flow faded out a 
couple of weeks after the explosions. 
Around the one-year anniversary of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, the third and last 
information flow emerged. Related coverage on mainstream media was rare because 
the topic was still highly politically sensitive in China. Therefore, the citizen-side 
news story sharing was more significant. By publishing the commemorative content 
from different perspectives on social media, this group of citizen journalists did not 
merely break the silence by the mainstream media and make an alternative voice but 
also created awareness of resistance among trusted friends. 
In this case, the visual materials played an equally important role to that of the 
detailed captions. These first-hand pictures and short videos documented by posters 
effectively increased the credibility of the news stories. The samples above have 
proved that camera phone images are conducive to moulding the depiction of news 
stories and adding more affect to them. In addition to filling the information gap, it is 
fair to say that the local residents attempted to evoke and communicate social 
empathy and solidarity by creating and sharing the affective news stories. The 
various perspectives of news stories also demonstrate that non-professional forms of 
news creation can be ‘informative’, ‘newsworthy’, and ‘therapeutic’ in times of 
disaster (S. B. Liu et al., 2008).  
3.5 Affective news storytelling: news values, forms, 
and the major role 
 
Through the eyes of citizen journalists, many audiences were able to see what 
happened at a closer distance with more details after the explosions. What stories 
were selected and published for attention on WeChat represents what news values 
were at the time of the 2015 Tianjin explosions. To get a better understanding of why 
local residents conducted citizen journalism practices, this section begins with an 
examination of what news values and forms were adopted by the local residents to 
capture the event of the 2015 Tianjin explosions. Moreover, based on the 
examination of the driving factors behind the news stories, this section takes a step 
forward to discuss the major roles of citizen journalists in times of disaster in China.  
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3.5.1 News values and forms of the affective news stories 
on WeChat 
John Hartley (2002) has emphasized that news values are about news stories rather 
than the events themselves, and what elements make a story newsworthy are 
constantly evolving. As the worst man-induced disaster in China, there is no doubt 
that the 2015 Tianjin explosions have been prioritized for reporting. Through 
analysing the selected samples, it is evident that the local residents instantly turned 
the event into various news stories based on their first-hand reporting at the scene. 
This section adopts two categories of news values proposed by John Hartley to 
interpret what drove those citizen journalists to select the stories they did to explain 
the explosions afterwards (2002, p. 166): 
· News values prioritize stories about events that are recent, sudden, unambiguous, 
predictable, relevant, and close to the relevant culture/class/location.
∙ News stories need to appeal to readers/viewers, so they must be commonsensical,
entertaining and dramatic (like fiction), and visual.
According to Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012), news stories regarding 
large-scale incidents published on social media platforms such as Twitter combine 
traditional news values and the values that have particularly emerged on the social 
media platform. To illuminate the traditional new values indicated among the 
samples, this study borrows McQuail’s conception of traditional news values, which 
includes the large scale of events, closeness to home, clarity of meaning, short time 
scale, relevance, consonance, personification, significance, negativity, and drama and 
action (2002). In this case, all the stories are about what the local residents 
experienced at the scene, so the news values of closeness to home and relevance can 
be found in all the news stories. To be more specific, closeness to home is mainly 
manifested by the words ‘Tanggu’, ‘Tianjin’, and ‘people in Tianjin’, and relevance 
is represented by the various story themes of the explosions. Besides, the story of 
firefighters reflects personification, drama and action are represented by the story of 
the certificate, and the clarity of meaning is evidently indicated in the 
commemorative story of the one-year anniversary.  
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Apart from traditional news values, the affective news stories in this case also reflect 
some prominent news values that have specifically emerged on social media. Based 
on Papacharissi’s work on news values that have emerged on Twitter (2015), there 
are another three news values behind the samples: instantaneity, solidarity, and 
ambience. According to the interviews, most collected data including the samples 
were instantly published by interviewees at the scene. After the explosions, China’s 
mainstream media were tightly controlled by the government; however, the 
affordances of mobile technologies and WeChat provided people with an opportunity 
to record and report the event instantly. The instantaneity of information updating by 
citizen journalists met the urgency of information-seeking among audiences. 
Meanwhile, as local residents in Tianjin, most of the interviewees are bound to local 
communities. Therefore, calling for or reinforcing solidarity through affective news 
storytelling is more likely to be accepted by their WeChat followers and cause wide 
resonance among them. In addition, the three visual information flows maintained 
ambience, which is ‘an ambient information sharing environment’ (p. 276) regarding 
the Tianjin explosions on WeChat. Although there was a large timespan between the 
second and third flows, the constantly and continuously updated news stories 
provided audiences with an always-on phenomenon.  
The form of the affective news stories on WeChat is strongly visual in character. 
Based on Hartley’s work on news process and values, Papacharissi and de Fatima 
Oliveira (2012) have suggested that the importance of news values on social media is 
not merely in shaping how events turn into stories but also in shaping the forms of 
news stories told. In the case of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, news storytelling 
became a process of turning the event into ‘atomized yet networked’ (Papacharissi, 
2015, p. 39) stories. Unlike Weibo, which limits users to 140 Chinse characters in 
each post, there is no restriction on the number of characters in WeChat friend circles. 
However, given the collected data, almost all the news stories in this case are short, 
simple, and affective. Compared to the traditional news report, emojis has been 
applied in the expression of news storytelling in order to add affective factors. Apart 
from photographs, the function of 10-second videos was commonly adopted to 
record an accurate and authentic version of the interviewees’ reality. In the practice 
of citizen journalism, visual images are not merely a critical part of emulating the 
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professional forms of news reports but also supplement news content with visual 
narratives. 
3.5.2 Citizen journalists as gate-watchers 
With the prevalence of social media, the major role of citizen journalists has shifted 
from gate-keeper to gate-watcher (Bruns, 2005). The conception of gate-watching 
refers to ‘the continuous observation of material that passes through the output gates 
of news outlets and other sources, in order to identify relevant such material for 
publication and discussion in the gaterwatchers’ own site’ (Bruns, 2018, p. 27). In 
the process of news production, news stories can be selected completely depending 
on what citizen journalists are interested in and what they believe could make a 
meaningful contribution (Bruns, 2018). Therefore, Alex Bruns (2018) has noted that, 
in Western society, citizen journalists play an important role in analysing, 
interoperating, and commentating. 
However, in the context of China, given the absence of professional journalists at 
some public events, it seems that Chinese citizen journalists are playing three basic 
traditional journalistic roles in times of disaster: disseminator, interpreter, and 
adversary (Weaver & Willnat, 2012). According to Reese and Dai (2009), the news 
reporting posted by Chinese journalists on social media has also been adopted to 
criticize, supplement, comment, check, and challenge the accountability of 
mainstream journalism. In this case, citizen journalists were the first to provide the 
eyewitness images of the explosions on the ground through social media. In the 
aftermath of the explosions, this group of citizen journalists maintained focus on 
monitoring the developments and updated the information instantly to meet the 
demands of the audiences they are familiar with. Finally and most importantly, in 
this case citizen journalists consciously or unconsciously played a prominent role in 
evoking empathy and solidarity among personal social networks. 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I investigated how local residents in TBNA adopted the form of a 
non-professional journalistic practice via storytelling to produce and circulate their 
first-hand experiences of the 2015 Tianjin explosions on WeChat. I also examined 
 
 
68 
the role of affective news stories in articulating local residents’ attitudes and appeals 
after a crisis. More than a reflection of reality, a news story is a creative product 
(Hartley, 2002). The local residents produced a large number of news stories as a 
personal memory to document and archive what was happened in the explosions. 
This sort of visual social media practices totally based on personal first-hand 
experiences, which are more likely to evoke other people’s affect and emotions. 
Sadness and sympathy are the major emotions strongly presented in the non-
professional journalistic practice of storytelling. These emotions directly link to local 
residents’ horror, angry, grief, and even trauma.  
What local residents creatively produced a combination of storytelling and images to 
supplement information that may not be reported in the mainstream media and 
articulate a citizen-side voice on a highly politically sensitive topic. Storytelling is an 
essential part of human experience that occurs at all levels of society (Anderson, 
1991). In the case of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, the stories produced by the 
participants completely focus on ‘us’: people who suffered in the explosions and 
those who contributed to the relief work. The first-hand images play an important 
role in nurturing the textual content of affective news stories. As an integral part of 
the storytelling, visual images are not merely the evidence to strengthen the 
authenticity of the news stories but also the key element that is beneficial to mould, 
enrich, and expand citizen-side information in times of disaster. 
As Zizi Papacharissi (2015) has pointed out, the affective news stories posted by 
citizen journalists on social media are always a mix of ‘fact with opinions, and 
objectivity with subjectivity’ (p. 267). Through analysing the examples, it is evident 
that the affect stories do not just reflect what the interviewees experienced at the 
scene but also their particular feelings and attitudes about the tragedy. In this case, 
sympathy and sadness are the two major emotions embedded in the news stories to 
solidify a sense of community and facilitate civic engagement at the neighbourhood 
level. Moreover, compared to Weibo, where ordinary people’s voices are difficult to 
hear, circulating the combination of first-hand stories and images through WeChat is 
conductive to information circulation. For other WeChat users who are outsiders, 
citizen journalism as storytelling provides them with an opportunity to access 
unknown and unexpected information about the explosions.  
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Chapter 4 Jamming the Smog: A Case 
Study of Air Pollution in Beijing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
In the last decade, most Chinese people have experienced an extraordinary amount of 
smog weather, which is caused by airborne particular matter 2.5 micrometres or less 
in diameter (PM 2.5) (G. Huang, 2015). Since PM 2.5 has significant negative health 
impacts, the issue of air pollution has become a leading social and political concern 
in Chinese society. On Chinese social media, the discussion of air pollution has 
evolved into a topic of national conversation. In particular, Chinese netizens circulate 
various forms of visual images as responses to the issue. For example, one of the 
most common practices is that people use their mobile phones to capture real-time air 
conditions and post them on social media.  
In December 2015, the authorities issued their first ever ‘red alert’ for smog to warn 
and protect people from the poisonous air in Beijing. During conversations with local 
friends, I realized that checking the index of PM 2.5 via mobile phone apps has 
become the first thing many people do after waking up in the morning because they 
need the forecast of air quality to decide whether they can take their children to do 
outdoor activities or if they should wear a smog mask when going to work. When the 
red alert for air pollution was issued again in 2016, more than 20 other Chinese cities, 
including Beijing, were enveloped in heavy smog (T. Phillips, 2016). However, due 
to its unique political, economic, and cultural status in China, air quality in the 
capital city has come under particularly heavy scrutiny. Accordingly, air pollution in 
Beijing has received more attention from both domestic and international media. 
Given these facts, this thesis particularly focuses on the issue of air pollution in 
Beijing as a representative case to conduct a research investigation. 
Drawing upon the collected data, it is interesting that compared to other 
environmental events that have occurred in China, culture jamming has never been 
so prominently employed as a response to environmental degradation as in this case. 
According to Mark Dery (2017), ‘jamming’ is the CB slang that originally described 
the illegal practice of disrupting ongoing radio broadcasts or conversations. From the 
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perspective of anti-consumerism, Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti (2005) has defined 
culture jamming as ‘chang[ing] the meaning of corporate advertising through artistic 
techniques that alter corporate logos visually and by giving marketing slogans new 
meaning’. From a social and political perspective, Christine Harold (2004, p. 192) 
has provided a commonly definition of culture jamming as ‘an interruption, a 
sabotage, hoax, prank, banditry, or blockage of what are seen as the monolithic 
power structures governing cultural life’.  
This distinct phenomenon led me to consider that why and how do Chinese people 
use culture jamming to disseminate their critical messages about a long-term 
catastrophic environmental problem via digital networks? In what ways does culture 
jamming contribute to civic engagement in China? Is culture jamming prevalent on 
social media merely because it functions as a powerful tool to articulate people’s 
critical attitudes? To address these questions, this chapter begins by providing a 
detailed context regarding how the issue of air pollution in Beijing intertwines with 
social media in the context of China. Through analysing the major forms and content 
of visual materials provided by interviewees, this chapter attempts to illustrate a 
relatively complete scenario of how ordinary people use visual images to challenge 
the transparency of pollution data. Drawing upon the conception of culture jamming, 
the main body of the chapter explores how culture jamming has been employed on 
social media in response to an unprecedented air disaster, the impact of culture 
jamming on protesting a severe environmental issue, and why local residents chose 
the means of culture jamming to articulate their opinions on the air pollution.  
This chapter is based on 10 in-depth interviews conducted by email and online voice 
calls. It must be pointed out that the visual examples presented in this chapter consist 
of two sources. One is the visual images obtained from the interviewees’ social 
media accounts (see Table 4.1) with their permission. This part of the visual data was 
either created and published or reposted from other people’s social media. The other 
is the visual images that impressed interviewees on social media during the period of 
smog; this part of the data was mined following the clues in the interviews and 
downloaded from online open resources.  
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Table 4.1: List of interviewees 
Interview 
number 
Name Age Gender Occupation 
1 Katherine Bi 34 Female Corporate staff 
2 Y. Li 27 Female Corporate staff 
3 Yi Zou 50 Male Founder of an ENGO 
4 Juqiang Song 32 Male Freelance photographer 
5 R. Song Female Corporate staff 
6 L. H 35 Female Corporate staff 
7 Lancia Huang 33 Male Internet technology company 
8 JH Wang 33 Male Internet technology company 
9 Julia Zhu 34 Female Consultant 
10 YH Liu 29 Female Performing instructor 
4.2 Air pollution in Beijing and social media 
The recent social media debate over PM 2.5 in China began in August 2008. When 
Beijing was scheduled to host the Summer Olympic Games, the U.S. embassy in 
Beijing installed a rooftop air pollution sensor and began to publish real-time data of 
PM 2.5 on their official Twitter account. This action provoked a nationwide online 
debate over air quality in China. At that time, the Chinese authorities did not widely 
collect and publicize air pollution data. For most Chinese people, the notion of PM 
2.5 was new, and thus it quickly captured the public’s attention. The perniciousness 
of the PM2.5 has been emphasized by both scientific evidence and public health 
concerns. Particle matter smaller than 2.5 micrometres is the major pollutant in 
Beijing’s dark grey sky and can easily cause health damage by penetrating and 
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lodging deep in the lungs (G. Chen, 2009). According to a report released by the 
Asian Development Bank, even before PM 2.5 became the indicator of air quality in 
China, only a few of the largest cities in China met the air quality standards provided 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) (Q. Zhang & Crooks, 2012). There is no 
doubt that poor air quality has become a life threat for millions of Chinese citizens. 
It has been proven that air pollution is difficult to eradicate. In order to present a 
positive image to the world, the Chinese government spent billions of U.S. dollars 
and made a series of stringent short-term administrative measures to reduce the air 
pollution during the Beijing Olympics. For instance, the government halted and 
relocated hundreds of industrial factories, power plants, and construction sites within 
a 150-kilometre radius of Beijing, strengthened emission control on motor vehicles, 
planted trees to prevent sandstorms, substantially developed the public transportation 
grid, and promised to reduce the pollution down to WHO standards (Mead & Brajer, 
2008). However, the blue sky and other improvements were short-lived. In the wake 
of the Olympic Games, the air pollution in Beijing became worse than ever before. It 
has become a phenomenon that air quality improves dramatically when Beijing hosts 
large events. As a result, Chinese citizens have coined a series of phrases on social 
media such as ‘Olympic Blue in 2008, ‘APEC Blue’5 in 2014, ‘Military Parade Blue’ 
in 2015, and ‘Two Conferences6 Blue’ in 2016 and 2017.  
Following the rise of microblogging in China since 2009, the debate over PM 2.5 has 
continued to build momentum on Weibo. Opinion leaders and celebrities on Weibo 
have played an important role not only in evoking and influencing online debate but 
also in pressing the authorities to improve air pollution monitoring. For example, in 
2011 when Weibo users found the disparity of published PM 2.5 data between the 
U.S. embassy twitter account and Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) 
assessments, Pan Shiyi, one of the most well-known real estate developers in China, 
not only shared his self-tested results of air pollution with his millions of followers 
but also launched a vote through his Weibo account as a call for action for the 
government to promulgate stricter standards for air quality.  
 
5 APEC stands for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summits. 
6 The term ‘two conferences’ refers to the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference. 
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The numerous public complaints on social media finally spurred the government into 
action to mitigate the issue. In February 2012, the state council approved new 
nationwide standards of air quality in which PM 2.5 detection was included for the 
first time.7 The new standards were reported as a bottom-up victory for Weibo users 
by the state-run media outlet Xinhua News Agency (Xinhua, 2012). In September 
2013, the first version of the Air Pollution Action Plan was released to help the 
country rein in air pollution. It set PM 2.5 targets for key regions and required local 
governments to make significant reductions in five years (Hao, 2018). However, 
although the government and national leaders have made a series of positive 
responses, air pollution still remains a serious problem in Chinese society. 
Although air pollution is no longer such a taboo topic in China because it is 
frequently discussed by the government and official media, there are still some 
limitations on social media. In February 2015, a self-financed documentary called 
Under the Dome, which is about the investigation of pollution and air quality in 
China, caused a national debate on social media again. The documentary was 
produced and narrated by Chai Jing, a former investigative journalist at China 
Central Television (CCTV), China’s national television network. Aside from 
drawing more than 100 million reviews on video streaming websites within 24 hours 
of its release, it also resulted in 280 million posts on Weibo (Tram, 2015). The next 
day, the newly appointed minister of environmental protection Chen Jinming praised 
the documentary as the Chinese version of Silent Spring. Over two hours long, the 
video does not merely provide an insight into the cause and extent of air pollution in 
China but also deeply criticizes the government’s lax environmental regulations and 
laws. Yuan Ren (2015) has praised the documentary for its profound impact in 
stirring up Chinese people’s awareness about the dangers of smog and its call for 
solidarity in the face of this overwhelming air pollution crisis. Not long after, 
Chinese authorities took the documentary offline. Scholars (Johnson, Mol, Zhang, & 
Yang, 2017) have noted that the main reason for its ban was because the 
documentary evoked prevalent grievances that were likely to form a collective action 
against the government. 
 
7 See http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-12/28/c_124164243.htm. 
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Apart from tightening their control on social media debates, the Chinese government 
also adopted multiple means to ease people’s discontent concerning the issue of air 
pollution. They gave citizens the impression that air pollution is a scientific problem 
rather than a political one (Kay et al., 2015). This means that the problem only needs 
to be tackled by advanced technologies rather than a fundamental shift in the political 
and/or economic structures in China. Moreover, Hongtao Li and Svarverud (2017) 
have found that through making a historical comparison between air pollution in 
contemporary China and London’s Great Smog Disaster in 1952, the Chinese state-
run news media has attempted to shape the air pollution in China as ‘an inevitable 
outcome of a particular phase of industrialization’ rather than a serious problem 
unique to China (Hongtao Li & Svarverud, 2017). Li and Svarverud (2017) have also 
pointed out that following the example of London, the state-run media has tried to 
depict a bright future for Chinese people, saying that pollution will be solved one day, 
and ‘London’s today can be Beijing’s tomorrow’ (Tian, 2013). However, due to the 
lack of effective environmental improvements, Chinese people are frustrated and 
have expressed strong impatience and mistrust towards the government (Sha, Yan, & 
Cai, 2014). 
Although the topic of air pollution has been under strict surveillance online, mobile 
technology and visual images provide ordinary Chinese people with a place to 
discuss the problem broadly. The combination of digital technologies and visual 
images does not merely provide ordinary people with a tool to challenge the 
transparency of pollution data but also plays an important role in disseminating 
people’s critical attitudes. Based on the collected visual data that has been posted on 
both WeChat and Weibo, the visual images in this case can be generally classified 
into three categories. Apart from culture jamming, another two forms of visual 
images are visual comparison and individual near real-time recoding. In what follows, 
I focus on exploring how Beijing’s residents have adopted these two forms to 
challenge the transparency of air pollution data.  
4.3 Visual measures challenging the transparency 
and veracity of air pollution data 
 
4.3.1 Real-time activism 
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With mobile technology having permeated everyday life, Chinese people have 
become used to live broadcasting ongoing events on social media platforms. M. 
Jiang (2016) has noted that these events are normally ‘provocative, scandalous, and 
intriguing’ (p.31). Simultaneously, an increasingly urgent demand to gain air 
pollution ‘facts’ has emerged, with the air pollution problem having become more 
serious in recent years. In this case, instantaneously recording and uploading images 
of the dark grey skies to social media is the most common visual social media 
practice. According to Min Jiang (2016), this form of social practice can be 
recognized as real-time activism, which is a new genre of media activism on China’s 
internet.  
 
With the mainstream media absent from reporting information on air pollution, and 
the government’s iron grip on social media, large-scale social confusion ensued in 
China. In such circumstances, many local residents in Beijing began to take real-time 
pictures of smog weather and post them on social media to express their concerns 
and draw more public attention. For instance, the Beijing dweller Zou Yi began to 
post a visual diary on social media in 2013 and named it ‘Apparent at First Glance’. 
In the interview, he explained his starting point: 
‘I started to record the weather on 17th January 2013. I had just learnt how to 
use Weibo and WeChat at that time. After I took the pictures of smog, I 
uploaded them to my WeChat and Weibo accounts, to share with people, 
because at that time, people were panicked, confused, and worried about the 
smog. The information and guidance people could get from official channels 
was insufficient, so people feared the smog. Under such conditions, I started 
taking pictures to record the air quality in Beijing every day.’ 
What Zou Yi photographed tapped into a deep-seated social problem in Chinese 
society. In the interview, Zou Yi admitted that the initial purpose of taking the 
pictures was to vent his complaint since the government had kept silent on the issue. 
When he realized the air pollution data published by the US embassy in Beijing and 
the EPB were different, he began to believe that his pictures were playing a role of 
telling the truth to the public. When the air quality continued to get worse, his visual 
diary of Beijing weather conditions went viral on Weibo and was widely reported by 
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both domestic and global media. These real-time pictures taken by local residents are 
a supplement to the information released by the authorities. 
 
Photographing and posting near real-time images of air pollution widely and 
frequently emerged on Chinese social media during winter when air pollution 
became severe. On 7 December 2015, the readings of PM 2.5 exceeded 900 
micrograms per cubic metre in some parts of Beijing, and the authorities declared the 
first ever red alert for smog (T. Phillips, 2015). Meanwhile, a series of preventative 
measures were implemented by Beijing authorities; for example, they temporarily 
shut down schools, suggested that residents stay indoors, and ordered thousands of 
vehicles off the roads. Red alert is the highest possible level of a four-tier warning 
system that was introduced as part of China’s high-profile war on pollution (Griffin, 
2015). In short, the air quality can be considered catastrophic when a red or yellow 
alert is issued. In 2016, air quality continued to decline, and the authorities declared a 
red alert again on 17 December 2016. At that time, there were about 22 Chinese 
cities enveloped in severe air pollution (T. Phillips, 2016).  
 
For concerned citizens, recording and posting real-time images on social media has 
become the only way to demonstrate the harmful effects of air pollution in Beijing. 
Through displaying the catastrophic environment that they are living in, interviewees 
are not only expressing their concerns and dissatisfaction but also attempting to 
attract more public attention to the issue. Some interviewees expressed a similar 
intention, saying that the reason for posting images in near real-time is because they 
‘want more people to know what the circumstance in Beijing is’. As one of the 
interviewees, LH, explained, ‘the environment we are living in is very important, I 
hope everyone can consistently keep their attention on the social topic; it effects 
every one of us’. Approximately one month before the first red alert was issued in 
Beijing in 2016, the whole city was already shrouded by heavy toxic air pollution. In 
such circumstances, another interviewee, YL, documented the view from the window 
of her office and instantaneously posted it in WeChat with an ironic caption that 
began with the colourful palette emoji and the text ‘magic realism’ (see Figure 4.1). 
During the interview, YL shared the story behind the post: 
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‘I remember that the air pollution index was over 500 when I posted that 
picture. The buildings and traffic bridge through the window were still visible 
on the photo, but in real life, I saw almost nothing. It would have been after 9 
am when we began to work that I took the picture. Beijing had an alert on 
that day, and all primary schools and high schools were closed; the 
companies decided whether the staff would work from home or not. But we 
had to work eventually. I took the picture through the window when I was in 
the office. I was just like ‘Oh, goodness me!’ I felt helpless; it is a kind of 
choking feeling. Everything outside was covered by the grey air; I just felt it 
looked like some kind of magic realm … What I want to say is, the 
government might cover the truth sometimes, or demand the media to ignore 
something, so I hope I could help people see the reality of air pollution on 
Beijing.
Figure 4.1. A screenshot of YL’s post from 3 November 2016 posted in her WeChat 
friend circle.  
Meanwhile, I found that the interviewees always like to attach a screenshot of near 
real-time air quality data to their social media posts. During the interview, YL also 
provided me with a WeChat post with the caption ‘basketball players, don’t you guys 
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want to live?’ (see Figure 4.2). In the post, there are two pictures: one is of the 
residential area being enveloped by smog, and the other is a screenshot showing that 
the average real-time PM 2.5 data in Beijing at that time was 175. According to YL’s 
recall, the visibility was low due to the heavy smog that day, so she was very 
surprised that she found someone playing basketball in such conditions. Through 
instantaneously sharing the story she witnessed, YL did not merely want to show the 
reality but also to complain about the terrible surroundings that had not been 
substantially improved in Beijing. Under the post, one of her friends left a message 
saying, ‘175 definitely is a fake number.’ 
Mistrust towards the official air quality data has spread among Beijing residents. 
Scholars (Kay et al., 2015) have noted that people have realized the disparity of 
PM2.5 readings between the U.S. embassy and China’s official measurements. On 
Weibo, Pan Shiyi has also periodically posted both air quality readings to his 16.6 
million followers. Interestingly, the U.S. embassy’s readings were always higher 
than the official Chinese measurements. It is evident that the disparity has increased 
people’s suspicion of official information. 
Therefore, some interviewees have made an effort to challenge the transparency of 
air pollution data by circulating real-time images on social media. These near real-
time images have been considered a crucial resource with which to help uncover the 
truth and put the pressure on the government. JH Wang, an IT employee, started his 
near real-time recording through Weibo and Blue Map in 2011. He frankly expressed 
that mistrust towards the official data is the driving force that makes him 
continuously pay attention to air pollution. He said, 
‘Because the government is absolutely shameless. On one hand, they fake the 
air quality data and on the other hand, they have done nothing effective to 
solve the problem … According to the official data released by the 
government, there have been more and more days with blue skies. However, 
if you follow the U.S. reports of PM 2.5 readings, blue skies are not the same 
as a smog-free and zero-pollution situation. Despite the big drop in the 
official data, we feel that the air quality can be called “excellent” only three 
to five days a month, the rest are slightly or moderately polluted. And this is 
harmful to everyone, especially children.’ 
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Figure 4.2. A screenshot of YL’s WeChat post updated on 14 October 2016. The 
caption is, ‘basketball players, don’t you guys want to live?’ (Provided by YL). 
4.3.2 Visual comparison: a memory practice 
For this case study, visual comparison is mainly used to construct memory. For 
ordinary Chinese citizens, memories can be used as an effective tool of protection 
against the ideological hegemony shaped by the news media. Due to the top-down 
system present in China, the news media have been regarded as the foremost 
mouthpiece of the government. In Chinese society, citizens are overwhelmed by 
official information and interpretations of reality in every aspect of daily life 
(Kalathil, 2002). Therefore, ChingKwan Lee and Yang (2007) have pointed out that, 
in the context of China, social memory can be considered ‘social fact’ and is often 
used to make factual claims about past events. 
In the digital era, visual social media have been shaped into a unique medium and 
form to archive, display, and circulate people’s personal and collective memories. 
There is no doubt that visual image plays an important role in recording and storing 
personal and group experiences, which can then be shared with others (Nancy Van 
House, Davis, Ames, Finn, & Viswanathan, 2005). Meanwhile, with the help of 
digital technology, ordinary people can express and present their first-hand 
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experiences in a variety of creative ways in everyday life. Through creating and 
archiving memories on social media, ordinary people are not merely able to subvert 
the official definition and interpretation of experiences in everyday life but also to 
enrich their collective memory (H. S. Li, 2015).  
Visual comparison has been adopted to articulate what life as a local resident was 
like, and how those residents thought, felt, and interpreted the air pollution in Beijing. 
By constructing the memory, the interviewees attempt to give the public a strong 
sense of the toxic air pollution. For this case study, I selected two high-profile 
examples to illustrate how the local residents express discontent, opposition, and 
resistance to the environmental degradation by using visual comparison as a creative 
means of memory construction. The forms of visual comparison are different in these 
two examples. 
Through embedding the desirable past in photographs, the first example does not 
merely give the public a sense of the change, which is from good to bad, but also 
fosters critiques and reflections of the present. In December 2015, photographer 
Song Juqiang posted a series photographs comparing landmarks in Beijing on his 
Weibo account @飘在英伦 with the hashtag #lookatBeijinginadifferentperspective 
(see Figure 4.3). In this group of photographs, Song Juqiang is holding a mobile 
phone to show the pictures of good weather in front and behind is the severe air 
pollution of the day. The juxtaposition between clean, vibrant photographs of 
landmarks on the mobile phone and the bleak reality creates a contrast between the 
past and the current situation. As a result, the comparison effectively makes the 
current situation looks worse and brings attention to the levels of pollution in Beijing. 
The iconic buildings in the photographs include the Tiananmen Square, the 
Forbidden City, the Great Hall of the People, the CCTV headquarters building, and 
so on. Because of the symbolic importance of these landmarks in China, these 
photographs have an added layer of political meaning. Song Juqiang explained his 
understanding of what impact the photographs could have:  
‘For ordinary audiences, it may deepen their understanding of smog. 
Because this group of photos has a quite strong visual impact with its direct 
comparisons. From the pictures, you realize that the sky could be such a 
clean blue in good air conditions. After seeing the photos, you may have a 
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deeper understanding of pollution, or you might like to publish a speech, 
which could make the authorities to pay attention to the issue … For each of 
us, we might notice that our daily behaviours could have an impact on the 
environment. These are the positive impacts that these photos can have … I 
think such heavy smog should be a big event in history, despite it not being a 
long-term phenomenon. Without doubt, smog is the product of the 
development of our time … so I just want to record this temporal product of 
history through my lens.’ 
 
Figure 4.3. A screenshot of Song Juqiang’s Weibo post, which contains nine 
photographs of landmarks in Beijing. It was released on 1 December 2015.  
What makes the second example unique is that the interviewee Zou Yi has been 
taking photographs to document air quality in Beijing since 2013. No matter the 
weather, blue sky or smog, he steadfastly takes a picture of the same skyscraper from 
the same angle from his home every morning. Afterwards, he posts the photographs 
on his Weibo account @邹毅的邹along with the air quality index. In the beginning, 
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he just made a composite of approximately 60 photographs of the city’s air quality. 
However, the strong visual impact was beyond his expectation. Such an attempt 
inspired him to think about what the tens of millions of Beijing residents had been 
going through in the past two months. As a result, he decided to make a larger 
composite combining 365 photographs to show the air quality throughout the whole 
year (see Figure 4.4). Based on his first-hand experience, Zou Yi presents his 
personal memories of air pollution to the public by creating the visual composites 
over a certain timespan.  
For this case study, the visual compositions have been used as a kind of subversive 
memory to remind people what happened. They preserve a complete memory that 
exhibits the reality of air quality in Beijing over the course of a year. Obviously, the 
visual compositions play an important role in reminding the public about the issue of 
air pollution in Beijing. Given that the topic of smog is still sensitive on China’s 
internet, Zou Yi believes the visual memory he has archived can speak for him 
instead. In the interview, he said, 
‘No need to say more or polish it [refers to smog]. You only need to take the 
picture. Everyone has their own feelings, so you don’t need to put your 
subjective attitude or thoughts on it, just use the picture to express what you 
want. This is why a lot of people resonance with the composites. I think it 
means that the pictures I’ve taken represent a kind of just, objective and 
accurate attitude, well, maybe not just. These pictures are more popular in 
Beijing, because people believe these are what they have seen … Sometimes, 
the government is not willing to say the air quality is not good in our country. 
Like now, we call the air pollution “heavy or slight fog” instead of smog. 
This is why I named my pictures as “clear at a glance”. The starting point of 
naming the pictures is not to comment about it, or showing a personal 
perspective, but only to display an objective reality.... Do you know what 
China most lacked in the past five years? It is objectivity and truth.’ 
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Figure 4.4. A composite of 365 images recording air quality in Beijing taken by Zou Yi 
from his home in 2014 (downloaded from Zou Yi’s Weibo account @邹毅的邹). 
4.4 Jamming the smog  
4.4.1 Culture jamming on China’s social media 
Unlike other environmental campaigns or protests that previously occurred in China, 
culture jamming has been prominently adopted by ordinary Chinese as a response 
during the period of smog in Beijing. Through hijacking the existing popular cultural 
and political materials, Chinese jammers are committed to challenging the ‘highly 
centralized Chinese political context’ (J. Ho, 2010) and developing counter-
hegemonic discourses to fight for environmental justice on social media. In this sense, 
jamming air pollution can be seen as a way of Chinese people dealing with the 
miserable social reality of their everyday life. For this section, I selected a number of 
examples that were posted or personally archived by the interviewees to illustrate 
what cultural and political symbols have been reworked and disseminated and how 
they help to subvert the official discourses of air pollution.  
Although it has a comparatively short history, culture jamming has been pervasively 
applied to a large number of social and political issues. Through various forms of 
semiotic de-familiarization, culture jamming is adopted to ‘interrupt the flow of 
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mainstream, market-driven communications – scrambling the signal, injecting the 
unexpected, jarring audiences, provoking critical thinking, inviting play and public 
participation’ (DeLaure & Dery, 2017, p. 6). According to Bart Cammaerts (2007), 
culture jamming is always involved in disrupting mainstream political discourses and 
producing counter-hegemonic discourses. The primary goal of culture jammers is 
détournement, which is provoked by ‘re-routing spectacular images, environments, 
ambiences and events to reverse or sub-vert their meaning, thus reclaiming them’ 
(Lasn, 2000, p. 103). Sabotaging and appropriation are the two most prominent 
modes of intervention or resistance in culture jamming (Harold, 2004). 
Although culture jamming is not a totally new technique, it has emerged as a new 
genre of political resistance on China’s digital networks. According to J. Xu (2016), 
culture jamming emerged as a key part of popular internet culture in 2016. Similar to 
in Western society, culture jamming in China is considered a counter-hegemonic 
discourse practice that, accompanied with the acerbic critique of contemporary 
politics in frisky artistic form (Ming, 2016), helps cope with the messiness of reality. 
Simultaneously, social media is the major territory where political resistance is being 
performed in China, although the censorship and surveillance is effectively 
implemented. In this regard, social media provides producers and protesters with a 
new channel to spread cultural jams across the borders in a short time with minimal 
costs (Cammaerts, 2007). However, culture jamming takes on some different features 
when it is situated in the peculiar political, cultural, and social conditions in China. 
Culture jamming is often adopted as a playful civic engagement strategy on China’s 
social media. Yang and Jiang (2015) have noted that playfulness is one of the most 
prominent aspects of online politics and culture in China. When confronting serious 
environmental issues, posting and sharing images with playful characteristics has 
become an everyday political and social practice on China’s digital networks. Min 
Jiang (2016) has argued that this is because playfulness is conducive to 
circumventing the strict censorship and rapid dissemination of the alternative 
messages through social media. Moreover, playfulness plays a critical role in inviting 
citizens to participate in a social movement (Shepard, Bogad, & Duncombe, 2008). 
Within the form of culture jamming, DeLaure and Dery (2017) have suggested that 
the playful intervention can be linked to ‘laughtivism’, which refers to an activism 
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that undermines hegemonic power and ridicules dictators by adopting humoristic and 
symbolic actions as a political strategy (Novović, 2014).  
In this case, Chinese jammers make every effort to conduct a series of symbolic 
actions in a more playful way. The various playful means include humour, irony, 
mocking, satire, pranks, parody, carnivalesque inversions, and so on (Cammaerts, 
2007; DeLaure & Dery, 2017). Van Laer and Van Aelst (2010) have noted that these 
playful means are very important and powerful features of culture jamming tactics. 
Through adopting these playful means as a counter-technique, Chinese jammers 
disturb the influential cultural and political symbols in order to present a different 
reality and provoke critical enquiry on air pollution crisis. In terms of the roles of 
playful symbolic actions, scholars (Shepard et al., 2008) have claimed that they 
provide citizens with a non-violent way to engage with power, disarming and 
confusing opponents through unconventional logic and creating possibilities for new 
social relations between the powerful and the powerless and between and among the 
powerless.  
All the images of culture jamming presented below are either provided by 
interviewees or downloaded from social media platforms. Because culture jamming 
is always anonymous, the authors of the examples here are unknown and difficult to 
trace. Graham St John (2008) has argued that the anonymity in culture jamming can 
be recognized as a kind of tactical disappearance, which effectively attracts public 
attention to the cause itself rather than the authors. More importantly, in the context 
of China, remaining unidentifiable to the authorities is conductive to avoiding 
causing any potential political risk, especially when the jammers attempt to parody 
the state leaders or the iconic figures.  
4.4.2 Jamming the smog: appropriation and sabotage  
   
Based on the collected data, two modes of resistance have been adopted in response 
to Beijing’s air pollution: appropriation and sabotage. According to Christine Harold 
(2007, p. 74), pranksters and intellectual property pirates make appropriation work 
through ‘playfully and provocatively folding existing cultural forms in on 
themselves’. Compared to sabotage, appropriation is less aggressive but ‘still 
operates via an oppositional stance’ (p. 160). Christine Harold (2007) has also noted 
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that sabotage has been recognized as a strategy of political resistance used to block 
and jam the working of consumer culture by way of parody and inversion. Instead of 
merely clogging existing energy or resources, sabotage provides jammers with a 
‘launching tube’ (p. 78) to transmit newly created messages. In this case, through 
appropriating and sabotaging pre-existing commercial and political materials, 
jammers attempt to situate their critical discourses to articulate their dissent on smog. 
Although none of the interviewees are creators of the presented works of culture 
jamming, it is evident that posting or reposting the images through social media 
represents their attitudes towards the problem. 
On 1 December 2015, Interviewee KB saw a ‘smog poster’ (see Figure 4.5) from 
other social media outlets. She then posted it in her WeChat friend circle in response 
to the heavy smog that had enveloped Beijing for quite a while. The content of the 
image derives from the well-known ‘keep calm and carry on’ poster produced by the 
British government in 1939 to motivate the British people to prepare for Word War 
II. In contemporary society, the original slogan has been widely used as the theme 
for a wide range of products. If you walk down streets in London, you will find the 
slogan printed everywhere: mugs, T-shirts, fridge magnets, and so on. However, in 
this hijacked image, the crown was replaced with the Tian’anmen Gate. Since 
Chairman Mao proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China there on 1 
October 1949, Tian’anmen Gate has become a representative political symbol of the 
Communist Party of China. Additionally, the textual content had also been changed 
to ‘keep calm and breathe deeply then die’.  
By using humour with a serious undertone, this appropriated message struck a chord 
with the well-educated urban middle-class. It not only reminded people about the 
detrimental effects of smog on health but also euphemistically criticized the 
government’s unfulfilled responsibility to environmental protection. In the interview, 
KB said she shared the image on social media because she thinks it illustrates her 
emotion and attitude: 
‘If I posted something about smog, it's absolutely because there was smog 
that day. And then you post the update because, it's some form of 
communication with other people. And you must feel a little self-mocking and 
a little helpless maybe; yes, feel helpless to the reality’. 
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Figure 4.5. Source (original source unknown) downloaded from the interviewee 
Katherine Bi’s WeChat friend circle.  
 
During the period of air pollution, an image with the caption ‘Feed Smog to the 
People’ (喂人民服雾) (see Figure 4.6) was widely circulated on Chinse social media. 
In Mandarin, ‘Feed smog to the people’ is a homonym of ‘Serve the People’ （为人
民服务）, which is one of the most well-known political slogans in China. It was 
originally derived from a speech Mao Zedong made in 1948 and has been widely 
used for the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda. At present, this slogan still 
decorates Xinhua Gate, where is the entrance to the residence of the top leaders in 
China. The pre-existing image from this example is a popular political comic (see 
Figure 4.7) produced by the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. In the 
comic, a group of people are holding each other’s arms, and the one standing in the 
forefront is holding Mao’s little red book. These figures represent all the ordinary 
people from different social and ethnic groups; it also shows the solidarity of Chinese 
people under the leadership of the Communist Party. By using Photoshop, Chinese 
jammers have disrupted the original political slogan by imitating Mao’s calligraphy 
in an effort to mock and condemn the government for not fulfilling their 
responsibility regarding the air pollution crisis. The new catchy slogan went viral as 
soon as it emerged on social media and has been widely reported by domestic 
commercial media. 
 
8 The English translation of the talk is available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ 
mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_19.htm. 
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Figure 4.6 (left). Source (original source unknown) downloaded from my WeChat 
friend circle in 2016. 
Figure 4.7 (right). The state’s propaganda comic ‘Serve the People’. Source: 
http://www.photophoto.cn/pic/19498452.html. 
Chinese jammers have also targeted the political figures: in this case, Chairman 
Mao.9 The hijacked image was originally taken by Mao’s appointed photographer Lv 
Xiangyou and called ‘Chairman Mao Meeting with the Red Guards’ (毛主席接见红
卫兵). On 18 August, 1966, Mao went up to the Tian’anmen Gate and celebrated the 
inauguration of the Culture Revolution with millions of Red Guards10（红卫兵）. In 
the photograph, Mao is wearing an armband with the words ‘Red Guard’ on his left 
arm and waving his right hand to the people who have fallen into a crazed frenzy at 
Tian’anmen Square. This photograph not only became a symbol of the beginning of 
the Cultural Revolution but it is also the most popular, influential, and widespread 
image from the entire event. In the hijacked image (see Figure 4.8), Chinese jammers 
put a white mask on Mao’s face, and in the upper-left corner, the caption ‘Feed smog 
to the People by Mao Zedong’ imitating Mao’s calligraphy is added and highlighted 
in red. Since the Communist Party in China portrayed him as a great leader, 
Chairman Mao has become a symbol of the state and power for Chinese people. 
Chinese jammers have sabotaged Mao’s image in an effort to utilize the symbolic 
power of Mao not only to increase the image’s incongruity but also to mock the 
dominant power. 
 
9 Mao Zedong, also known as Chairman Mao, who was the founding father of People’s Republic of 
China. He ruled as the Chairman of the Communist Party of China since it established in 1949 until 
his death in 1976. 
10 The Red Guards were groups of militant university and high school students mobilized by Mao 
Zedong as a paramilitary force during the Cultural Revolution. These young people wore green 
jackets with red armbands as uniforms. 
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Figure 4.8. The hijacked image of Chair Mao meeting with the Red Guards (image 
downloaded from open online resource). 
In addition, culture jamming has been used to expose the environmental injustices 
people suffer in everyday life. By using photograph manipulation, Chinese jammers 
reconfigure fake, hilarious images with duanzi (段子, jokes), such as the image of a 
person’s nose with two cigarette filters (see Figure 4.9). In this fake image, a person 
is blocking his/her nose with two cigarette filters, and the caption says, ‘get two 
cigarettes first, nip the filters, peel the wrap off, and then put the filters in your 
nostrils. This kind of filter is able to effectively block particulates bigger than 1.6 
micrometres. You will not feel that your nose is blocked, and this method is better 
than wearing a mask. I am a living Lei Feng11, and this is what I can do for you 
(three smile emojis)’. Obviously, cigarette filters are unable to block the toxic 
particles in the air, and no one would actually take this seriously or try this method in 
reality. However, the absurdity and sarcasm derived from the combination of 
11 Lei Feng is a well-known political and cultural figure in China. He was a soldier in the People’s 
Liberation Army. After his death, he was portrayed as a selfless and modest person who devoted his 
life to serving people and the Communist Party.  
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hilarious image and ironic caption reflects people’s helpless moods, especially when 
they have been living within a severely polluted environment for such a long time. 
 
Figure 4.9. Image of how to prevent breathing in toxic air. Source (original source 
unknown) downloaded from LH’s WeChat friend circle. 
  
Given the examples analysed above, in the context of China, cultural jamming has 
until now focused more on attracting public attention and mocking the dominant 
power than on challenging the capitalist corporate brand culture. Through creating 
and disseminating culture jamming, ordinary Chinese make an effort to develop an 
alternative place to convey messages of public interest and push the government to 
be more accountable in solving the issue of air pollution. Jammers not only 
appropriate and sabotage the prevalent cultural and political materials both 
domestically and globally, but they also creatively Photoshop a combination of fake 
images and absurd jokes. In this case, texts play a critical role in interpreting 
people’s voices and increasing the playful effects of culture jamming. Since these 
examples of culture jamming are evidently characterized by humoristic irony, in 
what follows I analyse culture jamming from the perspective of ironic criticism to 
illustrate what local residents have attempted to articulate concerning the air 
pollution crisis. 
4.4.3 Culture jamming as ironic criticism 
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According to the collected data, culture jamming regarding air pollution in Beijing is 
often accompanied by ironic tonality. As a figurative device, irony is notoriously 
difficult to define (Reyes, Rosso, & Buscaldi, 2012). Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber 
(1984) have provided a traditional interpretation of irony and defined it as a 
communicative behaviour where a speaker ‘uses a figurative meaning opposite to the 
literal meaning of the utterance’ (p. 112). In this case, it is evident that some of the 
interviewees intentionally chose to express their negative attitudes by mockingly 
saying something positive about the issue of air pollution in Beijing. According to 
Dews, Kaplan, and Winner (2007), this form of ironic remark is the one most 
commonly used in everyday practice and can be perceived as an ironic criticism. 
Colston (1997) has also noted that when an event has turned out to be the opposite of 
what is expected or desired, people often choose to use verbal irony to criticize a 
person or a situation. Compared to literal criticism, ironic criticism is less offensive 
but can express more condemnation (Colston, 1997). This perhaps partly explains 
why people are inclined to adopt this form to respond to the air pollution issue on 
social media in China, where blatant criticism or mocking the government is most 
likely to be censored. As Dews et al. (2007) have confirmed by conducting 
experiments, when speakers remark on an unpleasant situation that is out of their 
control, addressees consider ironic remarks no less critical but also humorous. 
Among the ironic remarks presented in this chapter humour is found to be an 
integrant part of ironic criticism, and it plays a prominent role in fuelling and 
enhancing the effects of criticism and spreading the jams rapidly. From the 
perspective of release theories, Philips and Milner (2017) have noted that ‘humour 
provides an emotional outlet allowing participants to express socially taboo thoughts 
and feelings’ (p. 96). The payoffs of humorous posts on social media can be 
attributed to their proliferation and magnetism. Aside from the indirectness, 
absurdity, and incongruity of humour in ironic criticism, it is also conducive to the 
circulation of critical remarks on social media (W. a. Phillips, 2017). Digital media 
scholar Tim Highfield (2015) has noted that social media users are more likely to 
circulate funny posts. In the research field of social movements, Sorensen (2008) has 
argued that as a form of nonviolence resistance, humour has powerful potential in 
facilitating outreach and attracting public attention. 
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In my interview with LH, he mentioned that his intention of posting these jams and 
hilarious images in WeChat friend circle is to ‘make more people know about the 
severity of air pollution in Beijing’. Additionally, he explained the roles of culture 
jamming in circulating information: 
‘We have already obtained enough information on air pollution from the 
news media. These hilarious images are more like a kind of artistic creation, 
and provide people a cunning obscuring way to reach a deep point, which is 
not usually touched by the mainstream media … Apart from containing more 
information, these kind of images are easy to understand and convenient to 
circulate.’ 
In this case, humorous ironic criticism is mainly expressed as a combination of 
duanzi (段子, jokes) and exaggerated images. Duanzi plays a critical role in 
providing readers with a context to interpret the speakers’ complex intentions. On 
China’s internet, creating and sharing duanzi on social media has become one of the 
most popular everyday practices. However, blatantly political jokes about the 
country or the state leaders are not allowed and are more likely to be censored in 
China. During the period of air pollution in Beijing, especially when the data of PM 
2.5 went off the chart, a variety of visual images intertwined with duanzi were 
manipulated by Photoshop and immediately posted on social media platforms. 
Without the text transposed on them, these two examples of exaggerated images can 
mean anything or nothing. According to G. Yang and Jiang (2015), duanzi can be 
labelled with several colours to distinguish the contents. The two examples of culture 
jamming combined with duanzi in this section fall into the category of ‘Gray’, which 
is defined as ‘jokes that convey critical views about politics and society’ (G. Yang & 
Jiang, 2015).  
In order to illustrate the contents of this form of ironic criticism that emerged during 
the period of air pollution in Beijing, another representative example of culture 
jamming is presented and analysed in this section. This example was reposted from 
other social media sources in the interviewee LH’s WeChat friend circle in 
December 2015 and December 2016. The caption in this example (see Figure 4.10) 
provides several solutions for self-rescue in the smog weather for the government 
and people of different social statuses. It reads, ‘How to survive from smog: 1.for 
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ordinary individuals: wearing masks; 2. for whole families: purchasing health 
insurance; 3. for rich and idle people: traveling out of Beijing; 4. for millionaires: 
emigrating overseas; 5. for the government: wait for wind’. The background image is 
a female model wearing a luxury gas mask embedded with thousands of pink and 
sliver crystals. The exaggerated crystal mask in the image not only mocks the smog’s 
absurdity but also ridicules the government’s unfulfilled responsibilities regarding 
the issue. 
Figure 4.10 (left). The visual image regarding how to survive in smoggy weather. 
Figure 4.11 (right). A screenshot of LH’s WeChat post published on 20 December 2016. 
Unlike the example of how to prevent breathing in toxic air with its more serious 
tone in expressing people’s emotions, this example reflects a series of new social 
phenomena that have come into being in Chinese society in recent years. For 
example, ‘smog migration’ was once the hot topic on China’s social media, because 
many middle-class residents planned to escape the hazardous air pollution in Beijing 
and moving to other unpolluted Chinese cities, or even overseas. This smog 
avoidance tourism is called ‘lung cleaning’ trips. In recent years, it has become a 
trend for many people to spend their holidays outside of Beijing to enjoy fresh air. 
According to the SouthChinaMorningPost (2017), keyword searches for ‘smog 
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escape’, ‘lung cleansing’, and ‘forests’ have tripled on the website of one of the 
largest Chinese travel services, Ctrip.com, during the period of air pollution in China.  
Ironic criticism like making up solutions for air pollution enhances rather than 
diminishes the impact of the condemnations. Colston (1997) has argued that people 
express more condemnation by way of ironic criticism. Given the above examples, 
the absurdity and incongruity caused by sarcastic humour can be seen as adding 
emphasis to the local residents’ intensely negative feelings towards air pollution. In 
the interview, LH explained that by reposting and sharing posts on social media, he 
believes the hilarious and ironic images will not only make more people notice the 
air pollution happening in Beijing but will also make them realize how terrible the 
issue is. Obviously, people believe that increasing condemnation is more likely to 
attract public attention on social media, pushing the government into making 
effective efforts to improve the issue. 
In addition, by integrating duanzi into images, culture jamming is cleverly designed 
to confuse official viewers. Having analysed the case of the Dark Glass Portrait 
campaign, Min Jiang (2016) has argued that culture jamming has been designed by 
Chinese political dissidents to bypass censorship. In this case, humour and irony 
within culture jamming also plays an important role in maintaining the visibility of 
people’s critiques of social media. Despite the multiple meanings in the ironic 
utterances that may invite the possibility of misunderstanding, these two examples 
are based on a similar idea: to articulate people’s strong dissatisfaction with the 
status quo of the environment they are living in. As a result, everybody can easily 
understand the meaning and intention behind the humorous ironic criticism by the 
jammers.  
It is clear the culture jamming adopted by interviewees in this case is more related to 
politics instead of consumer culture. By creating and circulating the jams on social 
media, people are able to directly express feelings of intolerance and public hatred 
towards a common enemy: smog. Simultaneously, Chinese citizens and activists use 
culture jamming techniques to denounce the government’s unfulfilled responsibility 
regarding environmental issues. However, although culture jamming provides people 
with a creative and inventive way to fight for environmental justice, it should not be 
optimistically considered as a panacea for Chinese society.  
 
 
95 
Scholars have questioned the political efficiency of culture jamming. It is true that 
culture jamming helps Chinese citizens articulate their critiques, but it cannot create 
any structural social or political change (Cammaerts, 2007). Heath and Potter (2005) 
have argued that culture jamming serves more as a distraction or a ‘steam-valve’. In 
the context of China, the role of a ‘steam-valve’ can be interpreted to mean that 
culture jamming helps ordinary Chinese vent their complaints towards problems that 
may threaten social stability while simultaneously attracting the government’s 
attention, causing them to either improve or repress the problem (G. Yang, Goldstein, 
& deLisle, 2016). As an act of guerrilla activism, the dissenting messages expressed 
by culture jamming in this case are fragmented rather than sustained. As a strongly 
individualized form of political resistance, culture jamming is less likely to form any 
collective actions or mass demonstrations (Wettergren, 2003). Moreover, what 
deserves our attention is that Cammaerts (2007) has expressed concerns that political 
actors are actually using culture jamming as a ‘hip’ communication strategy. In such 
circumstances and based on the interviews, the following section suggests shifting 
the focus of analysis of culture jamming from political to social functions. 
4.4.4 Culture jamming as a lubricant for sociality 
 
According to the interviews, culture jamming has not been used merely for political 
resistance but also serves as a lubricant to smooth personal relationships on social 
media. Scholars (McAdams, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988) have suggested that it is better 
to understand culture jamming as an expressive outlet that has affinities with political 
resistance in contemporary environmental movements. Yang and Jiang (2015) have 
noted that as a staple practice of online political satire, culture jamming is first and 
foremost a networked social practice that was adopted by ordinary Chinese to 
communicate social and political problems in a playful way. Therefore, I attempt to 
shed light on how culture jamming has served to activate or maintain social networks 
in an individual environmental protest on social media in two ways. 
First, sharing and circulating examples of culture jamming often involves 
solidification of group identity. In the interviews, interviewees mostly mentioned 
‘sharing them with friends’ when we discussed the intentions of posting the hilarious 
and ironic images on social media. Wettergren (2009, p. 10) has asserted that the 
playfulness embedded in culture jamming can be seen as an emotional energy that 
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‘create[s] and reproduce[s] group solidarity, the (sacred) symbols of social 
relationship, and the shared norms and values’. Based on the interviews, culture 
jamming has been adopted as a kind of social capital to show the netizens’ everyday 
taste and aesthetics. In other words, some interviewees attempt to label themselves as 
insiders of a certain group. In the follow-up interview, KB explained her intention in 
sharing and circulating the image with the caption ‘keep calm and breathe deeply 
then die’ on WeChat, saying, 
‘Firstly, it is holding onto a hot topic, creating something to talk about that 
everyone can relate to. Secondly, I think this self-deprecation is also a way to 
show that I am an interesting person. It is really not that complicated.’ 
Second, circulation of culture jamming on social media is conducive to causing more 
interactions among friends and acquaintances. In the interview, LH expressed that he 
prefers to share jams and other hilarious images because it could help him attract 
more attention from his social networks. Culture jamming is not necessarily always 
political or critical, but is obviously full of creativity. The creativity of culture 
jamming provides people with an opportunity to share communal laugher or 
encourages people to create a personal meaning for laughter. For example, LH 
attached the short textual interpretation ‘十面霾伏’ to the jam of a female model 
wearing a luxury gas mask (see Figure 4.11). The phrase translated in English means 
‘everywhere is shrouded by smog’. In Mandarin, this is homophone of ‘十面埋伏’, 
the name of a popular Chinese film directed by one of the country’s most famous 
directors, Zhang Yimou. 
4.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I explored how the local residents in Beijing have adopted several 
forms of visual social media practices as a response to the issue of air pollution. I 
have found that culture jamming has never been prominently adopted to articulate 
people’s everyday opinions on an environmental issue. Through appropriating and 
sabotaging the existing well-known visual materials, particularly the political 
materials, Chinese netizens have creatively criticized the government’s unfilled 
responsibility regarding air pollution. In this case, none of the participants engaged in 
producing the culture jamming, and the original sources are difficult to trace. 
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However, like other Chinese netizens, the participants expressed their everyday 
opinions by reposting and re-interpreting the culture jamming through social media. 
In the context of China’s internet, the anonymity of culture jamming means more 
freedom and safety for the original creators, especially when they have appropriated 
and sabotaged iconic political materials like propaganda posters, the Communist 
Party’s slogan, and images of Chairman Mao.  
The humour and irony embedded in culture jamming provides an important 
opportunity to provoke and connect people’s online action. Although the circulation 
of culture jamming is individualized and fragmented, it still can be recognized as 
playful resistance. Laughter driven by the humour and irony enables a large number 
of far-flung people to laugh together and thus forms a sense of belonging (Meyer, 
2000; Speier, 1998). In this manner, drawing upon Mikhail Bakhtin’s (1984) theory, 
creating and circulating culture jamming as a response to a public event can be 
recognized as an online carnival in which Chinese netizens can circumvent internet 
censorship, enjoy temporary freedom, and build up an alternative world to articulate 
their opinions, dissent, and critiques in a playful way. Meanwhile, it is important to 
realize that the political efficiency of culture jamming is limited, and interviewees 
also adopt culture jamming to maintain and smooth personal social networks. 
However, even though the trajectory and effectiveness of culture jamming on social 
media is short lived, I argue that laughter helps ordinary people’s voices to be 
widespread, and the cumulative effect could bring the possibility of problem solving.  
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Chapter 5 Environmental Advocacy 
Campaign and Image Events on Social 
Media: A Case Study of River Watchers 
‘We have no better choices, no more suitable platform, so the We media is the only 
way for us to disseminate information’. (Hong Wu, a River Watcher) 
 
‘Social media is the only weapon we have. We don’t have any compulsory means to 
solve the problems as we are not working in the government, so voicing to the public 
is the only thing we can do. If without social media, we volunteers almost lost the 
meaning of existence, I think’. (Yuan Genliang, a River Watcher) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the investigation results released by the central environmental 
protection inspection team,12 water pollution has become the most concerning 
environmental issue in Hunan province, and many chemical plants discharging raw 
sewage into rivers is one of the main causes of this issue. In order to reduce and 
prevent water pollution in Hunan Province, a locally based grassroots ENGO called 
Green Hunan initiated an image-oriented environmental advocacy campaign on 
China’s most popular microblogging service Weibo in April 2011. During the 
campaign, Green Hunan called on concerned local residents to join the campaign as 
volunteers and encouraged them to regularly monitor and test the water conditions in 
local rivers, especially where chemical plants are located. By using mobile phones, 
the volunteers record test results and water conditions in these areas and then post the 
images on Weibo via their personal accounts. These environmental volunteers are 
called River Watchers. 
 
With the help of mobile phones and social media, Green Hunan and its volunteers 
have shifted the local water pollution issue to a more favourable arena. By exposing 
the images and drawing public attention on social media, the River Watchers have 
 
12 中央环保督察｜湖南：水污染最受关注，长沙信访问题最多 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1680634. 
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obtained leverage to question and dialogue with the local government through formal 
and informal channels. Aside from providing test toolkits to the volunteers, Green 
Hunan also set a series of action guidelines in terms of how to record the pollution by 
taking images and what key elements should be included in a Weibo post. No matter 
what the test results are, most volunteers regularly upload and share the images 
through their personal Weibo accounts to enhance the campaign’s influence. 
However, as a grassroots group, the voice of River Watchers is difficult to hear. 
Despite having some success in the beginning, the campaign has been trapped in the 
dilemma that repeatedly recording similar images of the water pollution is less likely 
to maintain audiences’ attention. To overcome this hurdle, River Watchers have 
attempted to explore the possibilities of enhancing the campaign’s visibility in the 
public space. To date, they have created a couple of successful image events on 
social media. Beyond attracting more public attention, visual social media has helped 
ordinary people create a social controversy around a local environmental issue in 
China.  
This chapter is mainly intended to determine how ordinary people use images to 
enhance the visibility of local environmental issues in the public space by engaging 
in a social media-facilitated advocacy campaign. To address this question, the 
chapter begins with analysis of what tactics the ENGO recommends to maintain the 
performance of the advocacy campaign on social media. It then focuses on how the 
volunteers implement the tactics in everyday practice and utilize the images to solve 
the issues by dealing with the local authorities. Based on the interviews and the 
collected visual data, I found that River Watchers do not stratify with following the 
instructions designed the ENGO on how to take photographs of water pollution. 
During the process of the campaign, they attempt to frame the reality of water 
pollution and increase visual values by incorporating affect in their images to cause 
social resonance. Focusing on the approach of visual rhetoric, this chapter explores 
what messages are embedded in the images in the Chinese context, how and why 
River Watchers create affective reality in an environmental campaign, and what kind 
of roles these images can play in accelerating civic engagement on environmental 
issues. As a result, this chapter argues that beyond documentation and exposure, the 
environmental volunteers actually frame the reality of environmental injustice in 
their everyday visual practice. Through framing the reality, ordinary people are able 
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to construct a social controversy and effectively engage in environmental issues 
within a limited political space in the context of China. 
 
This case study relies on the data collected from fieldwork conducted in multiple 
cities of Hunan Province in December 2018. To recruit potential interviewees, the 
former campaign organizer Liu Ke helped me form a WeChat group and invited 
several River Watchers to join. In the group, I explained the research purpose to the 
group members. Additionally, a semi-structured interview guide was designed to 
investigate how the volunteers produce environmental visual information using their 
mobile phones, how they disseminate the information on social media, and how they 
perceive the role of visual social media in the environmental campaign. During the 
fieldwork, 10 in-depth interviews were conducted face-to-face in Mandarin Chinese, 
and each one typically lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes. To understand how the 
River Watchers obtained first-hand information about water pollution, I went to a 
monitoring spot with the interviewee Zhang Zhibiao and observed how River 
Watchers routinely check and test the river water quality. Since a critical clue was 
found in the process of transcribing, I conducted another two interviews via online 
phone calls. The follow-up questions and parts of the visual data were exchanged 
with interviewees via WeChat instant messages. After data collection, all the 
transcripts were translated into English. The demographic information of the 
interviewees is listed in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1 List of interviewees  
Interview 
Number 
Name  Age  Gender  Occupation  
1 Yu Lixiang  64 Male  Retired, a full-time volunteer 
2 Zhou Yun 33 Female  Self-employed 
3 Qin Qiwei 30 Male  Manager of a kayaking club  
4 Yuan Genliang  35 Male  Worker  
5 Li Long 38 Male  Electrician 
6 Wang Huipeng 28 Male  Self-employed 
7 Zhang Zhibiao  55 Male  Retired, a full-time volunteer 
8 Zhang 32 Male  Employee of a kayaking club 
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Hongmou 
9 Lei Qiqi 39 Male  Full-time environmental volunteer  
10 Li Bing  20 Male  University student  
11 Hong Wu 47 Male  Full-time environmental volunteer  
12 Song Wei 34 Male  Self-employed 
 
5.2 Environmental advocacy campaigns in China: 
opportunities and constraints  
Advocacy is a powerful tool for civic organizations to achieve a wide range of goals. 
According to Prakash and Gugerty (2010), the term ‘advocacy’ refers to a systematic 
effort conducted by actors who aim to develop or achieve specific policy goals, and 
environmental protection is one of the most prominent domains where it has often 
been applied. On this basis, Robert Cox (2015) has conceptualized the understanding 
of ‘advocacy’ in the realm of environmental communication as an act conducted by a 
variety of social forces, including environmental groups, to persuade or argue in 
support of ‘a specific cause, policy, idea, or set of values’ (p. 179). Therefore, an 
environmental advocacy campaign has been generally defined as ‘a strategic course 
of action, involving communication, which is undertaken for a specific purpose or 
objective’ (Cox, 2015, p. 181).  
 
The campaign of River Watchers is a bottom-up environmental advocacy campaign 
that aims to advocate people’s rights-to-know about the local water pollutions and 
awake people’s awareness of environmental protection.13 In the past decade, 
frequently occurring environmental woes have caused great demand for effective 
environmental protection in Chinese society. Scholars (S.-Y. Tang & X. Zhan, 2008) 
have attributed one of the reasons for the failure of environmental protection to the 
‘lack of adequate agency transparency and public participation in environmental 
policy making and implementation’ (p. 430). As a locally based grassroots ENGO, a 
significant characteristic of Green Hunan is its strong volunteer and participant spirit. 
In the campaign, Green Hunan relies on local residents as a critical force to disclose 
 
13 《绿色潇湘十周年》, Ten-year anniversary of Green Hunan, 2017. 
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the images of water pollution on social media in order to halt the local water 
pollution and hold the local government accountable in environmental governance.  
 
To address how the grassroots ENGO developed a localized advocacy campaign to 
raise public awareness, it is necessary to understand the political and social 
opportunities and constraints that ENGOs are facing in China. Unlike their 
counterparts in Western society, Chinese ENGOs and environmentalists have 
different conditions under which to mobilize support for their programs. Although 
the space for people to engage in public issues is limited in China, Chinese ENGOs 
and their volunteers are still able to develop campaigns to defend rights if they take 
full advantage of opportunities.  
 
According to scholars’ (Sima, 2011; Zhan & Tang, 2013) observations, Chinese 
grassroots ENGO developed in the 1990s and have become more capable of 
mobilizing grassroots support and engaging in policy-making since the Sichuan 
earthquake in 2008. In recent years, the central government has realized that the state 
apparatus has limited administrative resources for environmental protection and local 
governments implement environmental laws and regulations inadequately (Xie & 
Van Der Heijden, 2010). As a result, the Chinese central government has begun to 
allow ENGOs and citizens to get involved in environmental governance as a third 
sector to monitor local government and business companies in order to maintain 
social stability (Zhan & TANG, 2013).  
 
On one hand, the central government has built up a multilayered environmental 
protection apparatus based on a top-down network of EPBs (G. Chen, 2009). For 
instance, in February 2016, in order to govern the issues of urban river pollution, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection launched a WeChat reporting platform and 
encouraged citizens to disclose the issues through the platform. In this study, most 
interviewees had used the platform to report the issues and affirmed its positive 
impact on environmental problem-solving, though they questioned its real 
effectiveness. 
 
On the other hand, the central government has also developed a decentralized system 
of environmental governance to produce better environmental performance. China’s 
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Environmental Law clearly indicates that ‘it is the local government’s responsibility 
to improve the environmental quality in their jurisdiction.’ More importantly, 
Chinese central government has adopted the environmental indexes to access local 
officials’ performances and determine their future promotions (G. Chen, 2009). As a 
consequence, although the local government and officials actually have limited 
authority and resources, they are assumed to have the highest responsibility for 
environmental policy implementation (Ran, 2017). 
 
The political opportunities always combine with technological opportunities. With 
the advent of Web 2.0, more established civic organizations have quickly embraced 
social media to facilitate civic engagement and collective actions (Obar, Zube, & 
Lampe, 2012). Affordable and wearable mobile devices and social media platforms 
have provided ENGOs and activists with a low threshold of technology and expense 
to amplify and sustain their voices in public. With the help of social media, ENGOs 
and activists are able to reach their target audiences directly rather than relying on 
traditional communication channels as before (Svensson, 2016).  
 
However, due to the limitations of institutional systems, the nature of Chinese civic 
ENGOs is ‘depoliticised’ (G. Yang & Calhoun, 2007). As Peter Ho (2001, 2007) has 
pointed out, unlike their counterparts in Western society, Chinese civic ENGOs 
adopt non-confrontational stances towards environmental issues rather than seeking 
structural political and social change. In its report, the All-China Environmental 
Federation describes the general principles that Chinese ENGOs have been following: 
‘to assist not to complicate, to participate not to intervene, to supervise not to replace, 
and to offer solutions not to break the law’ (ACEF, 2006). In this case, Green Hunan 
is not an exception. Like most ENGOs in China, Green Hunan and its volunteers 
maintain a cooperative rather than confrontational relationship with the local 
government. In this case, the activities Green Hunan requires the volunteers to 
engage in are non-radical and non-confrontational. 
 
In addition, since the Chinese government has been constantly strengthening its 
control over the society and the internet, the ways in which ordinary people use 
social media to engage in the environmental issues have been transformed. At early 
stage of environmental movements in China, for example, among a series of anti-PX 
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project protests that erupted in multiple Chinese cities from 2007 to 2012, mobile 
phones and social media played an important role in shaping a collective action 
repertoire to assist the mobilization and organization of an offline protest (S. Grano, 
2015). In today’s Chinese society, although it has been less common to mobilize and 
organize large-scale offline social movements to defend individuals’ rights, ENGOs 
and individuals have created new modes of online environmental activism with the 
evolution of digital technologies. The following section analyses how the grassroots 
ENGO Green Hunan has formed a localized environmental advocacy campaign via 
visual images and social media. 
 
5.3 A visually oriented online advocacy campaign 
Based upon the theoretical framework of the environmental advocacy campaign 
informed by Robert Cox (2015), this section focuses on analysing how a locally 
based ENGO has facilitated visually oriented civic engagement on social media by 
mobilizing local residents from three perspectives: what the campaign objective is, 
who the key decision makers are, and what strategies have been adopted. In addition, 
this section unfolds the intricate interactions among the local government, local 
residents, and ENGO during the advocacy campaign. 
 
First, an effective advocacy campaign needs a concrete campaign objective to help 
participants understand ‘what exactly does the campaign want to accomplish?’ (Cox, 
2015, p.183). Following Cox’s definition, a campaign objective could be ‘a specific 
action, event, or decision that moves a campaign closer to its broader goal’ (p. 184). 
In this case, the campaign objective is to protect local water resources. As Green 
Hunan claims in its official handbook, through mobilizing and organizing the 
campaign to reduce and prevent local water pollution, it is ultimately aimed at 
advocating the rights to know about environmental issues among local residents.  
 
Second, in order to carry out an effective advocacy campaign, it is necessary to 
identify the key audiences (Maibach, 1993). The key audiences are equivalent to 
what Robert Cox (2015) calls ‘decision makers’, which refers to people who are 
capable of responding to the issues. Who should be considered the key audiences is 
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directly related to the development and implementation of campaign strategy. In this 
case, the key audiences can be divided into primary and secondary levels. 
The primary audience is ‘the decision maker who has authority to act or implement 
the objectives of a campaign’ (Cox, 2015, p. 185). In the context of China, 
governmental involvement is the crucial factor for solving environmental issues. 
Therefore, persuading the local government to seriously implement the relevant laws 
and regulations to hold local enterprises accountable is the best way to prevent the 
problems of local water pollution. According to the interviews, instead of exposing 
the issues on social media, reporting the issues to the local government officials with 
an informal communication channel has become the preferred choice in River 
Watchers’ everyday practices. It is fair to say that the achievement of campaign 
objective depends on the local government’s favourable response. 
In this campaign, supporters, the general public, opinion leaders, and news media 
constitute the secondary audiences. In the context of China, public attention is 
recognized as the pivotal bargaining counter to push the government to respond to 
controversial public issues. Green Hunan relies on its secondary audiences to expand 
advocacy influence and gain public attention on social media. Therefore, secondary 
audiences are always the vital force necessary to hold the government accountable on 
environmental governance. 
Moreover, the extent to which the general public will mobilize in support of a cause 
is based upon their different understandings of issues, personal or social constraints, 
and degree of involvement (Grunig, 1989). In this case, the ENGO has designed a 
concise, compelling, and memorable message to express the campaign’s value, 
which is ‘engagement brings change’. This message is employed to awake local 
residents’ awareness of public participation in environmental issues and argue that 
individuals’ efforts could improve their living situations. It not only emphasizes the 
importance of local residents’ engagement in solving environmental issues, but also 
motivates citizens’ social responsibilities in public affairs. Additionally, the word 
‘change’ implies the possibility of a successful action, which forms a perception that 
ordinary people have ‘self-efficacy’ (Bandura, 1994) to not only accomplish the 
campaign tasks but also help and benefit the whole society. 
 
 
106 
  
Third, to persuade the local government to act on the campaign’s objective, Green 
Hunan has developed a strategy that aims to generate public attention by posting and 
circulating visual images of local water pollution issues on Weibo. In the context of 
China, when citizens collectively advocate for attention to be given to an issue on 
social media, public opinion could bring networked power and group pressure to 
force the government to address their concerns and influence the policy decision 
process (Luo, 2014). The forms of public attention on social media are various; even 
‘clicktivism’ or ‘slacktivism’ is conducive to garnering public attention. On China’s 
social media, this popular form can also be called ‘surrounding gaze’. Despite the 
fact that these low political risk activities merely serve as ‘feel-good’ activism 
(Morozov, 2009) and are unable to achieve any effective political and social change 
on social media (Putnam, 2000), they are conducive to increasing the visibility of 
social controversies and the concentration of public opinions on the issues (J. Xu, 
2016). 
 
5.4 The campaign’s communication tactics  
Robert Cox’s theory provides us with a basic framework for understanding the 
construction and operation of an environmental advocacy campaign, but given the 
data and information collected from the fieldwork, Green Hunan has actually 
developed more communication tactics to sustain and reinforce the campaign. It 
seems that these communication tactics are not only conducive to helping the 
volunteers avoid provoking the government while exposing the information about 
local water pollution, but also to reinforcing the solidarity of the campaign. In 
essence, however, the ENGO is attempting to act as a co-worker rather than an 
adversary of the local government. 
 
5.4.1 River Watchers: a collective identity 
In the campaign, Green Hunan initially formulated a collective identity of River 
Watchers to maintain long-term performance and strengthen the solidarity of the 
campaign. A large number of scholars have proven the importance of collective 
identity in social movement. In the research field of social movement, sociologists 
(Polletta & Jasper, 2001) have defined collective identity as ‘an individual’s 
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cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, 
practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be 
imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, 
although it may form part of a personal identity’. Polletta and Jasper (2001) have also 
argued that successfully framing a collective identity can be conducive to a social 
group recruiting members and supporters, gaining public hearings, making alliances 
with other groups, defusing opposition, and so on. With the development of ICT, the 
study of online activism has also demonstrated that the participants in an online 
community have an integrated sense of belonging because they share ‘common 
concerns, a common enemy, and, typically, a common space’ (McCaughey & Ayers, 
2013, p. 8). 
 
In order to recruit volunteers and cultivate their sense of the identity, Green Hunan 
has highlighted the importance of local residents’ engagement. Green Hunan has 
claims that ‘the local residents know the local history, environment, current 
situations and benefit entanglements, and they have not only the power but also the 
motivation to act’. This mobilized claim accurately interprets the pre-existing social, 
cultural, and affective bonds among local residents on the concrete issue of the water 
pollution, which is not isolated. As Fireman and Gamson (1979) have argued, the 
previously shared bonds among individuals can be significant stake in a collective 
action. In addition, emphasizing the character of localization in the campaign not 
only reflects who River Watchers are but also connects local residents from diverse 
groups to address a shared environmental concern. Based on the investigation of air 
quality test activities in China, J. H. Xu (2014) has noted that a collective identity 
enables ENGOs to solidify horizontal connections among participants and mobilize 
social forces, which are diffuse and fragmented, to challenge the current issues with a 
bottom-up approach.  
 
Among a variety of cultural materials employed in this campaign, the hashtag 
#RiverWatchers is prominently employed as a common mark to emphasize the 
group’s identity on social media. Attaching the hashtag to each Weibo post is clearly 
required as an indispensable part of the regular format of posting. Aside from 
exchanging resources, the hashtag often serves to increase the exposure of a 
conversation within the platform and help advocates to quickly circulate their 
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messages (Bonilla & Rosa, 2015). More than providing a quick retrieval system for 
people who are searching for updated information, the hashtag is particularly 
conducive to continuing the conversation beyond the originating dialogue by creating 
an identifier or tag for fellow activists (Stache, 2015). In this case, the hashtag 
#RiverWatchers has been used as an online campaign symbol to build solidarity, and 
it characterizes the collective identity by their shared practical experiences. This tag 
offers the volunteers a sense of belonging to highlight who they are and what their 
purpose is.  
 
In effect, the volunteers continue to develop multiple meanings of their group 
identity. In the beginning, Green Hunan recognized its volunteers as environmental 
information monitors. Monitoring a local river and presenting the monitoring 
information to the public via social media is what River Watchers are required to do 
in this campaign. As Postmes and Brunsting (2002) have suggested, a collective 
identity can be developed when the community members interact with each other 
online. Due to different self-efficacy, some River Watchers strive to maintain their 
performance on social media as educators or advocates to deliver information about 
environmental education and raise awareness. For example, interviews with River 
Watchers demonstrated that some of them have tried to clarify the meaning of test 
results, explain the seriousness of water pollution, and persuade the public to change 
their behaviours. 
 
5.4.2 A fixed Weibo posting format 
In term of how to document and post information on Weibo, Green Hunan provides 
its volunteers with a specific format. According to the River Watchers’ toolkit 
handbook (see Figure 5.1), a standard Weibo post should attach the hashtag 
#RiverWatchers, use global positioning system (GPS) to show the geographic 
information of the monitoring location, indicate the observation time, and record the 
amount, colour, smell, and pH value of the water and whether there are bubbles or 
floating objects in the river. At the end of the post, the volunteers should use the @ 
symbol to link to the official River Watchers Weibo account and other related 
accounts. Regarding the visual information, the uploaded images are required to 
reveal two kinds of content: water quality and the surroundings of the river. 
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Figure 5.1: Weibo posting format provided by Green Hunan. 
Screenshot from the River Watchers’ toolkit handbook (page 5). 
 
It is evident that Green Hunan requires its volunteers to maintain a neutral and 
objective stance when exposing the water pollution information on social media. On 
one hand, avoiding rational or sentimental expression is conducive to helping the 
Weibo posts bypass the online filter system and maintain the performance of the 
campaign on social media for longer. On the other hand, although this news reporting 
style ensures the objectivity and accuracy of information, it is difficult to maintain 
long-term public concern about the issues by repeating the simple and fragmented 
messages. 
 
The interviews also indicate that River Watchers consciously avoid presenting any 
personal judgements to illustrate the images in the short-term videos. Due to the 
visual affordances of Weibo and the technical capacity of mobile phones, some 
volunteers have embraced the short-term video to document the environmental issues. 
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In the process, the volunteers are cautious in recording their voiceovers on the 
footage. Interviewee Li Long explained the reason for this:  
 
‘I don’t add any subjective judgement. I don’t think the audience need my 
judgement, and my judgement might bring harm to this video. I only say what 
I see…The only thing I need to do in the video is to present the truth. My 
purpose of recording videos is mainly to present the truth rather than 
criticize any government department’. 
 
Meanwhile, most of the volunteers also distribute completely different content on 
same issue of the water pollution in WeChat friend circle. This can be considered as 
an online communication strategy by the River Watchers. According to the 
investigation from the field trip, the WeChat posts usually attached some pictures 
which were not posted on Weibo with more personal and emotional comments, 
which aim to tap into the River Watchers’ personal social ties. Unlike using Weibo to 
attract public attention and pressure the local officials, the River Watchers attempt to 
use WeChat to introduce their efforts and cause more attention from local people 
through their personal social networks.  
 
5.4.3 Exploiting personal social networks 
As a grassroots group, River Watchers rely on their personal social networks to 
implement and develop communication tactics during the process of the campaign. 
On one hand, since some active volunteers have obtained enough leverage on social 
media, they have gradually built up an informal communication channel with the 
local government officials to solve the issues. According to the interviews, instead of 
using social media, reporting the issues directly to the related officials via the 
informal channel has become the primary choice of these active volunteers. It seems 
that the local government officials are also willing to deal with the issues in this way 
because extensive online exposure of the environmental issues could negatively 
impact their promotion. Zhang Zhibiao, a well-known local environmental activist 
and a senior River Watcher, has commented that the informal communication 
channel ‘is a faster way to solve the issue’. One of the Interviewees Hong Wu shared 
his experience about how his informal communication with the local officials: 
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‘We might send the photos to the head of local environmental department or 
the leaders of local government directly when we found the pollution issues. 
They usually went to solve the issues immediately, so it is unnecessary to 
disseminate the information online. It could bring them in trouble if my post 
ranked in the system of public opinion monitoring. These things can make 
them very stressful. They always say that I can send any issues to them 
directly, and it won’t be late to post the issues online if they couldn’t figure 
the issues out or give me feedback in 24 hours’.  
In Chinese society, there is a special cultural phenomenon that informal rules 
function more significantly than laws and regulations on public events (Xie & Van 
Der Heijden, 2010). This personal connection in the Chinese context is often referred 
to as the practice of guanxi, which has been recognized as a crucial element that 
helps individuals successfully interact with the political system and bureaucracy (Xie 
& Mol, 2006). Because the formal organizational networks of ENGOs are still weak 
in China, volunteers’ personal networks have become an alternative way to expand 
campaign influence.  
On the other hand, personal social networks also contribute by proliferating the 
campaign’s messages and recruiting volunteers. Most of the interviewees noted that 
they have often sent the pollution information to people in their personal network via 
social media, especially WeChat groups. For example, Zhou Yun mentioned that she 
always calls for help from her friends to circulate the information she posts, and she 
believes that this is conducive to solve the problems quickly. As Jun J. Liu (2015) 
found in his study, Chinese environmental activists perceive their personal social 
networks as social capital to make the campaign information reach as many people as 
possible in a short period of time. 
5.4.4 Citizen camera-witnessing 
The process of recording and posting images of local water pollution by mobile 
phone in this campaign can be recognized as ‘citizen camera-witnessing’ (Andén-
Papadopoulos, 2014). The term was originally defined as political activists and 
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dissidents taking life risks to produce incontrovertible visual evidence to mobilize 
global public support around unjust and disastrous public events. Even though the 
water protection campaign is completely non-confrontational, it encourages 
participants to play the role of witness and take advantage of visual images to call for 
public attention to the environmental issue. By producing visual evidence and 
bearing witness in public, River Watchers thus obtain the legitimacy to be an integral 
part of the public event. During the interviews, ‘evidence’ was frequently mentioned 
to describe the role the images play in this campaign. The interviewee Li Long made 
the following statement: 
 
Yes, they [referring to visual materials he recorded] are evidence. I mean 
that I provide evidence of pollution through photos and videos. Water quality 
could vary over time. For example, the outfall might be discharging when I 
went to check it in the morning, but it stopped in the afternoon. This is also 
why I emphasized the time of recording. I think it can record the state of the 
moment.  
 
Moreover, the organization also adopts a kind of crowdsourcing and participatory 
mechanism to aggregate pollution data on social media. In contemporary society, it 
has become a pervasive phenomenon that the environmental justice movement has 
begun to engage in big data tactics to gather, visualize, and expose pollution 
evidence (Mah, 2017). In this case, with the low technical barrier, Green Hunan uses 
volunteers as data nodes to collect and upload water pollution data. According to the 
interviews, all the data produced by the volunteers is real-time or close-to-real-time 
data, which ensures the speed of information circulation online. To aggregate the 
data, Green Hunan requires the volunteers to include three key elements in each post: 
use the hashtag #River Watchers, call attention to River Watcher’s official Weibo 
account, and attach geographic information. Although this crowdsourcing and 
participatory mechanism is facing the dilemma that similar data has been repeated 
multiple times, it is an integral part of the environmental justice struggle. 
 
Generally speaking, these communication tactics effectively help the organization 
promote the campaign and maintain its performance on social media. However, these 
tactics also limit the expansion of the campaign’s influence. As the campaign 
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continues, it faces a significant hurdle in that the general public’s attention to the 
campaign is gradually waning while the local water pollution problem has not yet 
been completely solved. In this circumstance, River Watchers have begun to explore 
the possibilities of increasing the campaign’s influence through exploiting the 
affective power of images in their everyday practice. 
 
5.5 Practices of documenting reality 
In this case, conveying reality to the audiences is considered the core value of the 
images. Interviewees emphasized the importance of the objectivity and authenticity 
of information in gaining public support and trust. However, as Martin Hand (2012, 
p. 76) has pointed out, ‘photographs are necessarily partial documents of the real, 
through which elements are selected or excluded, made visible or invisible, and are 
often subject to staging of one kind or another’. In other words, the reality performed 
in the images is what River Watchers want the audiences to see. Based on the 
collected data, River Watchers have developed a couple of principles regarding how 
to document reality via images. This section explores what reality regarding local 
water pollution the volunteers are attempting to convey and how they cope with the 
subtle boundaries between the malleability and authenticity of digital images in 
everyday practice.  
 
5.5.1 No manipulation  
The most important principle to maintain the authenticity of images is ‘no 
manipulation’ by the interviewees. In the era of digital photography, manipulating 
the digital images has become a pervasive cultural phenomenon. The prominent 
feature of malleability in digital images has subverted our conventional perception 
that the photographic images can authentically record the reality; in contrast, 
manipulation has enlarged the distance between reality and digital images (Mitchell, 
1992). As the technical capacity has been pervasively embedded in smart phones, 
even amateur photographers are able to easily alter their visual productions in 
everyday practice. Despite this wide range of digital manipulation approaches, the 
practice of manipulation in this case specifically refers to using coloured filters to 
exaggerate the extent of water pollution. 
 
 
 
114 
Using a range of filters to modify image colours has been widely accepted in 
contemporary culture (Van Dijck, 2004), but it recognized as a kind of deceit rather 
than enhancement of reality in the context of environmental issues. As the 
interviewee Lei Qiqi has noted, ‘Environmental issues are not like other stuff, you 
cannot edit’; modifying the water colour is considered an unacceptable way to 
exaggerate the seriousness of the water pollution. It could lose the audiences’ trust 
and negatively impact the campaign’s reputation. As a result, the interviewees 
believe that ‘what is posted should be authentic, there is no rumour or drama in it’, 
and sharing the images without using any filters is intended to ‘show the original 
colours of the water’ and ‘objectively reveal the issues by the photos’. 
         
5.5.2 Amplifying part of the reality  
In order to pursue visual impact, River Watchers sometimes deliberately amplify a 
certain part of reality while capturing images at pollution locations. Sturken and 
Cartwright (2001) have noted that ‘the creation of an image through a camera lens 
always involves some degree of subjective choice through selection, framing and 
personalization’ (p. 16). According to the interviews, there are two methods River 
Watchers often adopt to highlight key points in the images: one is choosing a special 
aspect to frame the image, while the other is adjusting the composition by cutting and 
cropping. As a senior River Watcher, Yu Lixiang expressed that ‘in my photos, I 
mainly rely on the selected aspect and composition to illustrate the issues’. During 
my fieldwork, the River Watcher Qin Qiwei provided a photograph of a dead fish 
(see Figure 5.2) and shared his experience to illustrate how he deliberately 
emphasized a part of reality to make his image looks ‘better’. The meaning of 
‘better’, he explained, is having more visual impact.  
 
Once, Qin Qiwei tried to use his mobile phone to record a heavily polluted river near 
his home; however, due to the technical limitation of the camera lens, the pictures he 
captured could not reflect the water colour as dark as it actually looked. Then, he 
found that there was a dead fish floating on the river, and he decided to capture the 
dead fish from a foreground view to create visual impact. With a low angle and a 
close-up to see the environmental issue, Qin Qiwei emphasized the factor of the dead 
fish in the image. Through the image, he attempted to connect the fish’s death to the 
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water pollution in order to warn of the damage to local people’s health caused by the 
water pollution. Apparently, compared with a not very dark water colour, the dead 
fish is more likely to elicit people’s anxiety concerning the local drinking water 
resources. During the interview, he explained his purpose in amplifying the death of 
a fish in the image: 
‘In some circumstances, photos are used to magnify the event, just like the 
photo of a little dead fish I mentioned. From my perspective, the pollution 
was not such terrible as I saw on the spot, but people probably think the 
pollution is severe when they look at this photo. This is because photography 
is about which aspect or point you take’.  
Figure 5.2: Photograph of a dead fish (photo credit to Qin Qiwei). 
Adjusting the photograph composition by cropping to amplify a certain part of the 
reality is another approach that is pervasively adopted by River Watchers. According 
to the interviews, the purpose of cutting or cropping photographs is to ‘delete some 
unwanted content, which has nothing to do with the critical elements in the image’ 
rather than to mislead public opinions on the problem. In the digital age, cutting and 
cropping is one common and unavoidable manipulation approach and has been 
 
 
116 
recognized as a kind of ‘authentic manipulation’ (Hand, 2012) that has no relation to 
deceit or fabrication but refers to ‘a pragmatic way of producing an authentic account 
of what people wish to convey’ (p. 81). 
 
In everyday visual practice, River Watchers are not satisfied with simply 
documenting the environmental issues; in contrast, they have been trying to create 
images with a highly selective view that emphasizes some parts of reality and 
excludes others. Apart from the technical capacity mentioned above, the volunteers 
have actually adopted various approaches to shape the communicative possibilities of 
the images. As Hansen and Machin (2013) have argued, the ways of seeing images 
provided by producers are significantly connected to constructing viewers’ 
engagement, and what is deliberately constructed in images is intended to evoke a 
desired ideological alignment and response from the target audiences. Based on the 
collected data, the next section explores how River Watchers create a particular 
reality in their images on social media. 
 
5.6 Image events and visual rhetoric on social 
media  
5.6.1 Environmental image events on social media  
According to Deluca and Demo (2000), the term ‘image events’ refers to ‘staged acts 
of protest designed for media dissemination’, and it is one of the more central 
rhetorical activities that have been used to change the way people think about and act 
towards environmental issues. In Western society, civic ENGOs began to deploy 
image events and mass media in support of a wide range of environmental issues in 
the 1970s. For example, in 1975, Greenpeace activists steered little rubber 
speedboats to prevent a Soviet whaling ship from hunting whales off the coast of 
California. During the process of the action, Greenpeace documented how the 
whalers fired over the heads of the activists without warning. Although the action 
failed to save the whales at that moment, Greenpeace launched a very successful 
image event afterwards and provoked attention to saving whales around the world. 
Due to the stunning success of this operation, tactical image events have been 
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pervasively employed by Western radical ENGOs to promote public communication, 
create social problems, and form public opinion.  
 
In Chinese society, image events take on different characteristics but play a 
prominent role in providing ordinary people and marginalized groups with a new 
possibility for civic engagement. The examples of Chinese ENGOs employing image 
events on social media are countless. Since 2011, several small ENGOs have 
established a do-it-yourself air quality testing campaign across multiple cities in 
China. The campaign encourages citizens to test the air quality and post the results 
on social media in order to challenge the government’s lack of information 
transparency and promote citizens’ right to know about air pollution (J. H. Xu, 2014). 
As a local grassroots ENGO, Green Hunan employs image events on social media 
with a similar mechanism.  
However, in the case of Green Hunan, individuals actually play a more prominent 
role than organizations in producing the environmental image events. Unlike the 
producing process in Western society, which can often be radical, River Watchers 
create socially controversial topics and expands the possibilities of debate by staging 
the image events in a non-confrontational way. Based on the data collected from 
fieldwork, this section focuses on analysing the image events from a rhetorical 
perspective to explore how ordinary people adopt a non-confrontational way to 
articulate their dissent and resistance of local environmental injustice by provoking 
social controversy in the images.  
 
5.6.2 Visual rhetoric as an analytical tool  
Rhetoric can be visual even though it is still conceived as verbal discourse. A large 
body of scholars have contributed to enriching and extending the visual dimension of 
rhetoric (Kevin Michael DeLuca, 2012; Handa, 2004; Olson, Finnegan, & Hope, 
2008; Rice, 2004). According to Olson et al. (2008), visual rhetoric refers to the 
‘symbolic actions enacted primarily through visual means, made meaningful through 
culturally derived ways of looking and seeing and endeavouring to influence diverse 
publics’. In this sense, visual images work in rhetorical ways that primarily function 
to persuade the target audiences. Following this definition, Robert Cox (2015) has 
furthered the function of visual rhetoric in the research field of environmental 
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communication, which is ‘both pragmatically – to persuade – and constitutively, to 
construct or challenge a particular “seeing” of nature or what constitutes an 
environmental problem’ (p. 74).  
 
Beyond the process of seeing, visual rhetoric provides us with a central approach to 
focus on the process of meaning making of symbolic actions (Rice, 2004). Analysing 
the rhetoric in visual images helps us understand how image makers influence and 
construct reality for their audiences by conducting symbolic actions (Olson et al., 
2008). Based on a case study of radical environmental groups, J. Delicath and K. 
DeLuca (2003) have found that image events have been adopted as a kind of rhetoric 
activity to deliver argumentative fragments in the public sphere. Therefore, this 
section focuses on analysing the rhetoric of image events created by River Watchers 
in the campaign in order to explore how ordinary people present their claims and 
provoke public debate on a local environmental issue within a limited political space 
in China. According to the data collected from fieldwork, in what follows I examine 
the image events created by River Watchers from four perspectives: juxtaposition of 
oppositional symbols, visual comparison, creation of condensation symbols, and 
supplementation of visual pleasure.  
 
5.6.3 Wedding photographs: juxtaposition of oppositional 
symbols  
The set of wedding photographs next to the polluted river is the most successful 
image event in this campaign so far (see Figure 5.3). In September 2013, to help his 
friend have more stylish wedding photographs, Hong Wu suggested that the young 
couple take their wedding photographs next to a polluted river that they had 
monitored regularly since joining the campaign. The bridegroom Song Wei is also a 
River Watcher, and he agreed with the idea without hesitation. In the interview, Song 
Wei said that this idea has brought one of the most significant moments in his life. 
That night, when Hong Wu checked the photographs on his computer at home, he 
was completely impressed and uploaded the photographs to his Weibo account 
immediately. Beyond anyone’s expectations, the wedding photographs next to the 
polluted river went viral on Chinese social media in a very short time. On Weibo, not 
only ordinary netizens but also some Big Vs like Deng Fei (邓飞) reposted the 
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wedding photographs. Soon, the wedding photographs also hit many domestic 
mainstream media headlines, including the largest state-run media CCTV and 
People’s Daily. This set of photographs has successfully attracted public attention 
and evoked national debate by converting personal experience into a public event.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: One of the wedding photographs next to the polluted river (photo credit to 
Hong Wu). 
 
China’s internet is crowded by a cacophony of voices (Yang, 2009), so the 
volunteers have had to find an effective way to enhance the visibility of their appeals. 
With limited social capital, these grassroots activists’ voices are difficult to hear in 
the public space, especially facing the sheer number of text, data, images, and other 
information circulated on social media. According to the interview with Hong Wu, 
based on his previous work experience in the media industry, he has realized that ‘it 
would be hard to work out environmental issues without using some new means to 
draw public attention’. In this circumstance, some active River Watchers began to 
exploit opportunities to garner support and draw public attention by delivering 
affective messages in their images. The set of wedding photographs is one of the 
most prominent examples that effectively addressed the problem of distracted and 
disinterested spectators. On Hong Wu’s WeChat account Environmental Observation 
(环境观察), he expressed that the purpose of these wedding photographs is to 
‘awake more people’s awareness to care about the pollution issues in our 
surroundings’.  
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What the bridegroom Song Wei texted with the post of wedding photographs is low-
key and non-confrontational, just like any other regular monitoring post in this 
campaign. According to the report from the state-run medium Economic Information 
(2013),14 the textual content that Song Wei recorded was ‘No.14 observation point, 
the outfall at west of Tianxingdi River, Zhubu Port, Xiangtan City, the amount of 
water is large, many bubbles, stinky. pH test result is 7, water is colourful. 
Simultaneously, the expectation index for clean river is 10, happiness index is 10!’15 
Soon after the Weibo post was released, the audience seemed to realize the injustice 
and absurdity of local water pollution quickly from reading the wedding photographs 
post.  
 
A River Watcher whose Weibo user name is Xiangtan Maoge (湘潭矛戈) also 
witnessed the whole shooting process of the wedding photographs. After taking the 
photographs, he also uploaded and shared several wedding photographs through his 
Weibo account. Unlike Hong Wu and Song Wei, his post still exists on Weibo. 
Under the post, people’s responses to the wedding photographs demonstrate how 
some ordinary people have interpreted and made sense of the wedding photographs: 
This looks so unpleasant [in a wedding photo]. It strikes a chord in me 
(followed by a thumb up emoji). (See Figure 5.4)  
This is much more than just a wedding photo. It shows deep feelings about 
life! (See Figure 5.5) 
Wedding is such a beautiful thing. How could it be relatable to water 
pollution? I feel uncomfortable looking at it. (See Figure 5.6) 
 
Figure 5.4: Comment by Weibo user I Love Museum 
(Note: Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 are screenshots from Xiangtan Maoge’s Weibo post). 
 
 
14 http://dz.jjckb.cn/www/pages/webpage2009/html/2013-12/16/content_83965.htm?div=-1 
15 Since the initial Weibo post of the wedding photographs has disappeared, all the relevant 
information and data are collected from interviews, mainstream media reports, and other related River 
Watchers’ Weibo posts. 
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Figure 5.5: Comment by Weibo user Qin Keke’s aquarium. 
Figure 5.6: Comment by Weibo user Sun Haifeng. 
According to these reactions, two oppositional elements – a wedding ritual and 
polluted river water – ironically constructing a spectacular image is the main reason 
why this set of wedding photographs has had widespread public resonance. In the 
wedding photographs, we can see a happy young couple, particularly the bride 
wearing a beautiful white wedding dress and holding her husband’s hand while 
standing next to a polluted river. The photographer positioned the young couple (the 
most important part of the wedding ritual) in the foreground in the image. 
Simultaneously, in the background, there is an outfall discharging sewage into the 
river, where numerous white bubbles are floating. These spectacular images have 
been employed as the only way to break through the indifference of the intended 
audience (Szasz, 1994). As Nancy Fraser (1992, p. 123) has argued, spectacular 
images are the rhetoric of subaltern counterpublics who have been excluded from the 
forums of the public sphere, rather than the displays of rulers. 
The affective power of the wedding photographs is derived from the juxtaposition of 
two oppositional symbols. According to Rice (2004), oppositional elements consist 
of conflicting styles, generic violations, juxtaposition, paradox, irony, contrasting 
ornamentation, and other oppositional ideas. The set of wedding photographs 
successfully constructs a contrast by juxtaposing the sacred and the profane. In our 
common understanding, a white wedding dress has a sacred meaning, and the 
polluted river water obviously represents the dirty and profane. In the conventional 
cultural ritual, wedding photographs are supposed to be perfect and taken in a 
beautiful setting; anything related to the wedding ritual is about happiness and 
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excitement. In contrast, pollution always brings a series of negative feelings to 
people, such as anger, discomfort, frustration, and so on.  
 
Without a doubt, the juxtaposition of two operational symbols in the wedding 
photographs absolutely subverts people’s conventional aesthetics and perceptions of 
wedding photographs. This polarized contrast has successfully triggered public 
affective resonance concerning local water pollution. Meanwhile, this juxtaposition 
also makes a connection between a significant life moment and an ongoing pollution 
problem, which helps us to reflect on the relation between human beings and nature. 
The wedding photographs also close the distance between spectators and 
environmental issues and remind us of the existence and extent of environmental 
problems. 
 
5.6.4 Visual comparison: a memory practice 
Based on the interviews, some River Watchers frequently adopt the approach of 
visual comparison as a tactic to construct a public memory. In their everyday practice, 
some volunteers have captured the water quality at the same river for a long time, 
and have then presented the changes in water quality over a certain span by 
combining the images taken in the past and at present. For instance, one the 
interviewee Li Long recognized the combination of images as ‘data collection’ and 
expressed the following:  
 
‘I recorded pollution in a same spot every time, showcasing on Weibo the 
changes of water pollution over time, what the original look of the pollution 
was, how it had been changed afterward and what the river looked like when 
the pollution had been stopped. I think there is quite a bit of data here. But I 
knew nothing about communication at that time, and the only thing we 
wanted to do is let the government know the issues … I believe that we could 
make a comparison if we could pull all posted information together. We’ve 
found that there has been changes over time when we checking our posts, 
though our statistics is irregular. I think this is a kind of data’.  
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Given the success of the wedding photographs next to an outfall, Hong Wu invited 
Song Wei and his family to take another set of family photographs at the same place 
in April 2018. On his WeChat public account, Hong Wu put the two sets of images 
together (Figures 5.7 and 5.8) and clarified the changes that have occurred in both 
the people and the river with commentary. In the interview, Hong Wu explained his 
purpose of making the comparison: 
 
‘In the wedding photos it was only he and his wife that were standing next to 
the outfall, and now the family has four people. Not just this family, the 
outfall also has a big change. It was full with back water and white bubbles, 
but it is clear now. All happened in 5 years’. 
 
Based on these two examples, it is evident that the visual comparison connects the 
spatial and temporal variability of water quality and constructs the memory that 
serves as a record and a reminder of what happened and continues to happen in a 
local environment. As a result, the audiences who were absent before are thus able to 
reach back into the past to see what the water pollution looked like. By displaying a 
history of the event, the memory plays a role in shaping and mediating social 
understanding of the local environmental issues. 
 
For River Watchers, displaying a memory on social media is not only used to 
stimulate spectatorship but also to make their engagement more meaningful. In this 
case, through reflecting the positive changes, the visual comparison functions to 
provide proof of the impact of the campaign and confirm the contribution made by 
the volunteers. For example, in the published article on WeChat, Hong Wu wrote a 
commentary comparing the two sets of photographs: 
 
‘Persistence is victory, engagement brings changes …Now Xinagjiang River 
has experienced an unprecedented change. Heavy metal industry areas are 
closed down, the dirty and smelly water contaminated by the sewage has 
become clear and clean, outfalls used to be toxic to the living things but now 
is covered with green plants … the dream of transferring Xiangjiang River to 
the Rhine in Hunan is becoming true. Thanks for all who made contribution 
to it!’ 
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Figure 5.7: Wedding photograph taken in September 2013 (photo credits to Hong Wu). 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Family photograph taken in April 2018 (photo credits to Hong Wu). 
 
5.6.5 An image of a little boy: creation of a condensation 
symbol 
In their everyday visual practice, River Watchers also attempt to articulate their 
appeals for water pollutions in local areas by creating visual symbols in their images. 
For example, when exchanging follow-up questions with the interviewee Yuan 
Genliang via WeChat instant messaging, he provided me with a screenshot of one of 
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his Weibo posts (see Figure 5.9) to show his creativity in expressing the 
environmental issue. Yuan Genliang is a full-time worker in a local state-run factory, 
and he joined the campaign because he wants to do something meaningful in his 
spare time. The post he provided is accompanied by three photographs of a little boy, 
and one of them (Figure 5.10) shows that the boy is holding the test result of water 
quality on a dark night. In order to protect his son’s privacy, he has made the post 
invisible on Weibo and archived the photographs privately. In the interview, he 
explained why he took these photographs:  
‘This boy is my kid. I brought my kid to the spot because test the water quality 
near the outfalls has become a part of my everyday life, so it is quite nature 
that my family members also engage in the activity’.  
Although the Weibo post did not have any sentimental or provocative captions to 
describe the photographs, the little boy functions as a visual condensation symbol to 
call for environmental justice. According to Kjeldsen (2016), the conception of 
condensation symbols was probably first mentioned by Edward Sapir (1934), and it 
refers to ‘a highly condensed form of substitutive behaviour for direct expression, 
allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in conscious or unconscious form’ 
(p. 493). Doris Graber (1976) furthered this definition to be of ‘verbal condensation 
symbols’, which refer to ‘a name, word, phrase or maxim which stirs vivid 
impressions involving the listeners’ most basic values’ (p. 289). Compared with 
other ordinary symbols, a condensation symbol is more powerful to evoke people’s 
emotions, memories, or anxieties about some event or situation (Edelman, 1964), due 
to its connectedness in context (Kaufer & Carley, 1993). In this case, the image of 
the little boy could be deployed as a visual condensation symbol for people’s 
anxieties about local water pollution. 
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Figure 5.9: A screenshot of Yuan Genliang’s Weibo post, which was published on 9 
June 2014. Source provided by Yuan Genliang. 
Translation of the post content: #XiangjiangRiverWatchers## #LvshuiMonitorStation, 
Xinxiawan Port, 22.00pm, 9th June 2014. Small amount of water, no colour, has 
floccules floated on the river, PH 7. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: The photograph of a little boy (photo credit to Yuan Genliang). 
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According to Dunaway (2015), children have long served as popular emotional 
symbols to visualize the invisible dangers or threats in environmental campaigns. In 
this case, Yuan Genliang also mentioned that there were chemical plants located 
upstream of the river, and before they were shut down, they often secretly discharged 
sewage at night. Therefore, in a bid to determine the pollution evidence, Genliang 
sometimes went to the spot with his family after dinner. It is a universal 
understanding that children are innocent and vulnerable. When a little boy becomes a 
key visual motif in an image, it explicitly delivers a message that all groups of 
citizens are equally vulnerable in the face of environmental damage.  
 
There is another special connectedness with a historically rooted social perception 
that children are a reference to the future of human beings. In China, there is a well-
known metaphor that ‘children are the flowers of the motherland’. In the domestic 
media, children are repeatedly depicted as the country’s treasured citizens and the 
hope of the country. Therefore, an image of a little boy holding a test result of water 
pollution and standing against a completely dark background implies that the future 
of our environment is in danger if the problem of pollution cannot be solved. 
Connecting a child to the environmental issue in the images undoubtedly tells the 
audiences that protecting the environment is equivalent to protecting our children and 
our future. This implication cannot only evoke a sense of urgency about 
environmental protection but may also stir up parents’ empathy and concerns when 
seeing a child involved in environmental issues.  
 
In addition, these photographs of a little boy can be recognized as an invitation to 
encourage more children to engage in the environmental campaign. Yuan Genliang 
explicitly told the media that he intentionally fosters his son to be an environmental 
volunteer in the future and hopes his son will continue his career of environmental 
protection.16 In his book, Roger Hart (2013) has emphasized the necessity of 
involving children in local environmental practices in all countries and all 
communities and has pointed out that monitoring the physical environment is one of 
the ideal practices allowing children to see and understand many social issues. He 
 
16 http://wemedia.ifeng.com/56679410/wemedia.shtml. 
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has also argued that children are able to play a durable and valuable role in 
environmental issues if their participation is treated seriously.  
 
5.6.6 Scenery images: a visual pleasure supplement 
In their campaign, River Watchers do not merely show the ugliness of environmental 
damage but also provide their audiences with a kind of visual pleasure via scenery 
images. For example, the senior citizen Yu Lixiang, who joined the campaign after 
his retirement, always posts beautiful images of the rivers he routinely patrols with 
poetic descriptions in both Weibo and WeChat friend circles. In his images, the 
beauty of nature can be represented by different subjects such as a clean river, a 
bunch of lotus, a magnificent bridge, a pavilion built on the lake, and so on. Unlike 
devastation, images highlighting the beauty of nature make the audiences feel clean, 
restful, delicate, and fair. In order to document a beautiful view, Yu Lixiang 
sometimes even deliberately avoids recording the polluted part of river water. In his 
opinion, the scenery images he captures function to ‘mirror the ugliness of 
pollution … awake more people’s awareness to act and protect our beautiful 
homeland … tell people that the life we have is beautiful and we should cherish the 
natural resources and protect the environment’. 
 
Visual pleasure in scenery photographs apparently inspires the audiences’ love of 
nature and its beauty. Through restoring the original beautiful appearance of local 
surroundings, the scenery photographs play a role in reminding the audiences how 
the local environment is supposed to be. In the past decade, Chinese citizens have 
suffered from the consequences of environmental degradation caused by the dramatic 
development of industry. The scenery photographs attempt to emind us that the 
relation between humans and nature ought to be as harmonious as what Yu shows in 
his images and encourages us to live in a healthy environment and enjoy the scenic 
beauty of the world. In addition, constantly share the ugliness of pollution could 
repel the audiences, but the visual pleasure in scenery images can comfort people’s 
anxious and restless emotions while facing the environmental damage as well as 
encourage people to reflect on their relations with nature in contemporary society. 
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In addition, scenery images have been employed as a tactical way to recruit 
campaign members and obtain social support. According to my interview with Zhou 
Yun, she has realized that the beautiful views of the local environment showcase the 
significant social change made by River Watchers. By reflecting the changes to the 
local environment, the scenery images imply to potential participants a sense of 
accomplishment that could be gained by joining the campaign. In this sense, the 
scenery images actually deliver the campaign’s message that ‘engagement brings 
change’ to the public and also prove that ordinary people are capable of influencing 
environmental issues. In her interview, Zhou Yun commented on the role of scenery 
images in mobilizing the campaign: 
‘Showing the positive changes to the public can encourage more local 
residents to join the campaign and raise their awareness on protecting the 
environment in our hometown. Actually, many people want to but are afraid 
to join our campaign … some even think that what we are doing cannot solve 
the problems or raise the government concern’. 
 
5.7 Conclusion  
Even though the environmental advocacy campaign seems to be depoliticized, the 
volunteers actually re-politicize it during the process of creating image events on 
social media. Due to the current institutional and political system, civic ENGOs have 
to play a role as a co-operator rather than an adversary of the government. Instead of 
mobilizing large-scale social movements, ENGOs always encourage their volunteers 
to take moderate means to against environmental injustice and defend their rights. In 
this case, it is evident that Green Hunan has adopted all necessary means to maintain 
the campaign from a depoliticized stance. However, the campaign has proved that 
simply and repeatedly documenting the reality of the issues is less likely to meet the 
affective needs of audiences regarding social issues and maintain long-term public 
attention on social media. To enhance the visibility of the campaign, River Watchers 
choose to ‘make something different’ in everyday practice. Based on the analysis of 
visual rhetoric in the collected images, the volunteers have not merely embedded 
their dissent and appeals in the images but have also provided the audiences with ‘an 
interesting version of reality’ (DeLuca & Demo, 2000, p. 245) in order to create a 
social controversy. Therefore, this chapter argued that the environmental activists in 
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this case actually ‘frame’ rather than ‘document’ reality in their images. In the 
process of framing, River Watchers create affective power to increase the visual 
value in the image events in order to attract public attention. Although not every 
image created by River Watchers is capable of evoking public debate, the 
combination of image events and social media have provided ordinary people with a 
new possibility of engaging in public events in the context of China. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion: Understanding 
Visual Social Media, Affect, and Civic 
Engagement  
This thesis investigated the role of everyday visual social media practice in 
facilitating the new bottom-up form of civic engagement in China. By studying three 
notable environmental cases, this research found that Chinese citizens have fully 
engaged their creativity in various forms of everyday visual content and circulated 
them on Weibo and WeChat to enhance the visibility of their voices. Adopting visual 
image to facilitate, mobilize, and organize environmental protests through media has 
been commonly practiced around the world. However, it is still significant for 
Chinese citizens to move towards a new form of civic engagement in the digital age. 
Drawing the findings of the case studies together, I argue that everyday visual 
content on social media has opened up an alternative space for civic engagement in 
China.  
Because of the historical, political, and cultural differences, I must emphasize that 
the understanding of civic engagement in the context of China should be different 
from democratic countries. In the thesis, I define the new form of civic engagement 
as Chinese citizens articulating their everyday opinions about public events through 
producing and circulating diverse visual content on social media platforms. Although 
this networked civic engagement is personalized, issue-based, fragmented, and not 
sustained, it is meaningful in enhancing the visibility of hidden issues and fighting 
for environmental justice for Chinese citizens.  
In order to elaborate on the argument, the last chapter of the thesis addresses the 
research questions proposed in the introductory chapter by linking the findings of the 
three case studies. This concluding chapter begins with a brief summary of the main 
findings and a restatement of the main arguments from case studies. Since image 
memory construction has been adopted to varying degrees in the three case studies, 
 
 
132 
this section also summarizes the commonalities and differences of image memory 
construction in articulating ordinary Chinese’s opinions. In this section, I answer the 
first and second subsidiary research questions outlined in the introductory chapter 
through illustrating how ordinary Chinese cerate and circulate their opinions in the 
forms of citizen journalism, culture jamming, and image event on social media. The 
following section focuses on what this PhD study can contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship among affect and emotions, visual social media 
practices, and civic engagement in the context of China. To address the third and 
fourth subsidiary research questions, this section focuses on demonstrating that how 
affect and emotions effectively help Chinese citizens to connect distant social media 
users and enhance the visibility of their opinions. Finally, the chapter reflects on the 
limitations of the civic engagement enabled by visual social media and raises several 
questions on future research in relation to visual social media and civic engagement.  
 
6.1 Thesis summary and main findings 
By reviewing the existing literature in the second chapter, I summarized China’s 
problematic environmental governance, the complexity of the internet censorship 
system, the unique advantages of visual social media practices in articulating 
ordinary people’s everyday opinions, and the importance of affect and emotions in 
forming collective actions. In Chapter 2, I addressed the research gap in the role of 
everyday visual social media practices in moving Chinese citizens towards a new 
form of civic engagement. Moreover, I determined that one aim of the thesis was to 
integrate affect and emotions into visual social media practices, in order to illustrate 
the impact of visual social media practices in facilitating civic engagement in China. 
 
In the third chapter, I drew upon the perspective of citizen journalism to examine the 
role of visual social media practices in times of disaster. Through exploring the case 
of the massive Tianjin explosions in 2015, I found that the participants performed a 
non-professional journalistic practice via storytelling. In the immediate aftermath of 
the explosions, the urgent demand for information from the citizens and the absence 
of professional journalists initially evoked citizen journalism practices. Although the 
disaster received extensive coverage by the domestic media afterwards, the 
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participants still actively updated the first-hand visual images and the stories behind 
them on WeChat.  
 
By borrowing the concept of ‘gatewatcher’ from Axel Bruns (2018), I demonstrated 
that the local residents supplemented or supplanted the information of the 2015 
Tianjin explosions through their non-professional journalistic practices. After the 
explosions, the media reports were highly controlled, and the public distrusted the 
official information. This is mainly because the Chinese government has a historical 
record of under-reporting and cover-ups following crisis events (Zeng et al., 2019). 
As a result, rumours were pervasive on Chinese social media. In these circumstances, 
the first-hand stories and visual images were used to refute rumours and break the 
information monopoly. Depending on their experiences and new values, the 
participants acted as gatewatchers to decide which stories should be heard. Other 
social media users were thus able to access unknown and unexpected information 
about the explosions. The other social media users who were previously uninformed 
were able to be more cognizant of what was happening at the scene of the explosions. 
The first-hand information received through trusted social networks on WeChat is 
often considered credible for outsiders.  
 
More importantly, what makes the stories of the 2015 Tianjin explosions distinct in 
this thesis is that they completely focus on ‘us’: local residents who suffered in the 
disaster or contributed to the relief work. Storytelling is an essential part of human 
experience that occurs at all levels of society, and individuals discursively construct a 
community and imagine themselves as its members through sharing collective stories 
(Anderson, 1991). In this case, the emotional stories expressed the presences of the 
interviewees and feelings about how they perceived the impacts of the massive 
explosions. By embedding sadness and sympathy in the locally relevant stories and 
circulating them on WeChat, the participants shaped a strong sense of community 
and facilitated civic engagement at the neighbourhood level in a time of disaster. 
Confronting with information control, non-professional journalistic storytelling was 
also adopted as an intervention in the official discourse.    
 
Structured around the idea of playful resistance, the fourth chapter examined the role 
of culture jamming in mocking the government’s unfilled responsibility to solve the 
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problem of air pollution in Beijing. Confronted with increasingly deteriorated air 
quality, local residents in Beijing prominently adopted culture jamming as an 
everyday response to express their dissent. Through appropriating and sabotaging 
well-known existing cultural and political materials, Chinese jammers creatively 
exploited humour and irony to condemn the government. Although none of the 
participants participated in producing the culture jamming, they expressed their 
opinions by circulating the images through their social media accounts during the 
period of smog. 
 
In this chapter, I suggested that through producing and consuming culture jamming 
on social media, Chinese netizens have created an online carnival that ‘is not a 
spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, and everyone participates because its 
very idea embraces all the people’ (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 7). In this sense, I argued that 
Chinese netizens have built their own world in which to criticize the undesired 
environmental conditions freely by creating and circulating culture jamming, and that 
laughter driven by the humour and irony within the culture jamming is the core 
communicative power and a strategy to make the condemnation more visible in a 
world controlled by the government. 
 
In Chapter 5, I explored the role of an image event in a social media-facilitated 
environmental advocacy campaign in Hunan Province, China. In this image-
dominated online campaign, a group of grassroots environmental volunteers have 
prominently exploited the power of visual images to draw public attention to the 
issue of local water pollution through Weibo. Compared with the other two cases in 
the thesis, this one indicates a more complex relationship among three key sectors: 
the local government, ENGOs, and citizens. As scholars (P. Ho, 2007b; G. Yang & 
Calhoun, 2007) have stated, Chinese ENGOs and environmentalists consider 
themselves partners with the government, and China’s environmentalism is thus 
characterized as depoliticized. In this case, the ENGO recruit volunteers help the 
local government monitor water pollution, which is mainly caused by the local 
chemical plants. The ENGO also designed an online communication agenda to 
ensure that the Weibo posts updated by volunteers report the issues accurately and 
rationally. To avoid the campaign attracting more public attention on social media, 
the local government officials opened an informal communication channel with the 
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volunteers. The volunteers have recognized directly reporting the issues to the 
officials via telephone calls and text messages and obtaining feedback in a short 
timeframe as their primary problem-solving approach.  
 
However, due to the difficulty and complexity of environmental problem-solving, 
these volunteers do not always ‘partner’ with the local government. When the 
informal channel failed to solve the problems, the volunteers began to fight for 
environmental justice in their own way. According to the collected data, the 
volunteers have created image events on Weibo. J. W. Delicath and K. M. DeLuca 
(2003) have emphasized that image events are an argumentative practice intended to 
shape public opinions by ‘delivering unstated propositions, offering indirect claims, 
and advancing objections with dramatic imagery’ (p. 322). In this sense, I adopted 
visual rhetoric analysis as an approach to examine the propositions, claims, and 
objections behind the visual images. As a result, I argue that this group of grassroots 
volunteers have made an effort to enhance the visibility and influence of their voice 
by framing the reality of water pollution in everyday visual social media practice, 
and they have successfully re-politicized the campaign by creating image events on 
social media. 
 
In addition, memory construction is another important visual social media practice 
adopted by the participants in the study, and it has been creatively unfolded in 
different forms. In the first case, because the domestic mass media were banned from 
reporting the one-year anniversary of the 2015 Tianjin explosions, most participants 
updated the visual images they took one year ago and shared the stories behind them 
on WeChat to commemorate the tragedy themselves. By presenting these memories, 
the participants intended to break the silence and remind people to remember what 
happened in the past. In the second and third cases, the participants constructed 
memories about the environmental issues through visual comparison. The forms of 
visual comparison are creative. In the case of Beijing smog, the participant Zou Yi 
made a composite of 365 photographs that were taken every morning at the same 
place to show a trajectory of the change in air quality during a year in Beijing. 
Additionally, the freelance photographer Song Juqiang and the environmental 
volunteer Hong Wu constructed memories by comparing the past and the present of 
environmental issues in order to emphasize the changes. The difference between the 
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two is that Song emphasizes the seriousness of the current air pollution by awakening 
people’s memory of the good environment, while Hong proves the effectiveness of 
the campaign by presenting the river is clear from pollution.    
 
In this study, I suggest that the participants challenged the transparency of 
information by constructing the memory of environmental issues. In the first and 
second cases, the information was highly controlled by the authorities, and the 
participants distrusted the official information. Therefore, visual images were used to 
break the information control and question the accuracy of official information. The 
memories of the environmental issues are communicated by eyewitness images. 
According to Barbie Zelizer (2007), viewers commonly consider the information 
delivered by eyewitness images to be credible and authoritative, because the 
participants experienced the moments of the events and the visual images were taken 
at the scene. Through playing a role as evidence to present a ‘fact’, mnemonic 
practices are used to challenge the transparency of information by making factual 
claims. 
 
The three cases studied here have shed a light on the potential of visual social media 
in opening up a new form of civic engagement in China. Since civil organizations are 
highly controlled and have taken a non-confrontational stance towards the 
government, individuals play a vital role in hosting this networked form of civic 
engagement. Therefore, visual social media have become a critical tool for Chinese 
individuals articulating their voice and engaging in various forms of protests, 
campaigns, and social movements. Compared with selfies, memes, emojis. etc, the 
three forms of visual social media practices mentioned in this study is less 
dominantly used in previous China’s civic engagement. However, the the forms of 
reflect the latest trend of how Chinese individuals engage in environmental issues in 
Chinese society. 
 
The three case studies also led me to consider why visual content on social media is 
able to provide an alternative space for civic engagement. A key function of visual 
content in circumventing internet censorship is certainly an initial and basic factor. In 
China, internet censorship is an important barrier that limits the freedom of speech. 
Even worse, after living in such an online environment for years, self-censorship has 
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become deeply rooted in Chinese netizens’ minds and changed their methods of 
everyday online communication. They carefully choose the subjects they wish to 
express and are quite cautious about the content of those expressions on social media. 
Due to the advantages of visual images in circumventing internet censorship, 
Chinese citizens are able to articulate their opinions relatively freely in this 
alternative space on social media platforms. However, as I have reiterated in the 
thesis, internet censorship is an important rather than the ultimate motivation that 
drives Chinese netizens to choose visual images when engaging in environmental 
issues. Beyond bypassing censorship, the main intention of the participants in 
adopting visual social media practices is to attract more attention to the 
environmental issues. In the context of China, it is fair to say that visual social media 
is one of few tools that can help ordinary Chinese to be heard. 
Drawing together the findings from the case studies, I have demonstrated that these 
various visual social media practices are an example of creativity in the service of 
enhancing the visibility of ordinary people’s opinions on social media. In this 
research, creativity is recognized as how participants craft and manage affect and 
emotions to evoke public attention in the visual images of environmental issues. 
Affect and emotions work as a form of capital (Ahmed, 2013). How affect and 
emotions are incorporated in visual images is connected with the processes of 
meaning-making. In this sense, I understand that incorporating affect and emotions in 
everyday visual images is intended to gain communicative value. However, what 
affect and emotions have been incorporated in the visual images responding to 
environmental issues? How are affect and emotions expressed, performed, and 
intentionally provoked by everyday visual content on social media? In the next 
section, this study strives to illustrate how visual social media pave the way for a 
new form of civic engagement in China. 
6.2 Affect and emotions in networked civic 
engagement  
Various affect and emotions have been exploited to facilitate the new form of civic 
engagement on China’s social media. In digital society, there is no place like social 
media where affect and emotions are so abundant and foregrounded (Nikunen, 2019). 
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Due to its centrality on social media, visual images have become a prominent vehicle 
for exploring how affect and emotions are used to articulate, evoke, and circulate 
everyday opinions on environmental issues in China. In order to understand the 
considerable impact of visual social media on forming civic engagement, one aim of 
this thesis was to illustrate how affect and emotions were integrated into visual 
images by ordinary Chinese. Therefore, this section seeks to elaborate on what affect 
and emotions were strategically crafted in the various forms of visual images by 
ordinary Chinese and the significance of affect and emotions in facilitating the new 
form of civic engagement on social media. 
 
Sadness and sympathy are the major emotions strongly presented in the non-
professional journalistic practice of storytelling in the case of the 2015 Tianjin 
explosions. These emotions directly link to local residents’ horror, grief, and even 
trauma. Unlike the conventional routines and values of journalism, which often keep 
some distance from emotions to maintain their objectivity (Pantti, 2010; Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2013), these non-professional journalistic practices produced emotional, 
subjective, and personalized forms of narrative, which are shaped by the vernacular 
of lived experience (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2016). In this case, the emotional stories 
mainly focus on the topics of the suffering of local residents, the contributions made 
by the volunteers, and young firefighters’ sacrifices, which evoked sadness and 
sympathy to attract attention. At the same time, the eyewitnesses’ visual images of 
the conditions on the ground moulded the authenticity and credibility of the stories. 
In the face of strict information control concerning the explosions, these non-
professional journalistic practices gave local residents a voice and provided outsiders 
who may not have venues of access to first-hand information with opportunities to 
obtain such information. More importantly, through sharing the stories and emotions 
with trusted social networks on WeChat, the practice of non-professional journalistic 
storytelling formed a sense of community among local residents and thus invited 
more dialogue on the disaster. 
 
In her book, Lilie Chouliaraki (2013) has proposed that the emotional appeals in 
humanitarian images in Western society have recently transformed from grand 
emotions into playfulness and reflexivity. This turn is also evident on China’s social 
media. In the case of Beijing smog, ordinary people’s emotional appeals regarding 
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the air pollution were prominently articulated in the form of culture jamming, which 
alters the familiar meaning of existing cultural and political materials in a playful 
style. By creating laughter in an ironic way, culture jamming attempts to convey 
people’s anger and resistance. This is what Michael Mulkay (1988) has called the 
serious mode of humour. In this mode, humour is more used to show the changes that 
have occurred and create the expectation of future changes than whether it can bring 
people laugh (Sorensen, 2008). The serious intentions are present behind the humour. 
In the context of China, as an important strategy for criticizing the government’s 
unfilled responsibility concerning air pollution, ironic humour helps creators and 
circulators to avoid the potential political risks. In this research, although there were 
no participants involved in the production of the culture jamming, they engaged in 
the issue via archiving and circulating.  
 
In their social media-facilitated campaign, the grassroots volunteers called River 
Watchers attempted to create a shocking effect by framing the reality of water 
pollution in images. The solution to the water pollutions adopted by the River 
Watchers is aggregating public attention to hold the local authorities more 
accountable in preventing and improving water pollution by recording and 
circulating visual images on Weibo. To increase the effectiveness of information 
circulation, the volunteers quickly began to evoke public emotions by creating the 
images, although the ENGO designed an online communication agenda to keep the 
volunteers in a rational and non-confrontational stance. These everyday images 
amplify the severity of the issues, juxtapose incongruous elements, and construct the 
relationship between human beings and nature. Through creating shock effect, the 
images provoke despair, anger, and sympathy to attract more public attention. 
However, repeatedly emphasizing negative emotions is more likely to cause apathy, 
indifference, and compassion fatigue (Chouliaraki, 2013). Therefore, the volunteers 
have also emphasized hope to the public. For example, after successfully creating an 
image event of wedding photographs taken next to a polluted river, the volunteer 
Hong Wu invited the couple and their children to take group photographs of the 
family at the same place five years later. By presenting the improvement of the water 
quality in the images, the volunteers conveyed the feeling of hope to draw attention 
and encourage action.  
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6.3 Critical reflections  
Affect and emotions embedded in visual social media practices have certainly made 
censorship difficult, bypassed the agenda set in the mainstream media, and enhanced 
the individualization of civic engagement in China. It is no exaggeration to say that 
visual content on social media has become an alternative place that allows 
comparatively free speech on ‘politically sensitive’ topics to exist. In China, 
environmental activism often performed on social media. However, as the central 
government has increasingly strengthened control over the society, it is rarely to see 
environmental protests occurred neither online nor offline in recent years. In this 
circumstance, with a variety of visual affordances, visual social media and mobile 
technologies have provided individuals with new possibilities and a lower threshold 
to engage in environmental issues, particularly for grassroots and marginalized 
groups who have very limited cultural and social capital. Within visual social media, 
China’s environmental activism emerged a series of new practices. It is fair to say 
that there is not much public space like visual social media could allow the 
environmental activism to exist in the context of China.  
 
The three interesting cases in the thesis have proven that Chinese individuals are able 
to discuss and comment on public affairs and even negotiate with the government 
because they have been informed and empowered by visual social media. However, 
this alternative space for civic engagement is contingent and ephemeral. More 
importantly, the hope that visual social media practices will achieve any genuine 
political or social changes to Chinese society is slim. In this sense, in order to 
examine the civic implications of visual social media and reflect on its limitations, 
this section focuses on discussing the extent to which visual social media could 
enhance the visibility of Chinese individuals’ articulation and empower individuals 
to require the government to be more transparent and accountable. 
 
The three empirically based and theoretically grounded cases studied here 
demonstrate that the extent of networked civic engagement depends on the nature of 
the environmental issues rather than on how creatively the visual social media 
practices were employed. The 2015 Tianjin explosions were a human-induced 
tragedy that killed hundreds of people and caused severe environmental and health 
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consequences in the local area. Since the disaster had great potential to trigger large-
scale protests and challenge the legitimacy of the current political power, the 
authorities implemented harsh control over the mainstream media and social media 
and left no space for negotiation. In comparison, it seems that the government is 
more willing to negotiate in the case of Beijing smog and River Watchers. In 
particular, because the central government relies on civil organizations to hold the 
local governments accountable on environmental governance, the civic organizations 
and environmental volunteers have thus obtained the legitimacy to negotiate with 
local officials on the issue of water pollution via both formal and informal channels.  
The participatory form of civic engagement enabled by visual social media practices 
is self-organized and personalized. In the face of internet censorship and information 
control over mainstream media, visual social media and mobile technologies allow 
diverse voices including ‘lived, private experiences and emotions’ (W. Chen & 
Reese, 2015, p. 6) to be articulated in public. In the three cases studied, the 
participants spontaneously and pragmatically played the roles of producer, distributor, 
and critic to engage in the environmental issues. In this sense, I suggest that the 
actions formed by visual social media practices as addressed in this thesis are 
connective rather than collective. As Zizi Papacharissi (2015) has stated in her book, 
collective action requires a negotiation of a certain meaning, consequences, and a 
particular ideology. Without coordination, consensus-building, and leadership 
(Papacharissi, 2015), the form of civic engagement in this research is ‘inclusive of 
different personal reasons for contesting a situation that needs to be changed’ 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 744). Although the online campaign was initially 
organized and mobilized by the local ENGO in the case of the River Watchers, the 
volunteers actually had more autonomy to make their voices audible on social media 
by framing the reality of water pollution in their everyday images. In this sense, the 
visual social media practices connectively rather than collectively formed individuals’ 
consensuses around the environmental issues. Without a central decision-making 
authority, visual social media-facilitated connective actions are thus able to diffuse 
information easily and quickly. 
In addition, the three cases studied reveal that the limitation of the participatory form 
of civic engagement is that its eventual impact is contingent and ephemeral. The 
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extent to which individuals are able to make their articulations visible on social 
media depends on whether they can attract attention from national elites and mass 
media. Embedding a variety of affect and emotions in visual content has become a 
prevalent tactic adopted by ordinary Chinese to make their voices heard and even 
push the boundaries set by the authorities. While focusing on specific local demands, 
a few examples in the thesis have successfully extended the geographic outreach 
through domestic and even global media coverage. However, apart from the River 
Watchers case, which is supported by the ENGO, the trajectory and eventual impact 
of the civic engagement in the other two cases is ephemeral. More importantly, 
ordinary Chinese have no intention of challenging the legitimacy of the government 
when they connectively respond to environmental issues via visual social media 
practices.  
 
With the prevalence of visual images on social media today, it is evident that civic 
engagement is more visual than in the past around the world. This thesis captures a 
new form of participation in environmental issues at the level of everyday life 
afforded by visual social media. In the visual social media-enabled alternative space, 
ordinary Chinese across the country are connected to compete with official discourse 
and struggle for visibility and legitimacy of articulation. With the help of visual 
social media and mobile technologies, the new form of networked civic engagement 
generates and sustains public discussions on contentious issues filtered by the 
authorities. Ordinary Chinese speaking out contentiously on China’s social media 
have to contend with censorship, political regulations, and potential risks. Therefore, 
these conditions force Chinese citizens to think carefully about what kinds of actions 
they can engage in (Spires, 2011). Though the eventual impact of the new form of 
civic engagement is contingent and ephemeral, it allows previously unseen opinions 
and discussions to exist and be heard and simultaneously provides citizens with a 
relatively safe place to avoid potential political risks. However, due to the increasing 
development of censorship technologies for images, I am also concerned that the 
form of civic engagement enabled by visual social media will be more difficult in the 
future. 
 
Concerning the increasingly important role of visual social media in Chinese society, 
there are a few questions that could become the subject of further research. First, 
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Susan Sontag (2003) is concerned that the proliferation of images of suffering has led 
to compassion fatigue, which undermines people’s feelings, connections, and actions. 
In this sense, although visual social media practices are newly emerged in China, 
what if the public is fatigued with the existing visual representations of 
environmental issues? Are visual social media practices still able to facilitate civic 
engagement in China? Second, with the rapid rise of short-form mobile videos on 
apps like Tiktok in recent years, it appears that the environment on China’s visual 
social media has become entertainment-focused and commercialized. Although civic 
engagement can be facilitated by unexpected forms and actors on the internet (W. 
Chen & Reese, 2015), how do ordinary Chinese engage in public affairs on the new 
visual social media? 
 
In summary, based on three notable and interesting environmental cases, this thesis 
has illustrated the power of visual social media in facilitating the networked form of 
civic engagement and opened the door to more specific and in-depth discussions of 
the social, cultural, and political impact of networked civic engagement in the 
context of China. From the perspective of environmental participation, this thesis has 
demonstrated the importance of the unique combination of visual images and affect 
to make powerful statements, evoke public resonance, and accelerate information 
circulation in the context of China. In visual social media studies, however, more 
scholars are still needed to draw attention to the role that visual images and 
affectivity play in relation to connective actions. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
1. After the environmental issues occurred, what visual materials (such as
picture, video, geographic location, etc.), have you posted on Chinese social
media platforms, such as Weibo and WeChat?
2. If you indicated your geographic information when you posted those visual
materials on social media, could you please tell me why?
3. Is there any textual content matching with the posted visual materials?
4. Have your posts of the environmental issues caused any responses from other
netizens, such as re-post, comment and like etc.?
5. Why do you use visual social media to response to relevant environmental
issues?
6. Among these social media accounts you are following, what type of visual
content impressed you when environmental issues occurred? Why?
7. What visual content you have re-posted or commented on Weibo or WeChat
when the environmental issues occurred? Why?
8. Do you think you can achieve your anticipated goals through by using visual
social media? Why?
9. What visual content that you either posted or followed has been deleted?
Have they been censored or deleted voluntarily?
10. After the environmental issues occurred, have you posted any relevant visual
content on foreign social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram? If
you have, can you please tell me why?
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Appendix 2: Participant Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
HREC Project 
Number: HER2016-0263 
Project Title: Visual Social Media and Vernacular Responses to Environmental Issues in China 
Principal 
Investigator: Dr. Tama Leaver (Senior Lecturer) 
Student 
researcher: Shanshan Liu 
Version Number: 1 
Version Date: 25 July 2016 
• I have read, {or Shanshan Liu has read to me in my first language}, the
information statement version listed above and I understand its contents.
• I believe I understand the purpose, extent and possible risks of my
involvement in this project.
• I voluntarily consent to take part in this research project.
• I have had an opportunity to ask questions and I am satisfied with the
answers I have received.
• I understand that this project has been approved by Curtin University
Human Research Ethics Committee and will be carried out in line with the
National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (2007).
• I understand I will receive a copy of this Information Statement and
Consent Form.
• I consent to give the permission that all the visual materials I provide can
be used in the researcher’s thesis, academic conference and publications.
Participant Name 
Participant 
Signature 
Date 
Declaration by researcher: I have supplied an Information Letter and Consent 
Form to the participant who has signed above, and believe that they 
understand the purpose, extent and possible risks of their involvement in this 
project. 
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